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INCLUSION MATTERS IN AFRICAMaitreyi Bordia Das

Sabina Anne Espinoza

ADVANCE EDITION

INCLUSION MATTERS IN AFRICAMaitreyi Bordia Das

Sabina Anne Espinoza

ADVANCE EDITION

The text of this advance edition is a work in progress for the forthcoming book, Inclusion Matters in Africa. A PDF of the final book, once published, will be available at https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/ and http://documents.worldbank.org/, and print copies can be ordered at www.amazon.com. Please use the final version of the book for citation, reproduction and adaptation purposes.

© 2019 International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / The World Bank1818 H Street NW, Washington, DC 20433Telephone: 202-473-1000; Internet: www.worldbank.org

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Cover photo: Geoffrey Ernest Katantazi Mukasa, Red Face A, 21st century, mixed media collage on paper. Artist from Uganda. Image courtesy of the World Bank Group Art Program.

Cover design: Takayo Muroga Fredericks

INCLUSION MATTERS IN AFRICA iii

CONTENTS

Foreword vi

Acknowledgments viii

Abbreviations x

Overview 1Main Messages 1

Why Social Inclusion? Why Now? 2

Social Inclusion: A Primer 4

What Does Social Inclusion Add to the Focus on Poverty Reduction? 6

Africa Is Striding: Who’s Left Behind? 8

How Does Social Exclusion Play Out in Africa? 16

Social Inclusion Can Be Achieved if It Is a Conscious Choice for Societies 18

Change toward Social Inclusion Is within Reach 20

Endnotes 30

CHAPTER 1 The Motivation and Conceptual Clarity 32What Do We Mean by Social Inclusion? 35

What Does Social Inclusion Add to Poverty Reduction? 39

Costs of Social Exclusion: What Are the Channels? 40

Analytic Strategy and Road Map 45

Endnotes 47

CHAPTER 2 Africa Is Striding: Who’s Left Behind? 48Demographic Trends and Human Capital Accumulation 50

Economic Transitions 55

Technology and Digital Inclusion 61

Climate-Related Events and Trends 67

Conflict and Fragility: Challenges to Social Inclusion 68

Political and Civic Participation and Social Movements 70

Concluding Reflections 73

Endnotes 74

CHAPTER 3 How Does Social Exclusion Play Out in Africa? 76Legal, Administrative, and Social Structures 78

Concluding Reflections 97

Endnotes 98

CHAPTER 4 Toward Greater Inclusion in Africa 100Who Drives Change, and How? 102

Programs and Policies toward Social Inclusion: Reflections on the African Experience 107

Concluding Reflections 119

Endnotes 124

CHAPTER 5 Final Reflections 126

Annexes 130

References 134

iv CONTENTS

BOXES

Box O.1 Does Ethnicity Matter for Poverty in Africa? 7

Box O.2 Disability in Africa: The Importance of Advocacy, Data, and Analysis 9

Box O.3 The Importance of Place and Peace for Social Inclusion 13

Box O.4 Legal Reform for Women in Africa 23

Box 1.1 World Bank Regional Strategy for Africa 34

Box 2.1 Ability, Opportunity, and Dignity for African Youth 52

Box 2.2 Albinism and Human Capital Outcomes 54

Box 2.3 Ethnicity and Poverty in Rural and Urban Africa 57

Box 2.4 Areas and Peoples: North and Northeast Kenya 66

Box 2.5 Urban Floods: Disproportionate Effects 67

Box 4.1 Talking About Change: Stigma and Discrimination 103

Box 4.2 Talking About Change: Female Genital Mutilation 105

Box 4.3 Participatory Budgeting in West Pokot, Kenya 106

Box 4.4 Legal Reform for Women in Africa 110

Box 4.5 In the Sahel: A Focus on Young Women 114

Box 4.6 Reintegration for Ex-Combatants 116

Box 4.7 Building Infrastructure Doesn’t Mean It Will Be Used 117

TABLES

Table O.1 Illustrative Interventions for Social Inclusion in Markets, Services, and Spaces 26

Table 1.1 Costs of Social Exclusion: Mapping Some Channels 41

Table 4.1 Illustrative Interventions for Social Inclusion in Markets, Services, and Spaces 120

INCLUSION MATTERS IN AFRICA v

FIGURES

Figure O.1 The Social Inclusion Framework 5

Figure O.2 Growth of Global Urbanization, 1950–2050 11

Figure O.3 Smartphone Usage by Age, Gender, and Income Level 15

Figure O.4 Perceptions of Unequal Treatment under the Law 19

Figure BO.4.1 Improvement in the Women, Business and the Law Index, 2009–2018 22

Figure 1.1 The Social Inclusion Framework 37

Figure 1.2 Identity Is Salient to Social Inclusion 38

Figure 2.1 Fertility Decline across the Globe 50

Figure 2.2 Female and Male Literacy Rates, Ages 15 and Above 53

Figure 2.3 Poverty Rates in Fragile and Nonfragile Countries 56

Figure 2.4 Distribution of Ethnic Groups in Bottom Wealth Quintile 56

Figure 2.5 Depth of Food Deficit 58

Figure 2.6 Top Problems Facing Countries across Africa 59

Figure 2.7 Smartphone Usage by Gender, Age, Education, and Income 62

Figure 2.8 The Coming of the Urban Age, 1950–2050 63

Figure 2.9 Access to Electricity and Water Services 65

Figure 2.10 Forcibly Displaced Persons, 2012–2017 69

Figure 2.11 Forcibly Displaced Africans, 2012–2017 69

Figure 2.12 Civic Engagement among 18- to 35-Year-Olds in 16 Countries, 2002–2015 71

Figure 3.1 Laws and Policies (I) 80

Figure 3.2 Laws and Policies (II) 81

Figure 3.3 Groups Reporting Avoidance of Health Care due to Stigma and 86 Discrimination around HIV Treatment, 2014–2017

Figure 3.4 Women’s Acceptance of Domestic Violence 87

Figure 3.5 Attitudes toward Sexual Minorities and People of a Different Religion 88

Figure 3.6 Attitudes toward Different Languages and Immigrants or Foreign Workers 89

Figure 3.7 Attitudes toward Female and Male University Education and Female 91 Tertiary Enrollment

Figure 3.8 Salience of National versus Ethnic Identity and Feelings of Belonging 92

Figure 3.9 Perceptions of Unequal Treatment under the Law 93

Figure 3.10 Hope and Optimism around the Globe 95

Figure 3.11 Burkinabe Economy 96

Figure B4.1.1 Stigma and Discrimination in Eastern and Southern Africa, 2000–2016 103

Figure B4.2.1 Female Genital Mutilation in Burkina Faso, 1998–2015 105

Figure B4.2.2 Prevalence of Female Genital Mutilation in Eight African Countries 105

Figure B4.4.1 Improvement in the Women, Business and the Law Index, 2009–2018 110

Figure 4.1 Social Safety Net Programs in Africa 113

vi FOREWORD

FOREWORD

African countries have seen impressive gains in health, nutrition, education, and women’s empowerment over recent years and the pace of progress in some areas has been faster in Africa than in any other region. Innovation abounds in Africa and is reflected in multiple areas – in the next generation of social safety nets; in new platforms providing services to remote and fragile communities; in the spread of digital technology; and in advocacy movements, bringing previously ostracized people into public acceptance.

While positive developments in Africa hold promise, the continent still faces major development challenges – from poverty reduction to overcoming fragility and managing the growing impacts of climate change. Where there have been development gains, many groups of people have not benefited from them. Who are these groups? And why have they not benefited equitably from progress and development? Why are they more likely to be poor or lack human capital? The answer to many of these questions is social exclusion.

In 2013, the World Bank published the global flagship report Inclusion Matters: The Foundation for Shared Prosperity, which helped guide us towards better analysis and actions to combat social exclusion. Inclusion Matters in Africa draws upon the global report, as Africa finds itself at the center of rapid social and economic change, with the potential for even greater transformation. This report on Africa resonates with the main message of the Sustainable Development Goals: to leave no one behind. It complements the World Bank Group’s strategy for Africa which has placed added emphasis on social inclusion through a focus on building human capital, advancing women’s empowerment, strengthening the digital economy, combating climate change, and addressing the underlying drivers of fragility.

Inclusion Matters in Africa tells us that peace and security are inexorably linked to social inclusion. And that while we need to focus on reducing poverty, this is still not enough to end the exclusion of some individuals and groups. It draws attention to the structures and processes that drive social exclusion, too often conditioning people’s attitudes, perceptions, feelings, and behaviors.

INCLUSION MATTERS IN AFRICA vii

Hafez Ghanem Vice President, Africa Region

Laura Tuck Vice President, Sustainable Development

A key finding of the report is that while exclusion is costly, an inclusive society does not come for free. It is a conscious decision for any country. And the decision must be made with a clear appreciation of costs and benefits. With a strong social contract and greater accountability of the state and service providers to citizens, social inclusion in Africa is well within reach, as hundreds of initiatives across the continent demonstrate.

The report is grounded in the experience of African countries, but also shows that Africa’s challenges in social inclusion are not unique or exceptional. Our hope is that it will change the way policy makers, citizens, and global partners think about development, and help us all live up to the promise of equal opportunity for everyone in Africa.

viii ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This report was written by Maitreyi Bordia Das and Sabina Anne Espinoza, under the strategic guidance of World Bank directors Diarietou Gaye (Director, Strategy and Operations, Office of the Africa Regional Vice Presidency [AFRVP]), Maninder Gill (Global Director, Environmental and Social Framework), and Ede Ijjasz-Vasquez (Africa Regional Director, Sustainable Development). The authors are grateful for the support received from Louise Cord (Global Director, Social), Simon Ehui (Africa Regional Director, Sustainable Development), Sameh Wahba (Global Director, Urban, Resilience and Land), Anna Wellenstein (Regional Director, Latin America and the Caribbean [LAC] Region), and Albert G. Zeufack (Chief Economist, Africa Region). The Africa Regional Management Team, led by Hafez Ghanem (Vice President), held a dedicated meeting to discuss this report, and provided advice for which the authors are immensely thankful.

This report benefitted from the continuous engagement and substantive contributions of Senait Assefa (Practice Manager, Africa Region), Robin Mearns (Practice Manager, Africa Region), Aly Rahim (Practice Manager, Africa Region), and Varalakshmi Vemuru (Lead Social Development Specialist, Africa Region).

Peer reviewers for this report were Tom Bundervoet, Helene Carlsson Rex, Shanta Devarajan, German Freire, and Angela Khaminwa from the World Bank, and Cyprian Fisiy (Founder, Fisiy Foundation and Leadership Center, Cameroon). The authors deeply appreciate their insightful comments and the additional discussions held with them. Further, the authors would like to thank Emcet Tas (World Bank) for his contribution to chapter 2, and to Angela Khaminwa (World Bank) for her contribution to annex 2. Soumya Kapoor (senior consultant) and Shruti Majumdar’s (UN Women) detailed readings of previous versions of the report were invaluable.

Several other colleagues shared their wisdom and advice and sent background inputs and written comments at various stages during report preparation. They include Kathleen Beegle, Chifundo Chilera, Louise Cord, Clifton Cortez, Gina Cosentino, Raphael A. Espinoza, Patricia Fernandes, Jana El-Horr, Kamila Galeza, Michael Gboyega Ilesanmi, Marek Hanusch, Bernard Harborne, Somik Lall, Gloria Malia Mahama, Gayle Martin, Charlotte McClain-Nhlapo, Erwin de Nys, Helidah Refiloe Atieno Ogude, Daniel Owen, Margarita Puerto Gomez, Siddhartha Raja, Deepti Samant Raja, Lisa Schmidt, Ruchi Singh, Nicholas Meitaki Soikan, Simon Sottsas, Victor Sulla, and Najat Yamouri. Very instructive discussions of the early messages coming from the report were held with Andre Bald, Paolo Belli, Adrian Cutler, Kevin Heraniah, Muratha Kinuthia, Emma Mistiaen, Johan Mistiaen, Shamis Musingo, Abdu Muwonge, Margaret Ombai, Annette Omollo, Utz Pape, Abla Safir, Nadia Selim, and Vanessa Tilstone.

INCLUSION MATTERS IN AFRICA ix

Discussions with various partners from government, civil society, and academia enriched this report. Annex 1 describes some of these engagements. In addition, the authors are indebted to Wanjiru Kamau-Rutenberg (AWARD), Winnie Mitullah and Karuti Kanyinga (Institute for Development Studies, University of Nairobi), Shadrack Musyoka (Kitui County, Kenya), Munawwar Alam (United States Agency for International Development [USAID]/Kenya), Honorable Members of the Parliament of Sierra Leone, Yvonne Aki-Sawyerr (Mayor of Freetown, Sierra Leone) and the members of the UN System in Sierra Leone, with whom they discussed early results from the report.

Paul Gallagher, Maura Leary, Kristyn Schrader-King, and Andy Shuai Liu offered outstanding inputs in framing key messages and advice on communications around the report. Elizabeth Acul and Lucie Albert-Drucker provided critical administrative support, and Michelle Morandotti assisted the production team. Flavia Carbonari’s inputs to the Portuguese translations of the Overview are deeply appreciated. Finally, Takayo Fredericks provided the report design and typesetting, and Dina Towbin and Associates provided editorial services.

x ABBREVIATIONS

ABBREVIATIONSAfDB African Development Bank

AIDS acquired immunodeficiency syndrome

AU African Union

BBBEE broad-based black economic empowerment

BMI body mass index

BRAC Building Resources Across Communities

BWC Business Women Connect

CAN CBR Africa Network

CBR community-based rehabilitation

CSA Country Social Analysis

DHS Demographic and Health Survey

ELA Empowerment and Livelihood for Adolescents (Uganda)

EMC Continuous Multisectoral Survey

EPD End Poverty Day

ESF Environmental and Social Framework

ESS Environmental and Social Standards

FAO Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations

FCC Federal Character Commission (Nigeria)

FCS Federal Civil Service (Nigeria)

FGM female genital mutilation

FOI freedom of information

GBV gender-based violence

GDP gross domestic product

GLR Great Lakes Region (Africa)

GRP gross regional product

HCP Human Capital Project

HIV human immunodeficiency virus

ICT information and communications technology

ID4D Identification for Development

IDMC Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre

IDP internally displaced person or people

ILO International Labour Organization

IMF International Monetary Fund

IP indigenous person or people

KPBI Kenya Participatory Budgeting Initiative

LGBTI lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and intersex

LOGiCA Learning on Gender and Conflict in Africa

LOGOSEED Local Governance and Service Delivery Project (South Sudan)

LOI language of instruction

LSMS Living Standards Measurement Study

LTR land tenure regularization

MFD Maximizing Finance for Development

INCLUSION MATTERS IN AFRICA xi

MICS Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey

MP Member of Parliament

MSM men who have sex with men

NURC National Unity and Reconciliation Commission (Rwanda)

NYSC National Youth Service Corps (Nigeria)

OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development

OHCHR Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights

OLL Organic Land Law (Rwanda)

PB participatory budgeting

PNDDR National Program for Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (Congo, Dem. Rep.)

PPP purchasing power parity

PSIA Poverty and Social Impact Analysis

SAR special administrative region

SCD Systematic Country Diagnostic

SDGs Sustainable Development Goals

SGBV sexual and gender-based violence

SiAT Social Inclusion Assessment Tool

SOGI sexual orientation and gender identity

SSN social safety net

SWEDD Sahel Women’s Empowerment and Demographic Dividend

TCSS Transitional Constitution of South Sudan

TFR total fertility rate

TRC Truth and Reconciliation Commission (South Africa)

TRRC Truth, Reconciliation and Reparations Commission (The Gambia)

UDL Universal Design for Learning

UN United Nations

UNAIDS Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS

UN DESA United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs

UNDP United Nations Development Programme

UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization

UNFPA United Nations Population Fund

UNGA United Nations General Assembly

UN-Habitat United Nations Human Settlements Programme

UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund

UNMIL United Nations Mission in Liberia

UVR ultraviolet radiation

WASH water supply, sanitation, and hygiene

WB World Bank

WBG World Bank Group

WDI World Development Indicators

WG Washington Group on Disability Statistics

WHO World Health Organization

WVS World Values Survey

INCLUSION MATTERS IN AFRICA 1

Main Messages

1. Africa has seen significant progress towards social inclusion in thepast few decades, in many areas moving at a pace faster than seenglobally.

2. Some groups and areas have been left out of the progress in Africaand continue to remain at risk. Social inclusion helps us understandwho is left out, from what, in what ways, and why.

3. Social inclusion draws attention to the drivers of poverty in Africaand explains that while we need to focus on poverty, this is only astarting point to end the exclusion.

4. Structures and processes that aid and abet social exclusion oftenhave historical and cultural roots.

5. Areas that are affected by conflict and fragility stand out as havingthe poorest outcomes related to social inclusion. Conversely, peaceand security matter for social inclusion.

6. Societies incur significant costs from social exclusion. Yet, achievingsocial inclusion also has costs. Therefore, investing in social inclusionhas to be a conscious choice for states and societies.

7. With a strong social contract, social inclusion in Africa is eminentlywithin reach, as hundreds of initiatives across the continentdemonstrate.

O V E R V I E W

2 OVERVIEW

Why social inclusion? Why now?Africa today is under a global spotlight for its many achievements and its dynamism, but also for its substantial challenges. Poverty has declined, human development outcomes have improved, and dynamic social movements are helping to transform communities and bringing attention to stigmatized issues and peoples. Technological innovation has spread to many remote areas. New policies and programs across the continent have highlighted the importance of social inclusion. In some areas, African countries have led the charge toward progress; for instance, in the past decade, Africa has implemented the most reforms promoting gender equality of any region globally. Yet, as in other parts of the world, positive developments have been uneven in Africa too. They have left many areas and groups behind. Digital technology, for instance, can leave those who do not have mobile phones or Internet connections further behind. Similarly, improved infrastructure has provided better lives, but also carries risks, for instance, of lands being unfairly taken from those most powerless or of damage to the environment or livelihoods. Improvements in education and health can be concentrated in certain locations and for some groups. Areas that experience state and societal fragility also fall behind in various development outcomes.

The push towards social inclusion has garnered extensive support over the past few years. The rallying cry of the of the Sustainable Development Goals to leave no one behind has generated a groundswell of demands and actions at various levels. During the post–Millennium Development Goals conversations, the World Bank published its flagship report on social inclusion, Inclusion Matters: The Foundation for Shared Prosperity (2013). The report set out a clear definition of social inclusion. More recently, the World Bank Group (WBG) announced its new Regional Strategy for Africa1—this strategy is also rooted in the tenets of social inclusion. The upsurge of thought and action both within the World Bank and globally has led to several structured engagements between the WBG and a range of its partners. For example, the WBG has conducted regular Systematic Country Diagnostics (SCD) for each of its partner countries that have shown social inclusion issues to be intrinsic to, but not the same as, poverty reduction. This report builds on these and other documentation. It is intended for a wide array of readers: governments, the private sector, civil society, academia, the media, and others. It is also expected to influence the way the WBG conducts its business in Africa. Like all regional reports, it can do only limited justice to the vast heterogeneity of the continent.

4 OVERVIEW

Social inclusion: A primerThe term social inclusion (or just inclusion) has gained inexorable traction in development and broader policy debates, so it is important to define what we mean. This report defines social inclusion as the process of improving the terms for individuals and groups to take part in society (World Bank 2013). In articulating social inclusion, it emphasizes disadvantage based on social identity. Although such emphasis can sometimes be politically sensitive, its acknowledgment is important to the advancement of social inclusion. Markers of social identity can be derived from gender, age, disability, sexual orientation, gender identity, location, occupation, race, ethnicity, religion, or citizenship status, among other markers. Yet, no single identity really describes an individual; the intersection of identities bestows the real advantage or disadvantage. In answer to the question “inclusion in what?” the World Bank (2013) answers: in markets, services, and spaces. Markets comprise land, housing, labor, and credit, while services comprise education, health, transport, water, social protection, electricity, information, communication, and technology, among other services. The notion of space includes physical space, but also space in a broader sense: social, political, and cultural spaces can all solidify exclusion or foster inclusion. Social inclusion is, moreover, about enhancing the ability, opportunity, and dignity of individuals and groups to take part in society. While the importance of ability and opportunity have long been recognized by development economists, a social inclusion perspective draws particular attention to the idea of dignity, which when compromised can have severe and unexpected consequences for individuals and groups and for society and economy as a whole.

The report frames its key questions using the approach of the Social Inclusion Assessment Tool (see World Bank 2017d; Das 2016). It asks, in the wake of the enormous advances Africa has made over the years, who is excluded, from what, how, and why. It follows the analysis by highlighting what has been attempted in the quest of African countries for social inclusion. The report highlights the major trends and transitions that shape the context for social inclusion in Africa. Building upon recent evidence and using data from the Demographic and Health Survey (DHS), World Development Indicators (WDIs), Afrobarometer surveys, and World Values Survey (WVS), the report highlights key issues and identifies groups who may be left behind. Further, it provides pointers on the processes that underlie exclusion and inclusion and reflects on attitudes and perceptions. The report addresses important questions: Who are the key actors? What are some of the innovations promoting social inclusion in Africa? What evidence do we have on what has made a positive difference? Finally, it gives directions on framing the right questions for inclusive solutions (figure O.1).

INCLUSION MATTERS IN AFRICA 5

FEMALES

SERVICESSOCIAL PROTECTIONINFORMATIONELECTRICITYTRANSPORTEDUCATIONHEALTHWATER

SPACESPOLITICALPHYSICALCULTURAL

SOCIAL

MARKETSLANDHOUSINGLABORCREDIT

ABILITY OPPORTUNITY DIGNITY

Source: World Bank 2013.

Figure O.1 The Social Inclusion Framework

6 OVERVIEW

To sum up, this report accomplishes the following:

• It places the notion of social inclusion front and center in an analysis of Africa’sachievements and the challenges the region faces in poverty reduction and humancapital formation.

• The report takes an interdisciplinary approach, using evidence from varied sourcesand bringing empirical weight to issues that are being debated through advocacy andcontestation.

• It addresses with granularity who is left out, from what, and how. It garners andintegrates evidence on historically invisible groups such as persons with disabilities,persons with albinism, LGBTI persons, certain ethnic and occupational groups,persons who live in “lagging areas,” and especially young people. It further focuseson the intersectionality of social identity.

• The report is grounded in the experience of African countries, but also shows thatAfrica’s challenges in social inclusion are not unique or exceptional.

• It shows the channels through which individuals and economies may incur costsof social exclusion. The report points out that these costs may be direct or indirect,short term or long term. When taken cumulatively, the costs can impede the bestefforts of governments and societies.

• It provides examples of the remarkable innovations that abound in Africa and ofthe policy and programmatic movement toward social inclusion. It shines a light onareas in which deeply entrenched norms and practices have changed.

• Finally, the report asserts that social inclusion must be a conscious choice for societiesand their governments. It must be based on a clear social contract that recognizes boththe costs and benefits of policies and interventions that move toward social inclusion.

What does social inclusion add to the focus on poverty reduction?Most discussions of social inclusion in Africa have taken place within the context of poverty reduction and in response to humanitarian crises. These discussions are driven by the fact that despite significant progress in decreasing poverty, more than 400 million people are estimated to still live in poverty (Beegle and Christiaensen 2019). Poverty is an outcome; social exclusion is both a process and an outcome. Processes of exclusion can have long-term effects on mind-sets, psyches, and the dignity of subordinate or excluded groups. This exclusion in turn affects the ability of these groups to access the chances given to them. Slavery was one of the most egregious processes of exclusion, as were apartheid and untouchability (in South Asia). Less overt practices can also have devastating effects on subordinate groups. Consider bullying as an example of an insidious exclusionary process: the world over, some groups are bullied into subjugation. They may include lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and intersex (LGBTI) people, individuals who may speak with a different accent than the

INCLUSION MATTERS IN AFRICA 7

dominant group’s, eat different food, or have other unique characteristics. Bullying can stymie the educational opportunities of those subject to it, cause serious mental health problems and other devastating consequences, and ultimately lead victims to opt out of a system that they perceive as condoning bullying. All this may, and does, occur in an otherwise well-functioning educational system. So, victims of bullying may not be affected by poverty, but in such cases they are affected by processes of exclusion that prevent them from reaching their full potential. As another example, a person with mobility limitations who is part of rich household is not affected by poverty but may be excluded by inaccessible infrastructure and services. Therefore, it is important to acknowledge that although social exclusion may well have roots in poverty, there are times when it does not. Social inclusion adds another dimension to the discourse on poverty and inequality.

Asking “who are the poor?” and breaking down the poverty numbers, we find greater complexity. Take the case of the relationship between gender and poverty, for which there is a long tradition of analysis. Overall, women are not necessarily poorer than men, nor are male-headed households necessarily better off. Moreover, in many countries in Africa, female-headed households have experienced faster poverty reduction than male-headed households (Milazzo and van de Walle 2017). More nuanced findings emerge when we look at gender jointly with age and marital status: young married women, but more so those who are young and widowed, are especially vulnerable. In addition, older men are on average eight percentage points poorer than their female counterparts (Milazzo and van de Walle 2017; Munoz Boudet et al. 2018). A recent analysis of Kenya has similar findings: women in their 20s through their 50s are more likely than men to live in poor households, and when compared to men, poverty rates are higher for women who are separated, divorced, or widowed. In addition to gender, other markers such as disability status, race, and ethnicity also matter for poverty (World Bank 2018d).

Box O.1 Does Ethnicity Matter for Poverty in Africa?

Using the Demographic and Health Survey (DHS), which has data on ethnicity and wealth based on a household’s ownership of selected assets, we analyzed data from nine countries, including the Democratic Republic of Congo, Kenya, Malawi, Mozambique, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Uganda, and Zambia. Looking at the 10 largest ethnic groups in rural and urban areas, we found that ethnicity does indeed matter for wealth outcomes, but that the effects are more pronounced in rural areas and less so in cities and towns.

• Overall, certain ethnic groups are overrepresented in the poorest wealth quintile in all the nine countries.Disparities between ethnic groups are larger in ruralareas than in urban areas.

• Size of the ethnic groups does not seem to matter.This is unsurprising, because the across the worldthe size of an ethnic group seldom has a linearassociation with its welfare outcomes.

• The greatest dispersion along ethnic lines in thepoorest quintile in rural areas appears to occurin Kenya, Nigeria, and Uganda, followed bylesser dispersion in Mozambique and Zambia. Inurban areas, the greatest dispersion is found inKenya, Mozambique, and South Africa. While theoverrepresentation of some ethnic groups in thelowest wealth quintile is more pronounced in somecountries than in others, this may or may not reflectabsolute gaps in wealth between these groups.

8 OVERVIEW

Africa is striding: Who’s left behind?Social, economic, and political transformations are sweeping the African continent. We discuss transitions under some broad categories: demographic changes and their relationship to the accumulation of human capital; economic changes, of which poverty reduction is a big part; spatial transitions and their social ramifications, including urbanization, spatial inequality, and climate change; the growth of technology and its implications for social inclusion; and the pervasive nature of conflict and fragility, with its implications for a range of outcomes. Finally, we draw attention to the nature of political and civic participation and dynamic social movements.

Demographic trends and the accumulation of human capital

Africa has the fastest population growth in the world, but fertility is falling in almost every country. Half of the population in the region is under 25 years of age; by 2050, the continent will have 362 million young people who are between 15 and 24 years of age (World Bank 2014). Simultaneously, many African countries will see aging of the population: by 2050, Africa’s over-60 population is expected to more than triple, from 69 million in 2017 to 226 million (UN DESA Population Division 2017a). Although youth inclusion is the immediate challenge facing the region, the inclusion of older cohorts of Africans will soon be a part of the picture. Nevertheless, today Africa’s growing young population has the potential to dramatically drive development and further reduce poverty, if the right policies and opportunities are in place.

Like fertility, Africa has also seen improvements in health and longevity, but under-five mortality is still high. Children’s survival until age five is a core indicator of welfare, but also has other ramifications: high rates of infant and child mortality are associated with higher fertility, for example. Moreover, countries with high levels of child mortality are bogged down by the most basic imperative of keeping children alive and are less able to invest in human capital. Based on United Nations (UN) child mortality estimates, according to the Our World in Data project and AfricaInData.org, there has been a sharp decline in child mortality from 1980 to 2015.2 In fact, compared to other regions, Africa has seen the fastest decline between 1990 and 2016. Despite these improvements, Africa still has the highest under-five mortality rate, at 78 deaths per 1,000 live births in 2016. In other words, approximately 1 child in 13 still dies before the fifth birthday (Suzuki and Kashiwase 2017). There is considerable variation across countries, and fragile states have the highest rates of under-five mortality.

In education too there has been significant progress, but as in other parts of the world there are stark inequalities in educational outcomes based on identity markers. The average primary school gross enrollment ratio in the region increased from 68 percent in 1990 to 98 percent in 2015, and the number of enrolled students grew from 63 million to 152 million. Yet, despite the increase in primary school enrollment rates, an estimated 52.3 million primary, and lower secondary school-age children (ages 6–14 and 7–15) are still out of school, accounting for 45 percent of the world’s out-of-school child population across the world (Bashir et al. 2018). Literacy is the most basic educational outcome, and even here some people are left out. There is a significant gap

INCLUSION MATTERS IN AFRICA 9

in literacy between males and females, with Western Africa having the highest gender gaps and Southern Africa having the lowest.

The overlay of gender with other identity markers confers additional disadvantage in education, as it does in other outcomes. Using census data, Taş, Reimão, and Orlando (2014) show that ethnic minority women in Senegal and Sierra Leone suffer cumulative disadvantages in literacy, primary school completion, and secondary school completion. In Senegal, for example, women are 10 percentage points less likely to complete primary school for being female, 1.6 percentage points for being ethnic minority, and an additional 3.8 percentage points for being ethnic minority women. Therefore, cumulatively women of ethnic minority groups are about 15.4 percentage points less likely to complete primary school than men belonging to majority ethnic groups in Senegal. In South Africa, despite significant progress since the end of apartheid, education outcomes among black and colored South Africans remain low. Although the white population reached close to full attainment of 12 years of education in 1920, the black population has yet to achieve those levels today, perpetuating the legacy of a racial divide in education in South Africa, which remains a main driver of poverty and inequality (World Bank 2018f, 13). The Benin Systematic Country Diagnostic (SCD), similarly, notes that the lack of maternal language teaching in primary school puts indigenous children at a disadvantage and leads them to abandon school prematurely (World Bank 2017b, 57).

Box O.2 Disability in Africa: The Importance of Advocacy, Data, and Analysis

About 15 percent of the population of the world has disabilities. Africa is no exception. Yet, intervening on behalf of persons with disabilities requires nuanced understanding of disability and of the ways in which type and intensity of disability, gender, place in the life cycle, location, ethnicity, sexual orientation, gender identity, marital status, socioeconomic status, and other factors intersect to convey disadvantage or advantage.

The disability rights movement in Africa is arguably one of the most dynamic contemporary social movements in the continent. Using the axiom “nothing for us without us,” it has influenced budget allocations and research priorities, raised awareness, and helped reduce the widespread stigma against persons with disabilities. The advocacy movement for albinism is also unfolding before our eyes.

The importance of data and analysis has benefited from advocacy and in turn strengthens the hand of advocacy movements. The availability of data in some African countries has allowed an empirical focus on the poorer outcomes for persons with disabilities. Several studies show that persons with disabilities are more likely to be self-employed in agriculture and less

likely to be employees (Hoogeveen 2005; Mitra 2018). There are also variations in employment outcomes across different types, and intensity of, disability. In a study using data from Ethiopia, Malawi, Tanzania, and Uganda, Mitra (2018) found the largest gaps in Tanzania, where 53 percent of persons with severe functional difficulties are employed, compared to 85 percent of persons with no functional difficulty. Poverty outcomes are similarly nuanced: “while persons with functional difficulties are a disproportionately large share of the poor, not all persons with functional difficulties are poor” (Mitra 2018, 156).

There is also evidence on lower educational attainment of persons with disabilities in Africa (see Eide and Mmatli 2016; Filmer 2008; Hoogeveen 2005; Loeb and Eide 2004; Loeb et al. 2008; Mitra 2018; Mitra, Posarac, and Vick 2013; Mizunoya, Mitra, and Yamasaki 2016). When disability status is combined with gender, we see the real effects of intersectional disadvantage. Outcomes differ further by type of disability, but lack of reliable data presents serious constraints to analysis and action. In the case of intellectual disabilities, for instance, data are particularly scarce, as are services for persons with such disabilities.

10 OVERVIEW

Economic transitions: Poverty and employment

The period since the 1990s has seen an impressive reduction in poverty; however, absolute numbers of the poor have at the same time increased dramatically. Although the poverty head count declined steadily from 57 percent of the African population in 1990 to 41 percent in 2015,3 the absolute number of people living in poverty increased from about 278 million to over 413 million. There is significant divergence in performance across African countries, driven by several factors, among which fragility, conflict, and endowment of natural resources stand out (Beegle et al. 2016).

Spatial transitions and social implications

Africa’s social geography is rapidly changing; it is, for example, the fastest urbanizing region in the world (figure O.2). Currently, about 472 million people live in cities and towns—a number that is expected to double over the next 25 years (Lall, Henderson, and Venables 2017). There are, however, large subregional variations. Most people in North and Southern Africa already live in cities. West Africa is projected to reach an urban majority just after 2020, whereas urbanization rates are still below 20 percent in East Africa (UN-Habitat 2014). Nigeria is among the top three urbanizing countries in the world, and together with India and China it is estimated to account for 35 percent of the projected growth of the world’s urban population between 2018 and 2050, adding 189 million urban dwellers.4

Urbanization holds both prospects and challenges for social inclusion. Migration from villages to cities and towns tends to be accompanied by aspirations for a new life; greater social and economic mobility; and better access to markets, services, and spaces. It often also means separation from family and social networks and a sense of loneliness for those who do not have networks in their new abodes. A 2016 study from South Africa shows that rural-urban migration between 2008 and 2012 was accompanied by an 8.3 percent decrease in the subjective well-being of migrants (Mulcahy and Kollamparambil 2016). Further, as cities often lack careful planning, about 60 percent of Africa’s urban population lives in informal settlements, compared to 34 percent in other developing countries (UN DESA Statistics Division 2015; cited in Lall, Henderson, and Venables 2017, 38). Finally, informal workers such as waste pickers, domestic workers, street vendors, and others experience serious barriers to doing business in most cities. Yet, cities often provide a more anonymous space than do rural areas and allow individuals from excluded groups to escape discrimination and to pursue job and education opportunities that they would not have had in a rural context. Although further research is needed to understand the mechanisms through which these outcomes obtain, box O.2 explains that wealth disparities between ethnic groups are less pronounced in urban than in rural areas. At the same time, ethnic groups and migrants tend to cluster residentially and occupationally in urban areas, with varying effects for social inclusion.

Although there is considerable attention given to Africa’s urban growth and advances in service delivery, there is also evidence that location matters and that many areas lag behind. In general, countries and areas that are in the midst of conflict or experience fragility have poorer outcomes than do others. Clearly, there are lagging regions within

INCLUSION MATTERS IN AFRICA 11

Figure O.2 Growth of Global Urbanization, 1950–2050

Source: UN DESA (United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs) Population Division 2018. World Urbanization Prospects 2018.

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12 OVERVIEW

countries, and people who live in such regions may have other defining characteristics, such as belonging to particular ethnic or other groups. Across the world, lagging areas are also those in which people have less voice and political power than in other regions. African countries are no exception; the popular discourse in many African countries makes explicit links between political power and uneven regional development, pointing to the fact that areas with better political connections to those in power tend to fare better.

Finally, the majority of Africa’s population still lives in rural areas, and there is a significant rural-urban divide in opportunity. Take the case of health services: about 56 percent of the rural population around the world lacks health coverage, compared to 22 percent of the urban population, with the most deprived rural population living in Africa (Scheil-Adlung 2015, 6). Within rural areas, exclusion from health services also may be more severe for women, the elderly, some ethnic groups, and migrants (Scheil-Adlung 2015, 30). In South Africa, despite provision of free antenatal care, nonwhite women and those living in rural areas are less likely to receive antenatal care or to have a skilled attendant present at the time of delivery than white women in urban areas (Burgard 2004; Say and Raine 2007; Silal et al. 2012; all cited in World Bank 2013, 95).

Climate-related transitions are likely to affect many aspects of life globally, and certainly in Africa. Extreme weather events destroy infrastructure and affect livelihoods, health, education, and general well-being; they may potentially reverse many of the gains that African countries have made. Some climate events also contribute to large-scale, involuntary population movements. Africa is expected to host 86 million persons who will likely migrate due to the effects of climate change by 2050 (Rigaud et al. 2018). Rapid-onset events like extreme storms or floods tend to lead to short-term displacement, followed by return to affected areas, although they can also generate a combination of short- and longer-term displacement and out-migration. Slow-onset events like droughts or desertification, such as of the Sahel, by contrast, tend to lead to gradual long-term out-migration rather than affecting migration patterns immediately. Many internal migrants move to major cities; indeed, internal migration is a significant contributor to urbanization (Tacoli, McGranahan, and Satterthwaite 2015; cited in Rigaud et al. 2018, 18). Nairobi is an example of a city likely to see increased climate-driven in-migration. At the same time, low-lying cities, along with coastlines vulnerable to sea level rise and areas of high water and agriculture stress, are at risk of climate-induced out-migration. Addis Ababa and Dar el Salaam are among the cities likely to see dampened population growth due to rising sea level and storm surges (Rigaud et al. 2018). As we design programs for adaptation to climate change and mitigation of its impacts, we need to be cognizant of the fact that emergencies can often exacerbate existing inequalities and asymmetrical power relations and that both prevention and response need to take this into account.

INCLUSION MATTERS IN AFRICA 13

Box O.3 The Importance of Place and Peace for Social Inclusion

Peace is not just the absence of conflict; peace is the creation of an environment where all can flourish, regardless of race, colour, creed, religion, gender, class, caste, or any other social markers of difference. Religion, ethnicity, language, social and cultural practices are elements which enrich human civilization, adding to the wealth of our diversity. Nelson Mandela, 2018a

The congruence of conflict and fragility with poorer development outcomes is well understood by policy makers, aid workers, activists, and communities alike. Individuals and groups who reside in areas prone to, or in the midst of, conflict struggle for access to markets, services, and spaces. The least powerful among them sometimes face terrible atrocities. Although neither conflict nor humanitarian emergencies are exclusively African problems or only problems of poor and fragile situations, Africa faces some unique challenges. As an example, in 2016, Africa saw 3.9 million new internal displacements due to conflict, violence, and sudden-onset disasters. Together with the Middle East and North Africa Region, sub-Saharan Africa hosts the largest numbers of forcibly displaced groups, with a sharp increase over the past several years. For example, although each of the two regions had about 8 million displaced people in 2012, this number increased to 21.5 million in the Middle East and North Africa and 18.4 million in sub-Saharan Africa in 2017. Within sub-Saharan Africa, most forced displacement took place domestically: of the 18.4 million displaced people in 2017, 12.5 million were internally displaced persons (IDPs) and 5.9 percent were refugees.b

Countries that were rich in natural resources had 13 percentage points faster poverty reduction than countries that were not resource rich, after controlling for other country traits. Between 1996 and 2012, poverty decline in fragile states was smaller when compared to the decline in nonfragile states in Africa: after controlling for a set of country characteristics, poverty reduction in fragile states was 15 percentage points lower than it was in nonfragile states (Beegle et al. 2016). A caveat is in order here. Countries that

are endowed with natural resources can also fall prey to the “resource curse,” which can exacerbate fragility and conflict, unless institutions are robust enough.

Conflict, the threat of conflict, and the pursuant displacement affect both the displaced and their host communities. To start, although displacement comes with tremendous suffering, fleeing can mitigate the detrimental affects of conflict (Etang-Ndip, Hoogeveen, and Lendorfer 2015), and displaced persons are not always the poorest (Beegle et al. 2016). Moreover, host communities are affected by the inflow of forced migrants, and in some places, especially in remote and underdeveloped borderlands, they are poorer than IDPs and refugees. The effects of displacement on host communities take place through different channels. The Kakuma refugee camp in Kenya, for instance, is based in Turkana County, which has a poverty rate of close to 80 percent, compared to the national average of 36 percent (KNBS 2015). In Tanzania, the influx of refugees from Burundi and Rwanda in the 1990s adversely affected Tanzanian casual laborers, due to an increase in competition in labor markets and surging prices of various goods.

Women and young girls in conflict-affected areas may have greater exposure to sexual violence and may be actively targeted by opposing groups. Evidence from the Great Lakes Region (GLR) shows that female ex-combatants who try to reintegrate into their communities face stigma of various kinds. One underlying cause is their increased exposure to sexual violence during conflict. In some parts of the GLR, this stigma is so strong that some female ex-combatants avoid self-identifying as ex-combatants and forfeit their access to targeted assistance for ex-combatants. (Rhea 2014, 28)

Finally, the effects of climate change may exacerbate inequality and exclusion; the effects are pronounced in some areas. When extreme weather events hit areas with high levels of state and societal fragility, the whole population suffers, but some groups are affected more. These groups may include persons with disabilities, young children and the elderly, among others.

a From Nelson Mandela’s address to the Global Convention on Peace and Non-Violence, New Delhi, India, January 31, 2004 (UN DPI 2018).

b P. Connor and J. M. Krogstad, 2018, “Record Number of Forcibly Displaced People Lived in Sub-Saharan Africa in 2017,” Pew Research Center, https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/08/09/record-number-of-forcibly-displaced-people-lived-in-sub-saharan-africa-in-2017 (accessed August 24, 2019).

14 OVERVIEW

Technology can spearhead social inclusion, but can leave some people further behind

It is the global age of technology, but this is inextricably linked to the extent to which countries, regions, communities, and households have access to this potent medium. In many respects, Africa seems to have leapfrogged into the digital economy, but there is great variation across countries. For example, despite a relatively faster increase in mobile cellular subscriptions in fragile countries, the number of mobile cellular subscriptions is still higher in nonfragile countries (Calderon et al. 2019, 49). Similarly, financial technology (“fintech”) has also expanded across Africa over the past years: 21 percent of adults in Africa now have a mobile money account, with numbers having doubled since 2014, the highest of any region globally (Demirgüç-Kunt et al. 2018). M-PESA is one of the earliest and perhaps one of the most prominent examples of fintech in Africa. Digital technology can also spearhead employment, as the recent World Bank report on the future of work in Africa points out (Choi, Dutz, and Usman 2019).

As would be expected, the proportion of individuals who have access to the Internet in each African country is highly correlated with the country’s income level. South Africa is the only country in the region where almost 60 percent of the population is online.5 Furthermore, the Pew Research Center Spring 2017 Global Attitudes Survey in six countries showed that males, those with higher education and higher income levels were more likely to use smartphones (figure O.3). This means that nonusers of smartphones are left out of many opportunities to access markets, services, and spaces.

Political participation and social movements

Social inclusion often advances when individuals or groups who feel excluded assert their agency through social and political participation; the nature of such participation has seen a change in many African countries. Recent surveys draw attention to declining participation in formal political and civic processes, particularly among youth and women in Africa, but the picture is complex. The likelihood of voting is lower among African youth than among their elders, and data from the Afrobarometer survey suggest that the political participation of young people has declined over the past decade and a half (Lekalake and Gyimah-Boadi 2016). African youth are also less likely than their elders to participate in civic activities. Young women participate even less in public affairs; compared to their male counterparts, they report significantly less interest in public affairs and discussions around them (Lekalake and Gyimah-Boadi 2016). Such decreasing participation in formal political processes may signal several different things. It may mean disenchantment or lack of faith in the processes. It may also mean that young people use different channels to express their preferences. The importance of social media bears special mention here. The Internet affords anonymity, which allows groups that would otherwise not have a voice to express themselves through digital media. The youth in Africa are far more active on social media and digital platforms than are their older counterparts. The rise of social movements also shows that young people may use other civic channels to act on what they care about. Even so, the likely disenchantment with political processes may be an indication of broader disenchantment with the state.

INCLUSION MATTERS IN AFRICA 15

Although participation in formal political processes seems to be declining, social movements continue to raise the profile of social inclusion across Africa. That Africa has a vibrant history of social and political movements is well known. They include the legendary movements for independence and decolonization, the critical movements in academia against Eurocentrism, and movements for peace and civil liberties and against various economic policies. The student-led Fees Must Fall movement in South Africa points to the fact that, although young people may not participate in formal political processes, they are nevertheless politically very vibrant. Similarly, the movement that asserts the rights of indigenous peoples to their culture, lands, and unique identity also has a strong history. Two contemporary social movements deserve mention: the first brought attention to HIV/AIDS, and the second to the rights of persons with disabilities. Each demonstrates that advocacy and public education help to change norms and practices. Further, civil society has also galvanized citizens against corruption in several countries in Africa. In South Africa, for instance, civil society organizations started campaigning against corruption in the late 1990s, which led to the first anticorruption summit by the government in 1999 and the launch of the National Anti-Corruption Forum in 2001 that brought together civil society, business, and government in the fight against corruption.6 In Kenya, civil society organizations mobilized protests (Occupy Parliament) against the salaries of Members of Parliament (MPs) and brought about salary cuts of MPs and the president in 2013. Other countries have had similar forms of protest. Finally, radical feminist movements have gathered strength over the years and have organized to hold the state and society accountable for the poorer opportunities for girls and women.

Figure O.3 Smartphone Usage by Age, Gender, and Income Level

Source: Pew Research Center. 2018. ”Internet Connectivity Seen as Having Positive Impact on Life in Sub-Saharan Africa, but Digital Divides Persist.” http://www.pewglobal.org/2018/10/09/internet-connectivity-seen-as-having-positive-impact-on-life-in-sub-saharan-africa.

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16 OVERVIEW

How does social exclusion play out in Africa?Social exclusion is fundamentally about relations of power. The world over, societies devise intricate ways to solidify social structures and uphold the status quo. Attitudes, beliefs, perceptions, and practices, including superstitions, stigmas, and rituals, are among the processes through which societies render some groups to subordinate and others to dominant status. Structures and systems comprise, among others, families, communities, legal systems, labor, land markets, and knowledge systems. It is also important to note that structures and processes reinforce each other and are solidified by formal and informal institutions.

Across the world, belief systems, superstitions, stigmas, and other practices present formidable barriers to the inclusion of certain groups. Intimidation and harassment instill fear that prevents some groups from reaching their full potential and “keeps them in their place.” Social norms may assign males and females to certain occupations or may render some practices “unclean.” Other practices such as stigma and shunning may render some groups, like persons with disabilities or persons with albinism, invisible. Relatedly, some cultures may hide persons with disabilities. This lack of visibility can have several consequences, including not counting these groups in official statistics; thus, they remain hidden and unattended to, at both the familial and the national level. Often, these processes of exclusion are sanctified by religion or by those who interpret religious texts. Persons who have a nonconforming sexual identity are excluded to the point of being criminalized in many cultures; this is often upheld by an invocation of religious texts. Taboos surrounding menstruating women are common in many parts of the world; beliefs of purity and pollution serve to exclude certain groups at certain times or at all times. Overall, these practices are mechanisms to enforce social order and control.

Why do processes and practices matter for policies and programs? They matter because they affect the actions and behaviors of dominant and subordinate groups, of service providers, and of the state itself. Groups that are historically excluded, on their part, may respond in different ways. One possibility is that they “opt out” or reject the terms on which they are included. Excluded groups may drop out of school or the labor market or disengage from political processes. A second and related possibility is that grievances may accumulate, creating social tensions and having long-term effects on the economy and society. A third possibility is that groups that feel excluded organize themselves into formidable lobbies and use the political space to demand change. Processes and structures have strong effects on feelings and perceptions of individuals and groups. In our quest to leave no one behind, attain universal access, and eradicate extreme poverty, we need to be cognizant of behavior, which is the first step to lasting change. Yet, even as we know that belief systems, feelings, and perceptions affect behaviors, measuring and interpreting such systems and the underlying affective foundations is a complex undertaking that requires a deep understanding of the context as well as robust data and analytic tools.

Violence is one of the gravest manifestations of exclusion and a mechanism to show subordinate groups “their place.” Physical offensives are often justified by an intricate

INCLUSION MATTERS IN AFRICA 17

set of beliefs and taboos that serve to create a “logic of exclusion” that may be sanctified by religion. For example, many religions regard a woman’s place as being in the home and may implicitly condone violence against those women who dare to transgress this norm. Overall, the acceptance of domestic violence against women remains high in Africa, although there has been change over time. Beegle et al. (2016) find that between 2000–2006 and 2007–2013 acceptance of domestic violence by women in Africa declined by almost 10 percentage points, but, at 30 percent, acceptance of domestic violence in the region is still exceptionally high. There is considerable heterogeneity across countries, however. Some practices, such as female genital mutilation (FGM), which hold cultural value for some groups, are also examples of violence and extreme symbols of exclusion, with devastating effects on health, education, and life chances. FGM can have direct effects on reproductive and mental health and cause infectious disease. Sanctified and upheld by religion and culture, FGM serves to solidify the subordinate status of women and girls.

Culture plays a central role in the political, economic and social life of communities. Indeed, culture may be the missing link in the development of Africa. Culture is dynamic and evolves over time, consciously discarding retrogressive traditions, like female genital mutilation (FGM), and embracing aspects that are good and useful.

Wangari Maathai, 20047

Attitudes, perceptions, and feelings can point to the extent to which people feel included in markets, services, and spaces. Belonging to an ethnic group can create affinity and comfort among members; in the same vein, expressing affinity with a national identity is an indication that respondents feel connected to their country. The Afrobarometer 2014/2015 asked respondents who disclosed their ethnic identity at the beginning of the survey if they regarded their national or their ethnic identity as more important. The results are instructive; only a small minority of respondents appeared to give precedence to their ethnic identity alone. Feelings of national or ethnic identity may be driven by several factors, related to the extent of pluralism or of competition in society, the history of the nation-state or of conflict, and the current political milieu. It is also possible that these questions elicit socially or politically acceptable responses; they should not be taken as “truths” and must be interpreted with caution.

Negative feelings about the state are widespread in many parts of Africa. This disaffection is apparent in several countries in newspaper columns, social media, and casual conversations. It is also reflected in perception surveys. The Afrobarometer 2014/2015 asked respondents how often they feel that people in their country are being treated unequally “under the law” (that is, by the state); this likely indicates grievances and feelings of injustice and exclusion. Figure O.4 presents the results. There are, as expected, large variations across African countries; Botswana and Namibia stand out as countries where almost 60 percent of the respondents felt that people were never or rarely treated unequally under the law. In Malawi, Mauritius, and Tanzania, about half or a little more of the respondents felt that unequal treatment under the law was never or rarely manifested. At the other end of spectrum, in Mali and São Tomé and

18 OVERVIEW

Príncipe, over half the respondents felt that unequal treatment under the law was always manifested. Overall, in most countries more than half the respondents felt that people were often or always treated unequally under the law.

When a majority of citizens feel that people in their country are treated unequally, it often points to elite capture; in other words, the state is perceived as catering to the needs of a small section of society. In this situation, exclusion is not a minority issue but affects many or most citizens. Several recent World Bank Systematic Country Diagnostics (SCDs) in Africa identify elite capture and a lack of public trust as important obstacles to the delivery of inclusive services and a stable social contract more broadly. See, for example, SCDs for Benin (World Bank 2017b), Guinea-Bissau (World Bank 2016), Liberia (World Bank 2018e), and Madagascar (World Bank 2015). Other surveys and anecdotal evidence also point to perceptions that the state and its institutions are opaque and that they benefit only a few. A perception survey conducted by the Pew Research Center found that 64 percent of Kenyans, 63 percent of Nigerians, and 69 percent of South Africans surveyed felt that many jobs go to people with connections.8

Despite serious misgivings about their economies and often about their governments, there is emerging evidence that people living in several African countries have high levels of optimism. For instance, as part of the Pew Research Center Spring 2017 Global Attitudes Survey, roughly half of Africans (median of 49 percent) and Latin Americans (48 percent) surveyed said their day was “particularly good,” whereas other regions overwhelmingly described their day as “typical.” Similarly, Graham and Hoover (2006), based on Afrobarometer data, found levels of optimism in Africa that surpassed other regions, with particularly high levels of optimism among the poorest and most insecure respondents, who had high hopes for the future of their children. In keeping with this finding, the Liberia SCD (World Bank 2018e, 72) cites a 2014 survey that found that most Liberians believe the country is headed in the right direction, driven in part by Liberia’s return to relative peace and stability.

Social inclusion can be achieved if it is a conscious choice for societies Social inclusion is important because exclusion impedes the ability, opportunity, and dignity of some individuals and groups and is costly to societies and economies. But measuring the costs of social exclusion is no mean undertaking. Some estimates focus on specific groups when assessing the cost of exclusion; these groups include women, persons with disabilities, ethnic or racial groups, individuals in same-sex relations, and migrants. This report lays out some of the channels and levels through which costs are obtained. Costs can be surmised at the level of the individual, the household, the group, or the community; they may also be estimated at local, subnational, and national levels. The costs of social exclusion may be direct or indirect, short term or long term. The cumulative long-term costs can be significant and can affect the growth trajectories of entire economies. For example, lower earnings or employment outcomes at the individual level may be driven by lower human capital endowments,

INCLUSION MATTERS IN AFRICA 19

Figure O.4 Perceptions of Unequal Treatment under the Law

Source: World Bank calculations based on data from Afrobarometer 2014/2015, Round 6 (http://afrobarometer.org/sites/default/files/summary_results/ab_R6_afrobarometer_global_release_highlights.pdf).

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20 OVERVIEW

which in turn may be caused by prior disadvantage in education or by discrimination in hiring or in the workplace (for example, Buckup 2009; Lamichhane and Sawada 2013; Morgon Banks and Polock 2015). The experience of exclusion can have physical and mental health costs at the individual, household, group, and ultimately national level (see, for example, Lereya et al. 2015). Finally, foregone benefits can also be costly. Hunt, Layton, and Prince (2015) and Hunt et al. (2018) find that companies in the top quartile for gender, racial, and ethnic diversity are between 15 and 35 percent more likely to have financial returns above national industry medians. Gains from the inclusion of excluded groups occur not only due to addition of workers to the labor force; diversity in itself may increase productivity (Ostry et al. 2018).

Ultimately, social inclusion must be a conscious choice of societies and governments, with a clear understanding of the costs and benefits. Investing in an inclusive society is not free and needs concerted action to transform the investment into a win-win. Social programs, for instance, can be expensive and have an impact on fiscal sustainability. Governments often need to make trade-offs, either by cutting costs on other initiatives or by raising taxes. There may be political costs as well, as initiatives that focus on historically excluded groups can upset power relations. Governments and politicians need to craft clear social contracts with citizens to ensure support for social inclusion. There are examples the world over of citizens willing to pay for a more inclusive society. The most powerful form of support is through the fiscal realm, whereby citizens pay taxes that they know will fund policies and programs for greater social inclusion. In Brazil, Mexico, and Nepal, for instance, there is strong support for social protection programs; and in Bangladesh, poverty reduction is recognized as a national priority, with the elite supporting antipoverty initiatives (Hossain and Moore 2002). There is tentative evidence from Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, and Uganda that attitudes toward redistribution may be favorable overall (Langer, Stewart, and Schroyens 2016).

Change toward social inclusion is within reachHow does change take place? Who are the main actors? What are the channels through which progress toward social inclusion is achieved? What can we learn for the future and for the countries that want to make greater progress? We draw from the World Bank’s social inclusion framework (World Bank 2013) and address inclusion in markets, services, and spaces. Inclusion how? And here we repeat what we have said earlier in this report: by raising the ability, opportunity, and dignity of individuals and groups most likely to be left out. This report outlines some of the policy and program efforts in African countries in the pursuit of social inclusion. Sometimes, documenting process helps others in their quest to design workable solutions, so we focus on some innovations and generic solutions that African countries have tried.

There are other important drivers of change toward social inclusion in Africa, as elsewhere. These include a host of nonstate actors: religious groups, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), the private sector, and, most importantly, organizations of historically subordinate groups. Lasting change usually comes when state and nonstate

INCLUSION MATTERS IN AFRICA 21

actors come together. Elites are often part of both state and nonstate actions and play a critical role in propelling social inclusion. The importance of the HIV/AIDS epidemic in many parts of the continent presents an interesting case in point. What started as attention to a public health emergency quickly moved to identifying affected groups; they included, among others, gay and bisexual men, and men who have sex with men, widows, and orphans. The attention to sexual orientation in many African countries was legitimized because it was linked to a public health crisis, and groups previously invisible were rendered visible. This is not to say that stigma no longer exists, and sometimes the stigma may only have changed its form. Nevertheless, the epidemic was a catalyst. It presented an opportunity that enabled previously excluded groups to mobilize and be partners in the change that policy and programs propelled. Through the process of attacking the epidemic, governments and civil society co-opted elites and community members alike. Innovative methods of using information and communication technology to solicit anonymous responses to questions have become increasingly popular. Such technology can also be used to amplify voice. In Tanzania and South Sudan, two pilot initiatives referred to as “Listening to Africa” have been highly successful in collecting panel data through mobile phone interviews.

Regardless of which actor sponsors a program that is intended to promote social inclusion, few programs can succeed without community ownership. Communities that own the movement toward social inclusion and can visualize a new society for themselves are most likely to be invested in the success of such programs. Conversely, when programs are designed without community involvement, they may take longer to take off and even face resistance from the community. The process of abolishing FGM in Burkina Faso is an illustrative case. Together with criminalizing the practice in 1997, the government implemented a broad array of measures that promoted community ownership of the change. In addition to training lawyers, judges, police, and security officers to ensure their buy-in, the government supported “community patrols” that raised awareness of the harmful consequences of FGM and informed communities of its criminalization.

Most countries in Africa, as elsewhere, have a plethora of policies, programs, and projects to advance social inclusion. These policies may be targeted to certain groups or areas, or they may be universal, accessible to everyone. At the highest level, the constitutions of most countries guarantee equality and basic freedoms. Laws are the next level of actions that promote change; they can be progressive or regressive. Box O.4 shows that Africa has made the fastest progress in enacting laws that promotegender equality. Broad-vision documents, manifestos, and pronouncements give amore defined indication of the priorities of a government. Still lower down are policies, which lay out directives and show the clearer path of a government’s focus on socialinclusion. Many policies signal the groups that they privilege or ignore by their silenceon certain topics or groups or by the intensity of implementation of certain policies.So, although policies may not actively exclude individuals or groups, they may doso passively, either by not expressly indicating who is included or by not investingadequate resources or attention to implementation.9 Some examples of policies andprograms are presented in Table O.1.

22 OVERVIEW

Africa has implemented the most reforms promoting gender equality of any region globally, with 71 reforms over the last 10 years. Most of these reforms (over 50 percent) regarded laws affecting gender-based violence, with Burundi, the Comoros, Rwanda, São Tomé and Príncipe, and Zambia all introducing

laws addressing both workplace sexual harassment and domestic violence. Among the top reforming economies in the region over the past decade are the Democratic Republic of Congo, Guinea, Malawi, Mauritius, São Tomé and Príncipe, and Zambia (see figure B O.4.1).

The Democratic Republic of Congo saw the largest increase in its Women, Business and the Law index (from 42.50 in 2009 to 70 in 2018). Improvements in the Democratic Republic of Congo were based on reforms allowing married women to register businesses, open bank accounts, sign contracts, get jobs, and choose where to live in the same way as men. The legal requirement for wives to obey their husbands was removed, as were restrictions on women working in specific industries such as mining, manufacturing, and construction. The Democratic Republic of Congo also introduced gender nondiscrimination laws in employment and access to credit.

Mauritius began reforms in 2008 by introducing civil remedies for sexual harassment at work, prohibiting the dismissal of pregnant workers, introducing paid paternity leave, and prohibiting discrimination in access to credit based on gender. The government mandated

equal remuneration for work of equal value in 2013 and increased the length of paid maternity leave from 12 to 14 weeks in 2015. Due to these reforms, Mauritius’ score increased by 16.88 points; between 2009 and 2018, the female labor force participation rate went up by 6.82 percent relative to men’s.

São Tomé and Príncipe introduced a domestic violence law in 2009, implemented a workplace sexual harassment law including criminal penalties in 2012, and reformed its retirement laws for men and women to entitlement to full pension benefits, also making the mandatory retirement age for men and women equal, in 2014. Between 2009 and 2018, female labor force participation increased by 1.75 percent relative to that of men.

Source: World Bank 2018g.

Box O.4 Legal Reform for Women in Africa

Figure B O.4.1 Improvement in the Women, Business and the Law Index, 2009–2018

Source: World Bank 2018g, 11, based on Women, Business and the Law database. Note: WBL = Women, Business and the Law database.

WB

L in

dex 100

90

80

70

60

50

40

30

Congo, Dem. Rep.

São Tomé and Príncipe

Bolivia

Country

Maldives Guinea Mauritius Samoa Malawi Zambia

42.50

70

82.50

73.7568.13

76.88

58.75

75.00

73.75

83.7578.75

63.7568.13

56.88

91.88

49.3853.13

61.88

Change in score between WBL 2009 and WBL 2018

INCLUSION MATTERS IN AFRICA 23

Well-designed and implemented programs across the globe have changed the face of social exclusion. Of these, social safety nets have a historical track record of shielding households from the negative effects of shocks and, more recently, of building household and community assets. Such programs started in Africa in response to food crises and humanitarian emergencies and still complement emergency responses to crises or shocks, consequently reducing the cost and increasing the effectiveness of humanitarian action. Social safety nets often provide ready vehicles through which to intervene in crises. In response to the Ebola emergency, governments leveraged the existing modest programs and scaled up cash transfers and public works programs (Beegle, Coudouel, and Monsalve 2018, 67). Over time, Africa has become a leader in the design and delivery of social safety nets. Every country in the region has at least one social safety net program. A broad array of programs that can be loosely classified as “empowerment programs” are often targeted to historically excluded groups and can have large positive impacts. In Uganda, the Empowerment and Livelihood for Adolescents (ELA) program was developed and implemented by Building Resources Across Communities (BRAC) to provide training for small-scale enterprises and education for health and reduction of risky behaviors. The Sahel Women Empowerment and Demographic Dividend (SWEDD) project that spans Burkina Faso, Chad, Côte d’Ivoire, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger has used several innovations toward attaining its objective of empowering women and adolescent girls through access to quality reproductive, child, and maternal health services and working with local partners to improve their capacities. The project has garnered the support of religious leaders on issues such as child marriage, maternal and child health, family planning, girls’ education, gender-based violence, and women’s economic and social empowerment. In yet another initiative, the project gives bikes, school kits, and sanitary kits to girls. The project also organizes coaching classes in select areas so that girls can keep up in school and trains young women in nontraditional trades.

Another way of focusing on specific individuals or groups is through affirmative action or quotas. Special provisions for individuals and groups are common in OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) and non-OECD countries alike. Although sometimes controversial, especially in the context of stubborn group-based inequalities, affirmative action policies are still considered among the more effective policy mechanisms (Langer, Stewart, and Schroyens 2016). Many African countries have affirmative action policies for women and persons with disabilities. Uganda enshrined a quota system for parliament in the 1995 Constitution (Article 78) stating that parliament should include a woman representative in every district, as well as representatives from the army, youth, workers, persons with disabilities, and “other groups as Parliament may define.” Similar provisions were made to ensure seats for women in local government (Muriaas and Wang 2012, 311). South Africa, of course, has the most prominent and comprehensive set of initiatives.

24 OVERVIEW

The changing development context of the continent, as demonstrated by select regional trends, portends new opportunities and challenges for African countries over the next few decades. First, the decline of poverty almost across the board, the enhancement of education, and the improvements in health have meant (and will increasingly mean) that policy makers need to focus on those who have not benefited from this aggregate progress. Of these, people who are affected by conflict and fragility stand out, but some groups in nonfragile contexts are also at risk of being left out. These include some categories of women, sexual and gender minorities, persons with disabilities, older persons, some categories of youth and children, certain ethnic and racial groups, and those who live in “lagging” regions. Some of these groups are more assertive; others may have festering grievances. Second, development spearheads aspiration. As individuals and groups do better, they will seek more; this has implications for how governments respond to these heightened aspirations. The report shows that citizens in many countries in Africa are simultaneously disenchanted with the state and filled with optimism and hope for better lives. As more countries graduate to middle-income status, they will focus on “second-generation” issues of prosperity. The trends and transitions that shape and tame Africa’s dynamism are likely to have significant implications for social inclusion in the years ahead. Although a focus on poverty must be front and center in addressing issues of social inclusion, states and societies will also need to consider the drivers of poverty and why some groups are left out.

Africa has made enormous progress toward economic development and social inclusion, but much more needs to be done. There are several areas in which some of the fastest progress globally is in African countries. But, as the World Bank (2013) points out, social inclusion is not a linear process. Progress can stall for unanticipated reasons, but it may pick up again. Groups that were once disempowered may gain power and may upstage earlier dominant groups, who may in turn work to impede progress toward social inclusion because it hurts their interests. Social inclusion is, therefore, always work in progress (World Bank 2013).

26 OVERVIEW

Domain of inclusion

Channel for intervention

Illustrative actions targeting those most likely to be left behind

Illustrative examples of policies, programs, and projects

MARKETS

Labor Legal provisions enabling access to the labor market

· Ensuring access of excluded groupsto jobs and their ability to open bankaccounts and businesses.

· Removing the obligation of women toobey their husbands.

· Lifting restrictions on women working atnight.

· Enshrining nondiscrimination inemployment law (including hiring, pay,and promotions).

· Banning harassment at work.

· Establishing legal remedies for sexualand other forms of harassment inemployment.

· Prohibiting dismissal of pregnantemployees.

· Establishing paid maternity and paternityleave.

Congo, Dem. Rep. Reforms of family code to improve gender equality and gender nondiscrimination reforms in employment.

Zambia Gender Equity and Equality Act and establishment of Gender Equality Commission.

Ethiopia Reforms of property law, requiring both spouses’ consent in the administration of marital property; simultaneous change to raise women’s minimum age of marriage.

Burundi, the Comoros, Mauritius, Rwanda, São Tomé and Príncipe, and Zambia Laws against workplace sexual harassment and domestic violence.

Mauritius Prohibition of dismissal of pregnant workers, introduction of paid paternity leave, and extension of paid maternity leave.

Affirmative action and quotas

· Implementing measures to attract,develop, and retain individuals fromhistorically disadvantaged groups.

· Considering job quotas forunderrepresented groups.

· Establishing data and monitoring andevaluation systems to monitor and assessimpact of affirmative action.

· Setting up institutions that can addressgrievance.

South Africa 1998 Employment Equity Act and 2003 broad-based black economic empowerment legislation for “Blacks (including African, Coloured [mixed race] and Indians), women and people with disabilities.”a

Nigeria Federal Character Commission (FCC) established in 1996. Oversees implementation of affirmative action in bureaucracy, social services, infrastructure development, and the private sector.

Skills and training

· Supporting income-generating activitiesfor excluded groups (e.g., ex-combatants,youth, and women).

· Developing soft and hard skills training.

· Training for small-scale enterprisestargeted at specific groups, e.g., women.

Congo, Dem. Rep. Strengthening socioeconomic reintegration opportunities for vulnerable households of ex-combatants demobilized through the PNDDR.

Liberia Ministry of Public Works (with support from UNMIL, UNDP, and WB) initiated labor-intensive employment scheme to rehabilitate roads, offering jobs to ex-combatants and war-affected youth.

Uganda Empowerment and Livelihood for Adolescents (ELA) program.

Financial Mobile financial technology

· Prohibiting discrimination in access tocredit and financial transactions andputting in place systems for enforcement.

· Providing access to financial technology(“fintech”) to those who have beentraditionally “unbanked.”

· Training for the use of mobile financeproducts; business skills training formicroentrepreneurs.

Congo, Dem. Rep. and Mauritius Gender nondiscrimination laws regarding access to credit.

Kenya M-PESA, a money transfer system first introduced in 2007; by 2018, 96 percent of households outside Nairobi had at least one M-PESA account.

Tanzania Business Women Connect (BWC) program.

Table O.1 Illustrative Interventions for Social Inclusion in Markets, Services, and Spaces

INCLUSION MATTERS IN AFRICA 27

Domain of inclusion

Channel for intervention

Illustrative actions targeting those most likely to be left behind

Illustrative examples of policies, programs, and projects

Land Legal provisions for land ownership

· Establishing gender parity in inheritance and land ownership laws.

· Providing land titles or de facto recognition of land use and recognizing customary rights of excluded groups.

Rwanda Legislative reform first eliminated bias against female land ownership, followed by the 2005 Organic Land Law (OLL) to establish a single statutory system of land tenure and end the dualism of customary and formal tenure systems.

Kenya Decision of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights to recognize the ownership rights of Endorois (agropastoralists) to their ancestral lands around the Lake Bogoria Game Reserve.

Land reform · Enabling redistribution through land reforms, e.g., by making excluded groups (women, indigenous groups) joint landholders in land redistribution and resettlement projects.

· Reserving land use quotas.

· Strengthening the representation of women and indigenous persons in land negotiations.

· Facilitating participation of excluded groups in procedures, e.g., by allowing oral evidence in land tribunals.

Mozambique 1997 land law allows oral evidence to be used as part of land tribunals.

Rwanda 2010 nationwide land tenure regularization (LTR) program.

SERVICES

Cross-cutting services

Documentation · Ensuring that all groups have relevant documentation to access services.

World Bank Group–supported ID4D initiative (Botswana, Cameroon, Chad, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Ethiopia, Guinea, Kenya, Liberia, Madagascar, Morocco, Namibia, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, and Zambia).

Emergency responses to protect vulnerable groups

· Scaling up cash transfer and public works programs.

Multicountry responses to Ebola emergency, extreme weather events, and conflict.

Engaging communities and training governmental authorities

· Training regional and municipal governments in participatory budgeting.

· Requiring and enabling participation of excluded groups (e.g., women, pastoralist groups) in budget consultation meetings.

Kenya Participatory budgeting in West Pokot.

South Sudan Local Governance and Service Delivery Project (LOGOSEED).

Targeted attention to historically excluded groups

· Ensuring equal rights to quality services.

· Prohibiting discrimination in services.

· Establishing monitoring and enforcement mechanisms.

· Making services free and compulsory.

Nigeria Federal Character Commission (FCC) oversees affirmative action, including in social services.

Ghana Inclusive Education Policy.

Uganda Persons with Disability Act 2006.

Tanzania Primary education made both free and compulsory.

Kenya Cash Transfer for Orphans and Vulnerable Children.

Table O.1 continued

28 OVERVIEW

Domain of inclusion

Channel for intervention

Illustrative actions targeting those most likely to be left behind

Illustrative examples of policies, programs, and projects

Education Accessibility · Ensuring that educational infrastructure is accessible to persons with disabilities.

· Adapting education systems to ensure the inclusion of all learners, in particular those with special educational needs, including physical accessibility of schools.

· Promoting Universal Design for Learning (UDL) and learner-friendly school environments to enhance the quality of education for all learners.

Ghana Inclusive Education Policy.

Teacher training and curriculum development

· Training teachers to respond to diverse educational needs.

· Providing teacher training in local languages.

· Considering bilingual education.

· Ensuring that curricula are designed in a way that is sensitive to excluded groups.

Ethiopia Language-of-instruction (LOI) policy.

Ghana Inclusive Education Policy.

Guinea-Bissau and Niger Pilots of transitional bilingual programs.

SPACES

Physical Safety in public places

· Generating forums such as women’s and girls’ clubs that provide safe spaces for survivors of gender-based violence and offer access to sexual health services, legal aid, and empowerment training.

Uganda BRAC Nkingo girls’ clubs in Kemwenge and Kabarole.b

Political and social

Constitutional and legal provisions

· Explicitly acknowledging equal status and rights of different groups in the government constitution.

· Creating legal provisions to institutionalize equality and inclusion of formerly excluded groups.

· Establishing quota for excluded groups, e.g., in political representation.

South Africa LGBTI equality in constitution.

Mozambique and Seychelles Decriminalized same-sex relations (2015 and 2016, respectively).

Botswana 2017 Supreme Court decision requires government to legally recognize transgender people’s gender self-identification.

Namibia Courts’ decision to allow official recognition of gender change.

Bans on anti-LGBTI discrimination (Angola, Botswana, Cabo Verde, Mauritius, Mozambique, Seychelles, South Africa).

Kenya Domestic violence law.

Uganda 1995 Constitution (Art.78) stating that parliament should include a woman representative in every district as well as representatives from the army, youth, workers, persons with disabilities, and “other groups as Parliament may define.”

Changing social norms and tackling discrimination

· Building coalitions between government, civil society, the judiciary, and communities.

Congo, Dem. Rep. Strengthening socioeconomic reintegration opportunities for vulnerable households of ex-combatants demobilized through the PNDDR.

Table O.1 continued

INCLUSION MATTERS IN AFRICA 29

Domain of inclusion

Channel for intervention

Illustrative actions targeting those most likely to be left behind

Illustrative examples of policies, programs, and projects

Changing social norms and tackling discrimination (continued)

· Promoting information campaigns,e.g., through national radio broadcasts,television, newspapers, and social media.

· Putting in place systems to ensureparticipation of multiple stakeholders.

· Fostering community buy-in throughongoing contact and conversation withcommunities.

· Ensuring that the law is understood by all;translation of law, rules, and proceduresinto local languages.

· Training and fostering normative changeamong state personnel (e.g., lawyers,judges, police, and security officers.

· Providing space for movements thatadvocate for excluded groups to engageon policy reform.

Burkina Faso Criminalization of FGM and measures for enforcement and normative change.

Information campaigns around HIV across the region.

Opportunities for intergroup cohesion

· Sending young citizens to live in differentregions of the country.

· Considering truth and reconciliationcommissions (TRCs) to overcome conflict.

Nigeria National Youth Service Corps (NYSC).

TRCs in The Gambia, Mauritius, Rwanda, and South Africa.

Empowerment and dignity

· Establishing cash transfers and othersocial protection programs that boostself-confidence and imbue a sense ofdignity.

· Using social media and technology toamplify voices of excluded groups.

· Promoting reproductive rights andservices.

· Enabling survivors of gender-basedviolence to report anonymously.

Kenya, Mozambique, and Zambia Cash transfer programs.

South Sudan and Tanzania “Listening to Africa” initiative.

Sahel Women Empowerment and Demographic Dividend (SWEDD).

Uganda BRAC Empowerment and Livelihood for Adolescents (ELA) program.

Community-based rehabilitation (CBR) for persons with disabilities.

Better data and analysis

· Collecting better disaggregated data onsocial groups and processes

· Promoting platforms that make datapublic

· Fostering innovations in data collection,such as high frequency data collectionthrough mobile phones

· Investing in geospatial data and otherforms of big data

· Encouraging and financing better analysis

World Bank’s Gender Innovation Lab

Listening to Africa initiative

Table O.1 continued

Note: BRAC = Building Resources Across Communities; FGM = female genital mutilation; ID4D = Identification for Development; LGBTI = lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and intersex; PNDDR = National Program for Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration; UNDP = United Nations Development Programme; UNMIL = United Nations Mission in Liberia; WB = World Bank.

a. Burger and Jafta 2010.

b. Via the Supporting Children’s Opportunities through Protection and Empowerment Project, implemented by the Ministry of Gender, Laborand Social Development.

30 OVERVIEW

Endnotes1 See https://www.worldbank.org/en/region/afr/overview#2.

2 See https://africaindata.org/#/2.

3 Based on $1.90 a day in 2011 purchasing power parity (PPP). Source: PovcalNet, http://iresearch.worldbank.org/PovcalNet.

4 From UN DESA Population Division “2018 Revision of World Urbanization Prospects,” https://www.un.org/development/desa/publications/2018-revision-of-world-urbanization-prospects.html (accessed September 19, 2019).

5 Pew Research Center, 2018, “Internet Connectivity Seen as Having Positive Impact on Life in Sub-Saharan Africa, but Digital Divides Persist,” http://www.pewglobal.org/2018/10/09/internet-connectivity-seen-as-having-positive-impact-on-life-in-sub-saharan-africa.

6 A.-M. Essoungou, 2013, “The Rise of Civil Society Groups in Africa,” Africa Renewal, December, https://www.un.org/africarenewal/magazine/december-2013/rise-civil-society-groups-africa (accessed August 24, 2019).

7 W. Maathai, Nobel Lecture, Oslo, December 10, 2004, https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/peace/2004/maathai/26050-wangari-maathai-nobel-lecture-2004.

8 See R. Wike et al., 2016, “In Key African Nations, Widespread Discontent with Economy, Corruption: But Most Are Optimistic about Future in South Africa, Nigeria, Kenya,” Pew Research Center, https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2016/11/14/in-key-african-nations-widespread-discontent-with-economy-corruption.

9 For a discussion of active and passive exclusion, see A. Sen, 2000, Social Exclusion: Concept, Application and Scrutiny, Social Development Papers, No. 1. Asian Development Bank, Manila. https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/publication/29778/social-exclusion.pdf (accessed September 9, 2019).

CHAPTER1

INCLUSION MATTERS IN AFRICA 33

Africa is increasingly recognized for its dynamism, its

innovation and for social change. The idea of the ‘African

Century’ has pervaded national and international policy and

advocacy circles. Across Africa there have been impressive gains

in health, nutrition, education, and women’s empowerment,

among others. Innovation that abounds in Africa is reflected

in a plethora of areas: in the spread of digital technology, in

advocacy movements that bring people previously ostracized

and invisible into public view, and in social enterprises and

fresh answers to intractable questions. As incubation hubs that

create solutions to stubborn challenges, African countries are

the arena in which global development challenges will play out

and likely be overcome.

The Motivation and Conceptual Clarity

34 CHAPTER 1 THE MOTIVATION AND CONCEPTUAL CLARITY

Nevertheless, positive developments and prosperity have left some individuals and groups behind; a reality across the world, in OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) and non-OECD countries alike. This realization led to the formulation of the idea of social exclusion and its converse, inclusion, which has taken different forms across varied regions. In Europe, social inclusion has largely been associated with the job market, homelessness, and chronic poverty, with an increasing focus on ethnicity and migrant status. In Latin America, indigenous identity, race, disability status, and sexual identity have grown to prominence in national discourses. In South Asia, caste, ethnicity, religion, and disability status are key axes of exclusion. In Africa, most discussions of social inclusion have taken place within the context of poverty reduction and in response to humanitarian crises. These conversations are driven by the fact that despite significant progress in decreasing poverty, more than 400 million people are estimated to still live in poverty (Beegle and Christiaensen 2019). As in other places, in Africa, “the poor” is a heterogenous category. Some groups tend to be are overrepresented or underrepresented among them, and they systematically lack access to markets, services, and spaces. These groups have a weaker voice when it comes to asserting their needs with governments and elites. They often live in areas of conflict and fragility. It behooves us to ask: Who are these groups? Are they being left out of peace and prosperity? If so, why? Answers to these questions can significantly aid programs and policies intended to reduce poverty and boost human capital accumulation.

Box 1.1 World Bank Regional Strategy for Africa

• Empowering women to change fertility dynamicsand accelerate human capital gains: Through thenew Human Capital Project (HCP) the World Bank iscommitted to investing more and better in people.

• Accelerating Africa’s digital economy: With digitaleconomy investments and reforms, Africa maybe able to accelerate, possibly even leapfrog thetraditional growth model, and transition from anagriculture-based economy to a digital economy,while building core infrastructure, systems, andcompetencies.

• Climate change: In the face of increasing climate-related risks, investing in climate change adaptationand resilience mechanisms and disaster riskmanagement will remain a top priority.

• Regional integration: Regional integration inAfrica remains a critical emphasis of the WBGregional strategy to improve connectivity, leverageeconomies of scale, and facilitate collective actionby countries to address shared challenges.

• Maximizing finance for development: At a timewhen public resources are increasingly scarceand the aspirations of African populations arerising, the World Bank Group has embraced theMaximizing Finance for Development approachto systematically leverage all sources of finance,expertise, and solutions that will help create anenabling environment for investors, particularlythose in the private sector.

• Boosting resilience to conflict and violence: Withviolent conflict surging, the fight to end extremepoverty in Africa will require a stronger focus onaddressing the underlying drivers of fragility to create opportunities for peace and shared prosperity.

• Knowledge: Knowledge is essential to our effortto improve development outcomes and make aidmore effective.

Source: World Bank 2019, https://www.worldbank.org/en/region/afr/overview#2.

INCLUSION MATTERS IN AFRICA 35

Additional motivation for a spotlight on social inclusion is embedded in four related developments in the global policy arena. First, the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) with their philosophy of leaving no one behind have permeated the policy space. Second, the WBG’s focus on ending extreme poverty, combined with its twin goal of boosting shared prosperity, has moved the policy conversation to issues that go beyond poverty. Third, the World Bank’s flagship report on social inclusion, Inclusion Matters (World Bank 2013), has influenced the global conversation, and, although attribution is not clear cut, funding agencies have increasingly focused their grantmaking on issues of social inclusion, using language from the report. Last, the idea of social inclusion has pride of place in the new World Bank Environmental and Social Framework (ESF) that has applied to WBG projects since October 2018 (also see annex 2). The ESF defines social sustainability squarely in terms of social inclusion, stating that “social development and inclusion are critical for all of the World Bank’s development interventions and for achieving sustainable development.” It further states that “inclusion … embraces action to remove barriers against those who are often excluded from the development process, such as women, children, persons with disabilities, youth and minorities, and to ensure that the voice of all can be heard” (World Bank 2017d, 1).

Finally, the Africa Region of the World Bank announced its new strategy, which is rooted in the tenets of social inclusion. The strategy is outlined in box 1.1. Much of this report directly or indirectly addresses the issues that have been raised in the Africa regional strategy. The contribution of this report will be in its application of the social inclusion framework to the problems articulated in the strategy and its identification of the underlying structures and processes that exacerbate social exclusion.

What do we mean by social inclusion?The prolific use of “social inclusion” (or just “inclusion”) as a framing construct over the last decade has been somewhat of a double-edged sword, so it is important to define what we mean. Essentially, the usage “social inclusion” and its variants seems to have “become a catch-all … for any positive welfare outcome—from poverty to equality to better education, health, housing, transport, among others.” (Das 2016). Yet users of the term seem to want to convey something that is different from, or more than, poverty or inequality reduction or better human capital outcomes. Although this prolific use points to a new and broader lexicon in global development, the usage is fraught with lack of conceptual and policy clarity. This report draws its conceptual foundation from the World Bank (2013) as portrayed in figure 1.1. We define social inclusion as the process of improving the terms for individuals and groups to take part in society. An expanded definition takes into account how and for whom the terms of social inclusion can be improved: the process of improving the ability, opportunity, and dignity of people disadvantaged on the basis of their identity to take part in society. In answer to the question “inclusion in what?” the World Bank (2013) answers: in markets, services, and spaces. Markets comprise land, housing, labor, and credit, and services encompass education, health, transport, water, social protection, electricity, information, communication, and technology, among others. Spaces includes physical

36 CHAPTER 1 THE MOTIVATION AND CONCEPTUAL CLARITY

space but also spaces in a broader sense: social, political, and cultural spaces may solidify exclusion or foster inclusion. Moreover, social inclusion works to enhance the ability, opportunity, and dignity of individuals and groups to take part in society. Of particular significance is dignity, which when compromised can have severe and unexpected consequences for individuals, groups, and the society and economy as a whole.

It is clear from the definition of social inclusion that disadvantage based on social identity is salient, and, although such salience can be political and controversial, its acknowledgment is important to the advancement of social inclusion. Social identity may be derived from gender, age, location, occupation, race, ethnicity, religion, citizenship status, disability, and sexual orientation and gender identity (SOGI), among other factors (figure 1.2). Yet, no single identity really describes an individual; the context determines the identity that assumes dominance at different times (such as place in the life cycle) and in various places (such as the public or the private sphere). Moreover, the intersection of identities bestows the real advantage or disadvantage.

To close this initial discussion about the importance of social identity, we quote Sen (2008) who emphasizes the importance of “non-economic characteristics” that often drive outcomes.

Purely economic measures of inequality, such as the Gini coefficient or the ratio of incomes of top and bottom groups, do not bring out the social dimensions of the disparity involved. For example, when the people in the bottom income groups also have different non-economic characteristics, in terms of race (such as being black rather than white), or in immigration status (such as being recent arrivals rather than older residents), then the significance of the economic inequality is substantially magnified by its “coupling” with other divisions, linked to non-economic identity groups. It would be hard, for instance, to have an adequate understanding of the turmoil in the suburbs of Paris and other French cities in the autumn of 2005 only in terms of poverty and deprivation, without bringing in race and immigration. It would be similarly unsatisfactory to try to base a causal explanation only on race and immigration, without bringing in inequality and economic disparity. (15)

INCLUSION MATTERS IN AFRICA 37

FEMALES

SERVICESSOCIAL PROTECTIONINFORMATIONELECTRICITYTRANSPORTEDUCATIONHEALTHWATER

SPACESPOLITICALPHYSICALCULTURAL

SOCIAL

MARKETSLANDHOUSINGLABORCREDIT

ABILITY OPPORTUNITY DIGNITY

Source: World Bank 2013.

Figure 1.1 The Social Inclusion Framework

38 CHAPTER 1 THE MOTIVATION AND CONCEPTUAL CLARITY

Employmentstatus

Age

HIVstatus

Ethnicity

Marital status

Residency or citizenship

status

Disability

Sexualorientation

Religion

Location

Gender

Figure 1.2 Identity Is Salient to Social Inclusion

Note: Size or placement of shape does not reflect importance of identity.

INCLUSION MATTERS IN AFRICA 39

What does social inclusion add to poverty reduction?The development narrative on Africa has been inexorably about poverty reduction, as mentioned earlier. Why do we bring social inclusion into it? Because, while social inclusion is intrinsic to poverty reduction, it is also distinct from it. Poverty is an outcome; social exclusion is both a process and an outcome (World Bank 2013). Processes of exclusion can have long-term effects on the collective dignity, mind-sets, and psyches of subordinate or excluded groups. This exclusion, in turn, affects the ability of groups to access the chances that are given to them. Slavery was one of the most egregious processes of exclusion, as were apartheid and untouchability (in South Asia). Less overt practices can also have devastating effects on subordinate groups. Consider bullying as an example of an insidious exclusionary process: the world over, some students are bullied into failure. They may include lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and intersex (LGBTI) people, or those students who speak with a different accent than that of the dominant group’s, may eat different food, or have other unique characteristics. Bullying can stymie the educational opportunities of those subject to it, cause serious mental health and other devastating consequences, and ultimately can lead victims to opt out of a system that they perceive as condoning bullying. All this may, and does, occur in otherwise well-functioning educational systems. So, victims of bullying are affected by a process of exclusion that prevents them from reaching their full potential.

This report emphasizes that poverty is deeply rooted, with causes that may be both social and economic, to the vast detriment of peoples and countries. A focus on social inclusion helps promote a better understanding of poverty and attention to those groups most at risk of being left out. It is also important to acknowledge that although social exclusion may well be related to poverty, there are times when it is not. A person with mobility limitations, who is part of rich household and is not affected by poverty, may be excluded if without accessible infrastructure and services are not available. Social inclusion therefore adds to the discourse on poverty and inequality when unpacking the causes and drivers of the hardship of certain individuals and groups. In other words, it adds granularity to poverty analysis.

Finally, social exclusion is sometimes said in the same breath as “vulnerability,” but the two are not the same. The latter focuses on identifying those at risk of a shock, such as falling into poverty or being affected by disaster. There are certainly synergies between vulnerability and social exclusion, insofar as both emphasize underlying processes that contribute to persistent poverty. Often, the same groups that are at risk of exclusion are also among the most vulnerable; they also have the least wherewithal to cope with shocks. They include, for instance, persons with disabilities, orphans, HIV-positive persons, the elderly, ethnic minorities, indigenous peoples (IPs), and widows (Hoogeeven et al. 2004). But not all groups that are vulnerable to extreme weather events, to violent attacks, or even to poverty are necessarily excluded. For example, people living in seismic zones are all vulnerable, but only some of them may be excluded. The majority of households that reside in fragile ecological zones may be vulnerable

40 CHAPTER 1 THE MOTIVATION AND CONCEPTUAL CLARITY

to poverty, but within those households some individuals may be excluded and others not. Finally, social inclusion is distinct from equality of opportunity. It “takes the idea of equality of opportunity further. It argues that both ‘supply of opportunity’ and ‘demand for opportunity’ may be constrained by identity. Getting to full or effective opportunity is not only an institutional challenge in many countries, but the process of expanding opportunities can itself be exclusionary” (World Bank 2013, 103). A social inclusion lens, therefore, emphasizes the importance of addressing heterogeneity across groups and pinpointing whether or not some individuals or groups may be especially disadvantaged due to an identity marker. For a more in-depth discussion of conceptual issues, see World Bank (2013).

Costs of social exclusion: What are the channels?Social inclusion is important because exclusion impedes the ability, opportunity, and dignity of some individuals and groups; it is also important because exclusion is costly to societies and economies. But measuring the costs of social exclusion is no mean undertaking. In this section, we report on a scan of the literature that gives pointers to the many ways in which such costs can be quantified. Some studies focus on specific groups when assessing the cost of exclusion; these groups may include women, persons with disabilities, ethnic or racial groups, people in same-sex relations, and migrants. We highlight the channels through which exclusion affects individuals and society at large. A synthesis of the channels is laid out in table 1.1.

The costs of social exclusion can accrue through different channels and levels; they may be direct or indirect, short term or long term. The cumulative long-term costs can be significant and can affect the growth trajectories of entire economies. It is most common to find calculations at the individual and the national levels, but there may be intermediate levels as well (such as household, community, or subnational). At the individual level, the loss of wages, lifetime earnings, poor education, and employment outcomes are the commonest measures of costs. For instance, Buehren, Gonzalez, and Copley (2019), based on an analysis of Ethiopia, show that women lag men by 36 percent in agricultural productivity, by 79 percent in business sales, and by 44 percent in hourly wages (see also Lamichhane and Sawada 2013 and Male and Wodon 2017 on people with disabilities; Sprague, Simon, and Sprague 2011 on people with HIV; Turner 2013 on racial minorities in the United States; Wodon, Male, et al. 2018 and Wodon and de la Brière 2018 on gender; and World Bank 2014 on youth employment in Africa).

Drivers of lower earnings or employment outcomes may be lower human capital endowments, which in turn may be caused by prior disadvantage in education but also by discrimination in the hiring process or in the workplace (for example, Buckup 2009; Lamichhane and Sawada 2013; Morgon Banks and Polock 2015). Social exclusion is often solidified through discrimination and its manifestations, as noted earlier; discrimination can have physical and mental health costs for individuals and households, and ultimately national level costs (see, for example, Lereya et al. 2015).

INCLUSION MATTERS IN AFRICA 41

Domain of exclusion Illustrative channels Illustrative costs

MARKETS

Labor market · Members of subordinate groups who dropout of the labor market or take up jobs forwhich they may be overqualified becauseof discrimination in hiring, wages andpromotion, or the expectation that the labormarket will discriminate.

· Women, sexual minorities, and otherexcluded groups who feel unsafe in jobsbecause of harassment and lack of safety.

· Laws that forbid women from participating insome types of work or those that indirectlycompel women to take up less paying work(e.g., some tax laws).

· Workers with disabilities who do not get basicaccommodations such as accessible buildings,toilets, or information.

· Losses in productivity, innovation, andentrepreneurship.

Land, water, and other natural resources

· Individuals who are landless also lack statusand power, which makes them less likely toparticipate in other markets, services, andspaces.

· Land is collateral and so is linked to creditmarkets. Those who do not own land may notget loans for housing or business.

· Ownership of land can enhance women’svoices, including against domestic violence.

· Land and other natural resources are the basisfor employment and livelihoods in economieswith a large agrarian base.

· Those with poor access to water are morelikely to live in remote and fragile locationsand be poorer, and less likely to own land.

· Mineral resources may be located onlands inhabited by poorer or indigenouscommunities. They may lack voice and powerto assert their collective rights on mineralrevenues or on sharing benefits from othernatural resources.

· Elite capture of natural resources is commonin many parts of the world.

· Accumulated grievances among thosewho have been left out of land andother natural resources lead to socialtensions and conflict that can havelong-term social and economic costs.

· Costs of elite capture includeresistance to reform by elites, withlikely inefficiencies as well as politicalcosts to state and society.

Financial markets · The “unbanked” are often groups that haveother disadvantages as well (e.g., pooraccess to administrative spaces and lack ofdocumentation).

· Groups with poor access to credit marketshave barriers to the accumulation of otherassets such as land, housing, and education.

· Lack of access to formal payment systemsmeans that some groups may be excludedfrom cash transfers and other cash benefits.

· Costs to the banking industry ofuntapped financial markets.

· Difficulty in transferring paymentsmeans that administrative systemsrely on cash, leading to leakages andcorruption.

· Lack of access to credit leads toproductivity losses.

Table 1.1 Costs of Social Exclusion: Mapping Some Channels

42 CHAPTER 1 THE MOTIVATION AND CONCEPTUAL CLARITY

Domain of exclusion Illustrative channels Illustrative costs

SERVICES

Education · Subordinate groups who drop out or havefrequent absences from school due tobullying and name calling by teachers andother students in school.

· Girls who cannot stay in school due to normsand societal pressures on families to marrythem off early.

· Girls and young women who drop out ofhigher levels of education due to lack oftransport, lack of clean toilets, householdchores, and unsafe commutes and schoolenvironments.

· Persons with disabilities and groups suchas linguistic minorities who cannot performin school and have to drop out due to lackof accessible curriculum, infrastructure, andtutoring assistance.

· Low accumulation of skills that affectlabor market outcomes.

· Student absenteeism from schoolhas longer-term productivity lossesand costs of low human capitalaccumulation.

· Teacher absenteeism hasadministrative costs when schools orworkplaces function below capacity.

· Mental health costs.

Health · Rejection of health care by subordinategroups due to poor treatment and humiliationat health facilities.

· Norms of shame, stigma, and lack of privacythat prevent women, girls, and sexualminorities from seeking services such asreproductive health care and contraception.

· When groups opt out of healthservices, both they and the economyincur the high costs of emergencytreatment in lieu of more efficientpreventive and in-time care.

· Poor aggregate health outcomes (e.g.,maternal mortality and child nutrition)and high burden of disease.

· Long-term, intergenerational costs tosociety.

· Losses in productivity.

Water supply and sanitation · Those with poor access to water supply andsanitation in their homes spend more timeprocuring these services and are more likelyto get sick; their children are more likely to bestunted.

· Some groups with poor access to toilets (suchas women, girls, persons with disabilities ormobility challenges, and sexual minorities)cannot go to school or work.

· Costs related to health and welfare.

· Stunting has intergenerational costsand implies productivity losses.

· Absenteeism from school or workhas costs in terms of low humancapital accumulation and losses inproductivity.

· Absenteeism also has administrativecosts when schools or workplacesfunction below capacity.

Table 1.1 continued

INCLUSION MATTERS IN AFRICA 43

Domain of exclusion Illustrative channels Illustrative costs

SPACES

Physical · Some groups may be systematicallyconcentrated in ecologically or politicallyfragile locations or in informal settlements.

· Persons with disabilities or mobility challengesmay be excluded from physical spacesbecause of lack of accessible infrastructure.

· Groups that reside in remote locations maybe left out of markets and services unlessspecial efforts are made.

· Exclusion from physical spaces can also bedeliberate, such as menstruating womenbeing prevented from entering “pure”or ritual spaces and some groups beingprevented from entering clubs or hotels.

· Productivity losses.

· Administrative costs due to inabilityof governments to reach their targetgroups.

· Accumulation of grievances amongthose who are prevented fromaccessing certain spaces, leading tolong-term economic and social costs.

Political · Groups that have been historically left out orwho have low trust in the political system areless likely to participate in political processes.

· In contexts in which elites have capturedpolitical power, they may actively preventothers from asserting their voices.

· Some groups may have limited access toinformation and grievance redress processesdue to lack of state transparency or lack ofavenues for access.

· Accumulated grievances among thosewho have been left out may lead tosocial tensions and conflict, which canhave long-term social and economiccosts.

· Asymmetrical information can havecosts related to productivity, humancapital accumulation, and burden ofdisease.

Cultural · Minority cultures and languages may beunderprivileged and unrecognized, leading tofeelings of exclusion from society as a whole.

· Some cultural heritage and intellectualproperty belonging to minority groupsmay be captured or appropriated by morepowerful groups.

· Potentially lost revenues from tourismand cultural heritage.

· Accumulated grievances amongthose whose cultures have beenappropriated or ignored may lead tosocial tensions and conflict, with long-term social and economic costs.

Administrative · Some groups may systematically lackdocumentation such as proof of residence,nationality, age, disability status, or minoritystatus, which prevents them from accessingbenefits.

· Bureaucracies may be biased againstsome groups, or groups may not havethe information or ability to access localgovernments and other governmentalentities.

· Survey personnel who are not trained toenumerate socially and politically invisible orostracized groups multiply the disadvantageof the latter.

· When some groups are unable toaccess services due to administrativehurdles, it can impact health,education, and other outcomes,leading to long-term costs to theeconomy and society.

· Lack of data on historically excludedgroups has implications for targetingand implementation of policies andprograms, with administrative andpolitical costs.

Table 1.1 continued

44 CHAPTER 1 THE MOTIVATION AND CONCEPTUAL CLARITY

Research on mental health in Africa is growing (Sankoh, Sevalie, and Weston 2018) and some estimates suggest high costs of mental health disorders: in 2015 the World Health Organization (WHO) estimated that 17.9 million years of healthy life were lost to disability as a consequence of mental health (2018). Persons with mental health problems may, in turn, be subject to discrimination and exclusion.

At the national level, the economic cost of social exclusion can be captured by forgone GDP and human capital wealth. Exclusion or the perception of exclusion may cause certain groups to opt out of markets, services, and spaces, with costs to both individuals and the economy. When groups opt out of health services, for instance, both the groups and the economy incur the high costs of emergency treatment in lieu of more efficient preventive and in-time care (FRA 2015; Mbonu, van den Borne, and De Vries 2009). Those who opt out of education and the labor market or have lower aspirations for what they can achieve lose potential income, their employers lose productivity, and the country loses GDP. In the United States, Burns (2012) estimates the cost of exclusion of LGBTI people alone at $64 billion per year. A recent International Monetary Fund (IMF) paper (Ostry et al. 2018) shows that the current gender gap in the labor force costs countries that are at the bottom half of gender inequality around 35 percent of GDP. Wodon and de la Brière (2018) estimate that Africa lost $2.5 trillion in human capital due to gender inequality and 11.4 percent of total wealth in 2014.

We can also draw some lessons from studies that have quantified the economic cost of inequality. Berg and Ostry (2011), for example, demonstrate that inequality is costly for medium and long-term growth. Some estimates show that in countries like the United States, the United Kingdom, and Italy overall economic growth would have been 6 to 9 percentage points higher in the past two decades if income inequality had not risen (Stiglitz 2016). Closely related are studies on inequality of opportunity driven by differences at birth, such as gender, ethnicity, or parental background. Inequality of opportunity has been argued to be particularly detrimental to growth (for example, Ferreira et al. 2014; Marrero and Rodriguez 2013; World Bank and Oxford University Press 2006; and for Africa in particular, Brunori, Palmisano, and Peragine 2016). Finally, although exclusion is not tantamount to conflict, accumulated grievances due to exclusion may trigger social tensions. The World Bank (2018b) argues that conflict countries experience 2 to 8.4 percent of annual GDP loss; countries bordering conflict zones suffer a 1.4 percent decline in annual GDP and a 1.7 percent rise in inflation.

Forgone benefits can also be costly. Hunt, Layton, and Prince (2015, 2018) find that companies in the top quartile for gender, racial, and ethnic diversity are between 15 and 35 percent more likely to have financial returns above their national industry medians. Gains from the inclusion of excluded groups occur not only due to addition of workers to the labor force, but diversity in itself may increase productivity (Ostry et al. 2018). Hsieh et al. (2013) attribute a quarter of the increase of productivity in the United States between 1960 and 2010 to the improved allocation of talent in the labor market thanks to the reduction in discrimination against women and blacks (see also Cavalcanti and Tavares 2015 for estimates of the cost of gender discrimination).

INCLUSION MATTERS IN AFRICA 45

Ultimately, social inclusion must be a conscious choice of societies and governments, with a clear understanding of the costs and benefits. Investing in an inclusive society is not free and needs concerted action to transform the investment into a win-win. Social programs, for instance, can be expensive and have an impact on fiscal sustainability. Governments often need to make trade-offs, either by cutting costs on other initiatives or by raising taxes. There may be political costs as well, as initiatives that focus on historically excluded groups can upset power relations. Governments and politicians need to craft clear social contracts with citizens to ensure support for social inclusion. There are examples the world over of citizens willing to pay for a more inclusive society. The most powerful form of support is through the fiscal realm, whereby citizens pay taxes that they know will fund policies and programs for greater social inclusion. In Brazil, Mexico, and Nepal, for instance, there is strong support for social protection programs; and in Bangladesh, poverty reduction is recognized as a national priority, with the elite supporting antipoverty initiatives (Hossain and Moore 1999). There is tentative evidence from Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, and Uganda that attitudes toward redistribution may be favorable overall (Langer, Stewart, and Schroyens 2016).

Analytic strategy and road mapThis report sets out Africa’s development imperatives within a framework of social inclusion. It outlines some of the areas in which Africa has taken major strides and simultaneously asks who is left behind, from what, in what ways, and what can be done. The key questions in this report are drawn from the Social Inclusion Assessment Tool1 and from Das (2016). The report also highlights the many solutions that are already in place in various African countries. It is deeply influenced by the myriad conversations and engagements that World Bank teams have had with partners and counterparts across Africa. The groundswell of thought and action, combined with the strong push from both state and nonstate actors for the World Bank Group (WBG) to articulate social inclusion in the African context, has led to several structured engagements between the WBG and a multitude of its partners. These encounters are laid out in annex 1. The audience for this report, therefore, includes a wide array of actors: governments, the private sector, civil society, academia, the media, and others. It is also expected to influence the way the WBG conducts its business in Africa.

Several macro and micro level analyses have been published over the years on issues relevant to social inclusion in Africa. The WBG produces regular Systematic Country Diagnostics for each of its partner countries; those from African countries have shown issues of social inclusion to be central to poverty reduction. The diagnostics have also focused on individuals and groups that are at risk of being left out of the progress and prosperity that now sweeps most of Africa. This report builds on those macro-level diagnostics and on other regional and country reports focusing on poverty and human development. It also synthesizes other existing evidence to stimulate debate, research, and policies for social inclusion in Africa. Our hope is that this report will enable new questions to be framed and addressed, although, like all regional reports, it can do only limited justice to the vast heterogeneity of the continent. The analytic foundation for

46 CHAPTER 1 THE MOTIVATION AND CONCEPTUAL CLARITY

this report therefore, comes from a comprehensive review of the literature on social inclusion and data from poverty assessments, Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS), World Development Indicators (WDI), the United Nations, the Afrobarometer surveys, and the World Values Surveys (WVS), to name a few.

The report contains five chapters. This first chapter lays out the motivation for this work and clarifies concepts and underlying assumptions. Chapter 2 highlights the major trends and transitions that shape the context for social inclusion in Africa and describes who may be left behind. Chapter 3 provides pointers on the processes that underlie exclusion and those that foster social inclusion. Attitudes, perceptions, and feelings are elaborated. Chapter 4 highlights Africa’s movement toward social inclusion. Who are the key actors? What are some of the innovations promoting social inclusion in Africa? What evidence do we have about what has made a positive difference? Finally, chapter 5 concludes the discussion and provides guidance on framing the right questions for inclusive solutions.

INCLUSION MATTERS IN AFRICA 47

Endnotes1 See World Bank, “The Social Inclusion Assessment Tool (SiAT),” http://pubdocs.worldbank.

org/en/478071540591164260/SiAT-Logo-web.pdf.

CHAPTER2

INCLUSION MATTERS IN AFRICA 49

Africa has seen extraordinary progress over the past few decades. In

fact, in some areas, the progress in Africa is faster than it is in any

other region, and sometimes faster than we have historically seen

anywhere in the world. But the trends are highly heterogeneous

across and within countries. Although they hold the promise of

greater heights, they also create new challenges for social inclusion.

Digital technology, for instance, can leave those who do not have

mobile phones or Internet connections further behind. Similarly,

improved infrastructure has provided better lives, but also carries

risks, for instance, of lands being unfairly taken from those

most powerless or of damage to the environment or livelihoods.

Improvements in education and health can be concentrated in certain

locations and for some groups. Areas that experience state and

societal fragility also fall behind in various development outcomes.

So, both areas and peoples can be excluded from the gains that the

continent has achieved. This chapter discusses the major trends and

transitions in Africa with a focus on their potential implications for

social inclusion. The chapter begins with a discussion of how poverty

reduction, demographic changes, climate change, and conflict in a

context of rapid urbanization are likely to affect social inclusion.

Africa Is Striding: Who’s Left Behind?

As we embark on this great collective journey, we pledge that no one will be left behind. Recognizing that the dignity of the human person is fundamental, we wish to see the Goals and targets met for all nations and peoples and for all segments of society. And we will endeavour to reach the furthest behind first.

Resolution adopted by United Nations General Assembly on September 25, 2015

50 CHAPTER 2 AFRICA IS STRIDING: WHO’S LEFT BEHIND?

Demographic trends and human capital accumulation

Population and fertility

Global population is certainly growing, but fertility is falling in every region (figure 2.1). More than half of the anticipated growth in global population between now and 2050 is expected to occur in Africa (UN DESA Population Division 2019). Yet, Sub-Saharan Africa will see the largest reductions in average total fertility, which is projected to fall from about 4.6 live births per woman in 2019 to 3.1 in 2050 and 2.1 by 2100. There are 36 countries or areas where the fertility rates are above 4 births per woman; of these, 33 are in Sub-Saharan Africa. The most populous countries with total fertility rates of more than 4 are (in order of size) Nigeria, Ethiopia, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Tanzania, Uganda, and Sudan. By 2050, Niger is expected to be the only country with a total fertility rate (TFR) of 4.0. There are large variations both within and across countries, and countries of Southern Africa have much lower fertility rates than other areas. Countries with the highest fertility and the slowest decline are those that are the most affected by conflict and fragility. Africa also has the highest rates of teen pregnancy; about 46 percent of all births to girls and women in the 15 to 19 age group occur in Africa (UN DESA Population Division 2019).

Figure 2.1 Fertility Decline across the Globe

Live

bir

ths

per

wo

man

Year

Projection

1950 2000 2050 2100

7

6

5

4

3

2

1

Source: UN DESA Population Division 2019.

Note: Regions per UN classification.

a. Excluding Australia and New Zealand.

Sub-Saharan Africa

Northern Africa and Western Asia

Central and Southern Asia

Eastern and South-Eastern Asia

Latin America and the Caribbean

Australia/New Zealand

Oceaniaa

Europe and Northern America

INCLUSION MATTERS IN AFRICA 51

Why does fertility matter for social inclusion? It matters because women are the bearers and, for the most part, the rearers of children. When to have children, how many to have, and how much space there is between children are all factors that cast inexorable influence on the life chances of women and their children and, to an extent, of men and entire families. Women’s ability to control their fertility and their reproductive rights are inseparable from their overall welfare outcomes and those of their children and families. When women do not have access to or information about birth control, it affects their overall agency; this is especially salient for adolescent girls, who often have the least power, information, and ability to control their fertility. Although there have been rapid changes in access to contraception in some parts of Africa, the unmet need for family planning is still significant. Between 2000 and 2017, Middle and Western Africa saw some increases in contraceptive prevalence (from 18 to 23 percent and from 13 to 20 percent, respectively), but unmet need for family planning remained constant at levels above 20 percent in 2017. Eastern Africa, Middle Africa, Western Africa, Melanesia, the Federated States of Micronesia, and Polynesia had the highest unmet need for family planning in 2017. This need indicates a supply side failure, leaving women who may want to control their fertility unable to find the means to do so (UN DESA Population Division 2017b). Yet, there may also be other factors that affect women’s desire for more children.

Health and mortality

Like fertility, Africa has also seen improvements in health and longevity, but under-five mortality is still high. Children’s survival to age five is a core indicator of welfare, but also has other ramifications: high rates of under-five mortality are associated with higher fertility, for example. Moreover, countries with high levels of child mortality are bogged down by the most basic imperative of keeping children alive and are less able to invest in human capital. Based on United Nations (UN) child mortality estimates, according to the Our World in Data project and AfricaInData.org, there has been a sharp decline in child mortality from 1980 to 2015.1 In fact, compared to other regions, Africa has seen the fastest decline between 1990 and 2016. Despite these improvements, Africa still has the highest under-five mortality rate, at 78 deaths per 1,000 live births in 2016. In other words, approximately 1 child in 13 still dies before the fifth birthday (Suzuki and Kashiwase 2017). There is considerable variation across countries, and fragile states have the highest rates of under-five mortality.

Life expectancy has also increased in the last few decades, but AIDS has had long-term deleterious impacts. Overall, Africa has seen the largest increase in life expectancy between 2000 and 2015, compared with South Asia, Latin America, and the Caribbean (UNDP 2016, 96). Yet, the countries with the lowest life expectancy are also located in Africa; they are the Central African Republic, Chad, Lesotho, Nigeria, and Sierra Leone, each with life expectancy at birth below 55 years in 2019 (UN DESA Population Division 2019). African countries were also ravaged by AIDS-related mortality, which has seen a sharp decline globally, driven by the huge improvements in Africa. AIDS-related mortality peaked in the last decade in most high-prevalence countries. But many countries have not yet recovered fully from the effects of the epidemic: in Southern Africa, life expectancy at birth fell from 62.9 years in 1990 to 52.6 years in 2004 and has since recovered to

52 CHAPTER 2 AFRICA IS STRIDING: WHO’S LEFT BEHIND?

just above the 1990 level, having reached 63.8 years in 2019. This lower life expectancy at birth represents a loss of two decades of potential improvements in survival rates for Southern Africa. HIV/AIDS continues to have other long-term consequences, and stigma against persons with HIV is still evident. The catastrophic long-term effects for orphans, estimated at 52 million in Africa,2 deserve special attention.

As African countries proceed with the demographic transition, the age structure of their populations is poised for transformation. Today, half of the population in the region is under 25 years of age; by 2050, the continent will have 362 million young people who are between 15 and 24 years of age (World Bank 2014). Simultaneously, many African countries will see aging of the population: by 2050, Africa’s over-60 population is expected to more than triple, from 69 million in 2017 to 226 million (UN DESA Population Division 2017a). Although youth inclusion is the immediate challenge facing the region, the inclusion of older cohorts of Africans will soon be a part

Box 2.1 Ability, Opportunity, and Dignity for African Youth

African countries are abuzz with initiatives that either focus on young people or are run by them, or both.

The youngest among all continents, half of Africa’s population is below 25 years of age. These young people are innovators, leaders, entrepreneurs, social media influencers, writers, volunteers, activists, and professionals of various kinds. Asserting their African identity, they exercise thoughtful leadership at local, national, and global levels in a variety of ways. Yet evidence from an array of sources, some of which is highlighted in this report, shows their unique needs. This report also portrays the heterogeneity of African youth—the intersectional advantage or disadvantage bequeathed by gender, occupation, religion, ethnicity, socioeconomic status, location, sexual orientation, and marital status—and shines a light on some aspects, such as vulnerability to gender-based violence, female genital mutilation (FGM), child marriage, and reintegration of young ex-combatants. Building human capital and hearing these voices are central to the inclusion of African youth, as in the world over.

The World Bank’s social inclusion framework highlights the importance of ability, opportunity, and dignity in advancing inclusion.a These three elements are nowhere more salient than for young people who crave and aspire for the right to make decisions about their own lives and for their communities and countries. While the focus on jobs in Africa is important in the face of high levels of youth unemployment, there is a need for policy that would give young people the status and dignity they deserve. This report presents

evidence on the changing nature of participation of young people in political process.

While the downward trend of youth turnout in elections is indeed worrying, we should not confuse apathy about the political process with a lack of passion about the issues and challenges facing the world. It is clear that the sense of disillusionment that many young people feel for our political institutions reflects the fact that they have been sidelined by them. If young people do not think that they can make a difference through these institutions and processes, should we really be surprised at their ambivalence towards them?

Annan, 2013b

If young people feel left out of markets, services, and tangible and intangible spaces, the potential dejection and frustration can have long-term consequences for them, their families, and society at large. At the individual level, it can lead to lowered human capital and increased mental health costs. If dejection becomes pervasive among a large group of the youth, it can take the form of radicalization and violence. This report describes some of the challenges for youth in Africa, and how young people are often potent agents of change in their communities.

a. World Bank 2013.

b. For more, see “Kofi Annan on International Youth Day:Let the Young Lead” at https://www.forbes.com/sites/skollworldforum/2013/08/12/kofi-annan-on-international-youth-day-let-the-young-lead/#2e16c2e32aae.

INCLUSION MATTERS IN AFRICA 53

of the picture. This is something policy makers find difficult to visualize. Nevertheless, today Africa’s growing young population has the potential to dramatically drive development and further reduce poverty, if the right policies and opportunities are provided for them (box 2.1).

Education and accumulation of human capital

In education as well, there has been significant progress, but like other parts of the world, there are stark inequalities in educational outcomes based on identity markers. The average primary gross enrollment ratio in the region increased from 68 percent in 1990 to 98 percent in 2015, and the number of enrolled students grew from 63 million to 152 million. Yet, despite the increase in primary school enrollment rates, an estimated 52.3 million primary- and lower secondary school–age children (ages 6–14 and 7–15) are still out of school, accounting for 45 percent of the world’s out-of-school child population (Bashir et al. 2018). There is also a significant gap in literacy between males and females, with Western Africa having the highest gender gaps and Southern Africa having the lowest (figure 2.2), and quality of education is a point of growing concern.

The overlay of gender with other identity markers confers additional disadvantage in education, as it does in other outcomes. Using census data, Taş, Reimão, and Orlando (2014) show that ethnic minority women in Senegal and Sierra Leone suffer cumulative disadvantages in literacy, primary school completion, and secondary school completion. In Senegal, for example, individuals are 10 percentage points less likely to complete primary school for being female, 1.6 percentage points for being ethnic minority, and

Figure 2.2 Female and Male Literacy Rates, Ages 15 and Above

Source: World Development Indicators (WDI; 2016 or latest available) from United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) Institute for Statistics, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SE.ADT.LITR.FE.ZS?view=chart.

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Literacy rate, adult females ages 15 and above Literacy rate, adult males ages 15 and above

54 CHAPTER 2 AFRICA IS STRIDING: WHO’S LEFT BEHIND?

an additional 3.8 percentage points for being ethnic minority women. Therefore, cumulatively, women of ethnic minority groups are about 15.4 percentage points less likely to complete primary school than men belonging to majority ethnic groups in Senegal. In South Africa, despite significant progress since the end of apartheid, education outcomes among black and colored South Africans remain low. Although the white population reached close to full attainment of 12 years of education in 1920, the black population has yet to achieve those levels today, perpetuating the legacy of a racial divide in education in South Africa, which remains a main driver of poverty and inequality (World Bank 2018f, 13). The Benin Systematic Country Diagnostic (SCD), similarly, notes that the lack of maternal language teaching in primary school puts indigenous children at a disadvantage and leads them to abandon school prematurely (World Bank 2017b, 57).

Disability status is also a critical determinant of education outcomes. Data from the Living Standards Measurement Study (LSMS) in Ethiopia, Malawi, Tanzania, and Uganda suggest that between 10 to 15 percent of working-age adults in Africa have a disability, defined as moderate or severe functional difficulty with walking, seeing, hearing, cognition, self-care, or communication (Mitra 2018).3 Several studies have presented evidence of lower educational attainment of persons with disabilities in Africa (Eide and Mmatli 2016; Filmer 2008; Hoogeveen 2005; Loeb and Eide 2004; Loeb et al. 2008; Mitra 2018; Mitra, Posarac, and Vick 2013; Mizunoya, Mitra, and Yamasaki 2016). In the cases of Ethiopia, Malawi, Tanzania, and Uganda, Mitra (2018) finds that both adults with moderate functional difficulties and those with severe functional difficulties are significantly less likely to ever have attended school than adults with no functional difficulties. In Ethiopia, only 15 percent of persons with severe functional difficulties (and 24 percent with moderate functional difficulties)

Box 2.2 Albinism and Human Capital Outcomes

Albinism is a genetic disorder that results in a decrease or absence of pigmentation in the hair, eyes, and skin. Although prevalence data are not available for most countries in Africa, estimates range between 1:15,000 (1 person with albinism in every 15,000 people) to as high as 1:1,000 in some areas in Zimbabwe and Tanzania (compared to estimates of around 1:20,000 globally). Certain ethnic groups seem to display higher prevalence rates, likely linked to factors such as limited geographical mobility, consanguinity, and certain traditional marriage practices that limit the genetic pool. The lack of melanin, which has a protective function against ultraviolet radiation (UVR), predisposes individuals with albinism to a range of pathologic conditions, including photophobia, decreased visual acuity, extreme sun sensitivity, and skin cancer. One 2002 study suggested that all persons with albinism had some form of visual impairment and

that this had strong implications for their education and overall life chances. Another study in Tanzania found that all individuals with albinism exhibited skin damage in their first year of life, and those ages 20 to 30 had advanced symptomatic cancers. Many of the outcomes of persons with albinism are associated with stigma, ignorance, and superstition. Nevertheless, life expectancy of persons with albinism has increased significantly over the past decades: whereas in the 1980s it was estimated that less than 10 percent of people with albinism would survive beyond 30 years and less than 2 percent would reach 40 years, they now live considerably longer because of advances in preventive sun protection.

Sources: Cruz-Inigo, Ladizinski, and Sethi 2011; Hong, Zeeb, and Repacholi 2006; Lund 2001.

INCLUSION MATTERS IN AFRICA 55

have ever attended school, compared to 48 percent of persons with no functional difficulty. In Uganda, 60 percent of persons with severe functional difficulty and 73 percent with moderate functional difficulty have ever attended school, compared to 89 percent with no functional difficulty.4

When disability status is combined with gender, we see the real effects of intersectional disadvantage. The extent of this disadvantage varies across countries: in Malawi, only 35 percent of women with severe functional difficulties have ever been to school, compared to 65 percent of men with severe functional difficulties. In Tanzania, those numbers are 30 percent of women versus 61 percent of men with severe functional difficulties, and in Uganda, 48 percent of women compared to 74 percent of men with severe functional difficulties. In Ethiopia, rates are much lower than in the other three countries for both men and women: 14 percent of women with severe functional difficulties have ever attended school, compared with 16 percent of men with severe functional difficulties. Gender gaps appear to widen with greater functional difficulty. Therefore, a woman with a disability has fewer years of schooling than any other category—men without a functional difficulty, women without functional difficulty, and men with functional difficulty. Outcomes differ further by type of disability, but a lack of reliable data presents serious constraints to analysis and action. In the case of intellectual disabilities, for instance, data are particularly scarce, as are assessment facilities and avenues for accessibility. There has been growing attention to albinism, a genetic disorder that causes severe functional difficulties, but data and evidence are limited. Box 2.2 provides a short overview on how albinism affects human capital outcomes.

Economic transitions

Growth and poverty reduction

The period since the 1990s has seen an impressive reduction in poverty; however, absolute numbers of the poor have at the same time increased dramatically. Although the poverty head count declined steadily from 57 percent of the African population in 1990 to 41 percent in 2015,5 the absolute number of people living in poverty increased from about 278 million to over 413 million, due to growth in the numbers of people overall. There is also significant divergence in performance across African countries, driven by several factors, among which fragility, conflict, and endowment of natural resources stand out (figure 2.3). Between 1996 and 2012, poverty decline in fragile states was smaller when compared to the decline in nonfragile states in Africa: after controlling for a set of country characteristics, poverty reduction in fragile states was 15 percentage points lower than it was in nonfragile states (Beegle et al. 2016). Countries that are rich in natural resources had a 13 percentage point faster poverty reduction than countries that are not resource rich, after controlling for other country traits. A caveat is in order here. Countries that are endowed with natural resources can also fall prey to the “resource curse,” which can exacerbate fragility and conflict, unless institutions are robust enough.

56 CHAPTER 2 AFRICA IS STRIDING: WHO’S LEFT BEHIND?

Asking “who are the poor?” and breaking down the poverty numbers, we find greater complexity. Take the case of the relationship between gender and poverty, for which there is a long tradition of analysis. Overall, women are not necessarily poorer than men, nor are male-headed households necessarily better off. Moreover, in many countries in Africa, female-headed households have experienced faster poverty reduction than male-headed households (Milazzo and van de Walle 2017). More nuanced findings emerge when gender is looked at jointly with age and marital status: young married women, but more so those who are young and widowed, are especially vulnerable. In addition, older men are on average 8 percentage points poorer than their female counterparts (Milazzo and van de Walle 2017; Munoz Boudet et al. 2018). Mitra, Posarac, and Vick’s (2011) study in Burkina Faso, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Mauritius, Zambia, and Zimbabwe is possibly the most detailed analysis of disability and poverty. They show that the relationship between disability and poverty varies by the measures of both poverty and disability that are used in the analysis. The most conclusive result

Figure 2.3 Poverty Rates in Fragile and Nonfragile Countries

Source: Beegle et al. 2016

Note: Figure shows results of a regression on the change in the poverty rate for 43 countries from 1996 to 2012 based on estimated poverty rates using comparable and high-quality surveys.

*** Statistically significant at the 1% level.

-15 -10 -5 5 10 15 200

Middle income

Landlocked

Resource rich

Change in poverty rate (percentage points) compared to alternative category

Fragile

-1.1

-7.1

-12.6***

-15.1***

Figure 2.4 Distribution of Ethnic Groups in Bottom Wealth Quintile

10

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Perc

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Rural Urban

Malawi

Rural Urban

Sierra Leone

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Mozambique

Rural Urban

Zambia

Rural Urban

Uganda

Rural Urban

South Africa

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Rural Urban

INCLUSION MATTERS IN AFRICA 57

Box 2.3 Ethnicity and Poverty in Rural and Urban Africa

Ethnicity can be a fraught idea in many African countries, as in other regions globally. Some expressly and officially acknowledge the importance of race in opportunities and outcomes, such as South Africa, and others focus purely on citizenship and eschew any focus on ethnicity. The latter is often born of historic conflict that assumed ethnic overtones. However, the literature from regions as diverse as Europe, South Asia and Latin America shows that certain ethnic groups are overrepresented among the poor. Their locational characteristics often explain their poverty, but this explanation often overlooks the political economy of regional development.

Does ethnicity matter for poverty in Africa? Using the Demographic and Health Survey (DHS), which has data on ethnicity and wealth based on a household’s ownership of select assets, we analyzed data from nine countries, including the Democratic Republic of Congo, Kenya, Malawi, Mozambique, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Uganda, and Zambia. Looking at the 10 largest ethnic groups in rural and urban areas,

we found that ethnicity does indeed matter for wealth outcomes, but that this is mostly true in rural areas and significantly less so in cities and towns. The results from figure 2.4 are summarized below:

• Overall, certain ethnic groups are overrepresented in the poorest wealth quintile in all the nine countries.Disparities between ethnic groups are larger in ruralareas than in urban areas.

• Size of the ethnic groups does not seem to matter.This is unsurprising, because across the worldthe size of an ethnic group seldom has a linearassociation with its welfare outcomes.

• The greatest dispersion along ethnic lines in thepoorest quintile in rural areas appears to occur inNigeria, Kenya, and Uganda, followed by lesserdispersion in Zambia and Mozambique. While theoverrepresentation of some ethnic groups in thelowest wealth quintile is more pronounced in somecountries than in others, this may or may not reflectabsolute gaps in wealth between these groups.

Source: World Bank calculations based on the latest Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) available for country (Congo, Dem. Rep. DHS-VI 2013/14; Kenya DHS-VII 2014; Malawi DHS-VII 2015/16; Mozambique DHS-VI 2011; Nigeria DHS-VI 2013; Sierra Leone DHS-VI 2013; South Africa DHS-VII 2016; Uganda DHS-VII 2016; Zambia DHS-VI 2013/14).

Note: Each bubble represents one ethnic group (as defined in DHS). Area of bubble is proportional to the share of the ethnicity’s rural (or urban) population in the total rural (or urban) population. Only the ten largest ethnic groups for each country are displayed. For South Africa, the DHS does not include more than five distinct ethnic groups in total, so all groups are displayed.

Figure 2.4 Distribution of Ethnic Groups in Bottom Wealth Quintile

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Rural Urban

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Rural Urban

is that when expanded measures of disability are used along with measures of multidimensional poverty, there are “significant disparities in disability prevalence in most countries by poverty status” (39). Box 2.3 and Figure 2.4 present an analysis of the extent to which ethnicity matters for poverty in select African countries.

58 CHAPTER 2 AFRICA IS STRIDING: WHO’S LEFT BEHIND?

Food security

Contrary to the Malthusian specter of population growth jeopardizing food production, between 1990 and 2015 Africa saw the steepest decline of food deficit in the world. In this period, the food deficit6 halved in African countries, whereas other regions, including South Asia and the Middle East, experienced fluctuations, as figure 2.5 shows. Nevertheless, over 50 million children under age five in Africa remain stunted: the region has the second highest stunting and wasting rates in the world, after South Asia. Africa is also the only region in which the absolute number of stunted children has increased over time, mainly due to population growth. These children will have difficulty reaching their full potential as adults. Globally, children living in households in the poorest quintile have higher stunting rates than children in other income groups. One study in Tanzania showed that the Maasai were disadvantaged compared to their neighboring ethnic groups on measures of both child nutritional status and disease. Although food insecurity was high throughout the study area, the Maasai fared worse (Lawson et al. 2014). It is likely that other children, such as orphans, children of parents affected by HIV, or those whose parents engage in precarious occupations (such as waste picking), also have a higher risk of malnutrition.

Figure 2.5 Depth of Food Deficit

Source: World Bank 2018c, based on data from Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO).

Note: The food deficit is defined as the amount of food needed to not be considered undernourished, measured in kilocalories a day.

The depth of thefood deficit in

Sub-Saharan Africanearly halved between

1990 and 2015.

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INCLUSION MATTERS IN AFRICA 59

Figure 2.6 Top Problems Facing Countries across Africa

Source: Extracted from Das (2017), based on the Afrobarometer Survey 2016.

Problem areas

Percent

Percent

0 10 20 30 40

47%31%

30%27%

25%25%

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b. Women’s views of top problems

Problem areas

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Top priorities for urban women(N=10,992)

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Unemployment

Health

Education

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Management of the economy

Infrastructure/roads

Electricity

Water supply

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Food shortage/famine

Unemployment

Health

Education

Poverty/destitution

Crime and security

Management of the economy

Corruption

Electricity

Infrastructure/roads

Water supply

Food shortage/famine

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Employment

Income from labor tends to play an important role in poverty reduction. The Afrobarometer (2016) asked respondents to list their top ten priorities or problems: unemployment emerges as the top concern among urban respondents—both men and women. Interestingly, the urban-rural difference in priorities trumps the gender difference; males and females give similar responses about their priorities. In Africa overall, the jobs challenge that gains spotlight in the media, in social media, and in political manifestos is also reflected in figure 2.6. This challenge is compounded by the fact that labor markets can be notoriously exclusionary, and African countries are no exception; employment outcomes vary across groups. This variation is not only caused by exclusion or discrimination, but it is often difficult to separate the effects of exclusion from those of other factors, such as human capital and effort.

60 CHAPTER 2 AFRICA IS STRIDING: WHO’S LEFT BEHIND?

Regardless of the reasons for differential outcomes in the labor market, some groups are systematically under greater stress due to either poor quality jobs or unemployment. Women’s labor force participation in Africa is generally higher than that in other non-OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) countries, and differentials in labor outcomes are lower. However, there are significant barriers to women’s economic empowerment. For example, women have historically been very active in agriculture but have fewer opportunities in other sectors. Labor market outcomes also vary across other groups; the youth are a case in point. Most young people in Africa do not have easy transitions into the sustainable jobs that are an intrinsic marker of adulthood (Filmer and Fox 2014). In Zambia, Bhorat et al. (2015) found that the youth are disproportionately affected by both unemployment and marginal or underemployment, with stronger effects for young women than for young men. Factors other than gender and age also matter for labor market outcomes. The South African evidence suggests that, despite progress since apartheid, significant differences in earnings persist between African, colored, and white people, with whites earning 40 percent more per additional year of education than Africans and 20 percent more per additional year than colored people (Salisbury 2016).

In addition to the fairly well-known differentials in employment outcomes across gender, age, and race or ethnicity, the availability of data has allowed a focus on the poorer outcomes for persons with disabilities. This focus comes through in several recent studies (for example, Eide and Loeb 2006 for Zambia; Eide and Mmatli 2016 for Botswana; Mitra 2008 for South Africa; Mitra, Posarac, and Vick 2013 for 15 developing countries, including Burkina Faso, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Mauritius, Zambia, and Zimbabwe). Hoogeveen (2005, 7) and Mitra (2018, 104) show further that persons with disabilities are more likely to be self-employed in agriculture and less likely to be employees. There are also variations in outcomes across different types, and intensity, of disability. Mitra (2018) points to large gaps in employment between persons with severe disabilities and those with no disabilities, using data from Ethiopia, Malawi, Tanzania, and Uganda. The largest gaps were noted in Tanzania, where 53 percent of persons with severe functional difficulties were employed, compared to 85 percent of persons with no functional difficulty. As for poverty, Mitra (2018) points out that, although people with functional difficulties are overrepresented among the poor, not all of them are poor (156).

INCLUSION MATTERS IN AFRICA 61

Technology and digital inclusionIt is the global age of technology, but this is inextricably linked to the extent to which countries, regions, communities, and households have access to this potent medium. In many respects, Africa seems to have leapfrogged into the digital economy, but there is great variation across and within countries. For example, mobile cellular subscriptions in nonfragile countries have increased from 0.67 per 100 persons in 2000 to 83 per 100 persons in 2016. In fragile countries, on the other hand, there was an increase from 0.2 subscriptions per 100 persons in 2000 to 68 per 100 persons in 2016. Despite a relatively faster increase in mobile cellular subscriptions in fragile countries, the number of mobile cellular subscriptions is still higher in nonfragile countries (Calderon et al. 2019, 49). Similarly, financial technology (“fintech”) has also expanded across Africa over the past years: 21 percent of adults in Africa now have a mobile money account, with numbers having doubled since 2014, the highest of any region globally (Demirgüç-Kunt et al. 2018). M-PESA, a money transfer system in Kenya, is one of the earliest and perhaps one of the most prominent examples of fintech in Africa. Digital technology can also spearhead employment, as the recent World Bank report on the future of work in Africa points out (Choi, Dutz, and Usman 2019).

ICT [information and communications technology] literacy will give women, especially in rural areas, a chance to join the virtual labor market. For example, many of today’s women in Sudan are using social media to exhibit their products. These women saw social media as a platform to sell their products because of the challenges they would face due to cultural and social constraints.

Yassien, 2019

Digital technology is a potent vehicle of social inclusion, but it can also be a channel for deepening exclusion. The proportion of individuals who have access to the Internet in each African country is highly correlated with the country’s income level. Regionally, Internet use is lowest in Sub-Saharan Africa, where a median of 41 percent across six countries use the Internet. South Africa is the only country in the region where almost 60 percent of the population is online.7 Furthermore, the Pew Research Center Spring 2017 Global Attitudes Survey in six countries showed that males with higher education and higher income levels were more likely to use smartphones (figure 2.7). Nonusers of smartphones are left out of many opportunities to access markets, services, and spaces.

62 CHAPTER 2 AFRICA IS STRIDING: WHO’S LEFT BEHIND?

Figure 2.7 Smartphone Usage by Gender, Age, Education, and Income

Source: World Bank depiction based on the Pew Research Center Spring 2017 Global Attitudes Survey.

Area ofdifference

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Male vs. female Ages 18–29 vs. ages 50+ With vs. without secondary education

Household income above vs. below median

Ghana Kenya Nigeria Senegal South Africa Tanzania

Africa’s social geography is rapidly changing; it is, for example, the fastest urbanizing region in the world (figure 2.8). Currently, about 472 million people live in cities and towns—a number that is expected to double over the next 25 years (Lall, Henderson, and Venables 2017). There are, however, large sub-regional variations. Most people in North and Southern Africa already live in cities. West Africa is projected to reach an urban majority just after 2020, whereas urbanization rates are still below 20 percent in East Africa (UN-Habitat 2014). Nigeria is among the top three urbanizing countries in the world and together with India and China is estimated to account for 35 percent of the projected growth of the world’s urban population between 2018 and 2050, adding 189 million urban dwellers.8

Cities and towns are simultaneously bastions of inclusion and sites of exclusion. Migration from villages to cities and towns tends to be accompanied by aspirations for a new life, greater social and economic mobility, and better access to markets, services, and spaces. It often also means separation from family and social networks and a sense of loneliness for those who do not have networks in their new abodes. A 2016 study from South Africa shows that rural-urban migration between 2008 and 2012 was accompanied by an 8.3 percent decrease in the subjective well-being of migrants (Mulcahy and Kollamparambil 2016). Further, as cities often lack careful planning,

INCLUSION MATTERS IN AFRICA 63

Figure 2.8 The Coming of the Urban Age, 1950–2050

Source: UN DESA (United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs) Population Division 2018. World Urbanization Prospects 2018.

Year

Africa Asia Europe

Latin America and the Caribbean Northern America Oceania

42.5%

49.9%

74.5%

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Urban population Rural population

64 CHAPTER 2 AFRICA IS STRIDING: WHO’S LEFT BEHIND?

about 60 percent of Africa’s urban population lives in informal settlements, compared to 34 percent in other developing countries (UN DESA Statistics Division 2015, cited in Lall, Henderson, and Venables 2017, 38). Finally, informal workers, such as waste pickers, domestic workers, street vendors, and others, experience serious barriers to doing business in most cities. Yet, cities also often provide a more anonymous space than do rural areas; they allow individuals from excluded groups to escape discrimination and to pursue job and education opportunities that they would not have had in a rural context. Although further research is needed to understand the mechanisms through which these outcomes succeed, figure 2.5 shows that in urban areas, wealth disparities between ethnic groups are less pronounced than in rural areas. At the same time, ethnic groups and migrants tend to cluster residentially and occupationally in urban areas, with varying effects for social inclusion.

While there is considerable attention to Africa’s urban growth and advances in service delivery, there is also evidence that location matters and that many areas lag behind. Figure 2.9 shows the advances in electricity coverage and basic drinking water services in the last decade. Almost every country has seen advances in both (more so for electricity than for water), but some countries have done better than others, with South Africa, Cabo Verde, and Gabon at the higher end of service provision and Mauritius and Seychelles at the highest end. In electricity provision, Burundi, Chad, South Sudan, Malawi, and the Central African Republic have the poorest outcomes, whereas for water services, the bottom five are Eritrea, Uganda, Ethiopia, and Somalia (where less than 40 percent of the populations have basic drinking water). In general, countries that are in the midst of conflict or experience fragility have poorer outcomes than do others. Clearly, there are lagging regions within countries, and individuals and groups who live in such regions may have other defining characteristics, such as belonging to a particular ethnic or other group.

Lagging regions across the world are also those where people have lower voice and political power than in other regions. African countries are no exception; the popular discourse in many African countries makes explicit links between political power and uneven regional development, pointing to the fact that areas that have better political connections to those in power tend to fare better. Box 2.4 highlights the case of north and northeastern Kenya, which have historically fared worse that the rest of the country. These lagging areas are inhabited by current or previous pastoralists and historically have been prone to being left out of services. In Uganda, where electricity coverage is low in general, almost half of the Muganda respondents in the 2011 Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) reported having electricity, but less than 5 percent of the Lugbara and Ngakaramajong did. The Afrobarometer found similar results by self-reported water insecurity: the Langi, the Ateso, and the Alur reported the highest incidence of having experienced water insecurity “many times or always,” and the Mutooro, Mukiga, and Munyankole were most likely to report never having experienced such insecurity (World Bank 2013, 96).

Finally, the majority of Africa’s population still lives in rural areas, and there is a significant rural-urban divide in opportunity. Take the case of health services: about

INCLUSION MATTERS IN AFRICA 65

Figure 2.9 Access to Electricity and Water Services

Source: World Bank calculations based on World Bank WDI (World Development Indicators), 2008–2015/2016, http://datatopics.worldbank.org/world-development-indicators.

NORTH AMERICA

SeychellesEUROPE & CENTRAL ASIA

MauritiusMIDDLE EAST & NORTH AFRICA

LATIN AMERICA & THE CARIBBEAN

Cabo VerdeGabon

SOUTH ASIA

EAST ASIA AND PACIFIC

South AfricaGhana

ComorosEquatorial Guinea

EswatiniSão Tomé and Príncipe

SenegalCôte d’Ivoire

BotswanaCameroon

NigeriaCongo, Rep.

KenyaNamibia

Gambia, TheTogo

EritreaEthiopia

MauritaniaBenin

AngolaSudan

ZimbabweMali

GuineaTanzaniaSomaliaLesothoRwandaZambiaUganda

MozambiqueMadagascarSierra Leone

LiberiaBurkina Faso

Congo, Dem. Rep.Niger

Guinea-BissauCentral African Republic

MalawiSouth Sudan

ChadBurundi

MauritiusNORTH AMERICA

EUROPE & CENTRAL ASIA

SeychellesLATIN AMERICA & THE CARIBBEAN

MIDDLE EAST & NORTH AFRICA

EAST ASIA & PACIFIC

SOUTH ASIA

GabonCabo VerdeSouth Africa

ComorosGambia, The

São Tomé and PríncipeBotswana

NamibiaGhana

SenegalMali

Côte d’IvoireLesotho

LiberiaMauritania

Guinea-BissauCongo, Rep.

EswatiniGuineaNigeriaMalawi

BeninZimbabweCameroon

TogoZambiaSudanKenya

Sierra LeoneRwandaBurundi

Central African RepublicBurkina FasoMadagascarSouth Sudan

TanzaniaEquatorial Guinea

MozambiqueNigerChad

Congo, Dem. Rep.Angola

SomaliaEthiopiaUgandaEritrea

0

2016

20 40 60 80 100 0 20 40 60 80 100

Percent of population Percent of population

a. Access to electricity b. Access to at least basic drinking water

200820152008

66 CHAPTER 2 AFRICA IS STRIDING: WHO’S LEFT BEHIND?

Box 2.4 Areas and Peoples: North and Northeast Kenya

Areas in the north and northeast of Kenya remain largely left out of recent economic progress. The ten counties of Garissa, Isiolo, Lamu, Mandera, Marsabit, Samburu, Tana River, Turkana, Wajir, and West Pokot remain below the national average of living standards indicators, and regional disparities are stark. The Kenya Integrated Household and Budget Survey 2015–2016 indicates that the average poverty rates in the ten counties is 68 percent, compared to the national average of 36 percent. Primary school attendance in the north and northeast is on average 55 percent, compared to a national average of 82 percent. Secondary school attendance is 19 percent, versus 37 percent nationally. The literacy rate among women is 41 percent on average, compared to 89 percent for the country as a whole. Thirty-four percent of births are assisted by a skilled provider, compared to a national average of 71 percent.

Today’s disparities can be traced back to colonial rule and the early years of independence. Initial development during British colonial rule was focused on the Kenya-Uganda railway corridor. The north and northeast—then dubbed the Northern Frontier District—were considered a buffer zone against hostile neighboring countries. The lack of infrastructure and services in this area and strict regulation of travel permits served that interest. Secessionist tendencies of the Somali minorities in the Northern Frontier District and distrust of the newly formed independent Kenyan state led to the “Shifta War” from 1963 to 1967, after which emergency rule was established in the area and not lifted until 1991. In addition, Sessional Paper No. 10 of 1965 directed public spending to areas with potential for high economic returns to achieve rapid growth. Investments focused on agricultural areas, whereas the social and economic infrastructure in the arid north and northeast was neglected.

For decades, the north and northeastern regions have been underserved by infrastructure and government services. Road networks are extremely poor, often cutting the region off from the rest of the country during the rainy season. In the dry season it can take on average three days to reach Mandera via Isiolo from Nairobi, a distance of about 983 kilometers. The counties of Isiolo, Wajir, Mandera, and Garissa cover 26 percent of Kenya’s land mass but are home to only 6 percent of the total road network in the country. Only 57 percent of households in this region have access to safe water and 34 percent to improved sanitation, compared to national averages of 72 and 59 percent.

Pastoralism is the main economic activity in the north and northeastern regions; 90 percent of the population relies on livestock-based livelihoods. These arid or semiarid areas struggle with frequent droughts. Some conflicts among pastoralist communities, such as cattle raiding and rustling, have a long history but have become increasingly destructive due to proliferation of small arms, organized crime, competition over control and access to natural resources such as water and pasture, land issues, the diminishing role of traditional governance systems, ethnocentrism, increasing levels of poverty and idleness among the youth, and inadequate security. Additionally, low levels of human capital call for capacity to be imported from other parts of the country for public service delivery. However, due to the lack of infrastructure and services in the area, the challenging security situation, and persistent stereotypes and prejudices, it is difficult to attract and retain qualified staff. In 2012, the vacancy rate for health professionals in north and northeastern Kenya was assessed at 79 percent.

Sources: World Bank 2018c. Additional data presented are based on the Kenya Integrated Household and Budget Survey 2015–2016 (KNBS Ministry of Devolution and National Planning 2015).

56 percent of the rural population around the world lacks health coverage, compared to 22 percent of the urban population, with the most deprived rural population living in Africa (Scheil-Adlung 2015, 6). Within rural areas, exclusion from health services also may be more severe for women, the elderly, some ethnic groups, and migrants (Scheil-Adlung 2015, 30). In South Africa, despite provision of free antenatal care two decades, nonwhite women and those living in rural areas are less likely to receive antenatal care or to have a skilled attendant present at the time of delivery than white women in urban areas (Burgard 2004; Say and Raine 2007; Silal et al. 2012; all cited in World Bank 2013, 95).

INCLUSION MATTERS IN AFRICA 67

Box 2.5 Urban Floods: Disproportionate Effects

At the time of writing, Cyclones Idai and Kenneth had wreaked havoc in many parts of Southern Africa. Such shocks have become commonplace as countries struggle to keep apace. Floods account for almost half of natural hazards in most metropolitan areas. Groups that are disproportionately affected are often (though not always) poor; they include, among others, migrant workers, the elderly, persons with disabilities, and people working in trades that are particularly susceptible to disruption during natural hazards, like street vendors and waste pickers. Persons with disabilities may lack access to warnings, evacuation notices, emergency shelters, or food distribution; they may become homebound during floods, be left behind in evacuations, or be separated from family members and caregivers (Das and Majumdar 2019). The disproportionate nature of effects plays out in other ways too. Ajibade, McBean, and Bezner-Kerr

(2013) found that the impacts of flash floods in Lagos, Nigeria, were differentiated by gender and income level. Women in lower-income neighborhoods had more intense negative impacts and took longer to recover when compared to other groups. Location also matters: urban (and rural) floods may be particularly damaging for groups living on fragile lands, in informal settlements, in low-lying areas, or in precarious housing situations. These groups may lack resilient infrastructure, and their schools, homes, and health centers may be the last to be rehabilitated (Das and Majumdar 2019). As we design programs for adaptation to climate change and mitigation of its impacts, we need to be cognizant of the fact that emergencies can often exacerbate existing inequalities and asymmetrical power relations and that both prevention and response need to take this into account.

Climate-related events and trendsClimate change is forging unprecedented spatial and other transitions and is likely to affect many aspects of life globally, and certainly in Africa. Climate-related events, for instance, affect livelihoods, health, education, and general well-being; they could potentially reverse many of the gains that African countries have made. Extreme weather events also contribute to large-scale, involuntary population movements. Africa is expected to host 86 million persons who will likely migrate due to the effects of climate change by 2050 (Rigaud et al. 2018). Rapid-onset events like extreme storms or floods (box 2.5) tend to lead to short-term displacement, followed by return to affected areas, although they can also generate a combination of short- and longer-term displacement and out-migration. Slow-onset events like droughts or desertification, such as of the Sahel, by contrast, tend to lead to gradual long-term out-migration rather than affecting migration patterns immediately. Many internal migrants move to major cities; indeed, internal migration is a significant contributor to urbanization (Tacoli, McGranahan, and Satterthwaite 2015, cited in Rigaud et al. 2018, 18). Nairobi is one example of a city likely to see increased climate-driven in-migration. At the same time, low-lying cities, along with coastlines vulnerable to sea level rise and areas of high water and agriculture stress, are at risk of climate-induced out-migration. Addis Ababa and Dar el Salaam are among the cities likely to see dampened population growth due to rising sea level and storm surges (Rigaud et al. 2018).

68 CHAPTER 2 AFRICA IS STRIDING: WHO’S LEFT BEHIND?

The impact of climate-related events on individuals and groups goes beyond the migration and competition for resources and alters social processes. Take the case of marriage markets. One study looked at the effects of rainfall variability on age at marriage in Africa and India. The research demonstrated that in Africa drought increased the likelihood of early marriage, whereas in India it lowered that likelihood. The two contradictory impacts are likely linked to the traditional transfers linked to marriage (bride price in Africa and dowry in India) and reflect the cultural and social mores that underpin household responses to rainfall shocks and the economic hardship they confer (Corno, Hildebrandt, and Voena 2016, cited in Das 2017). Another study from South Africa showed that single headship of a household makes it more vulnerable during times of rainfall variability. In particular, households headed by widows, never-married women, and women with a nonresident spouse (for example, “left-behind” migrant households) are especially vulnerable. The results are more significant in areas that tend to rely on rain-fed agriculture (Flatø, Muttarak, and Pelser 2017, cited in Das 2017).

Conflict and fragility: Challenges to social inclusion

Peace is not just the absence of conflict; peace is the creation of an environment where all can flourish, regardless of race, colour, creed, religion, gender, class, caste, or any other social markers of difference. Religion, ethnicity, language, social and cultural practices are elements which enrich human civilization, adding to the wealth of our diversity.

Mandela, 20049

The preceding discussion, as indeed other parts of this report, highlights the fact that areas that face conflict or fragility have poorer outcomes across a number of domains. Individuals and groups who reside in these areas struggle for access to markets, services, and spaces. The least powerful among them sometimes face terrible atrocities. Although neither conflicts nor humanitarian emergencies are exclusively African problems or only problems of poor and fragile situations, Africa does face some unique challenges. As an example, in 2016, Africa saw 3.9 million new internal displacements due to conflict, violence, and sudden-onset disasters. Together with the Middle East and North Africa Region, Sub-Saharan Africa hosts the largest numbers of forcibly displaced groups, with a sharp increase over the past several years. For example, although each of the two regions had about 8 million displaced people in 2012, this number increased to 21.5 million in the Middle East and North Africa and 18.4 million in Sub-Saharan Africa in 2017 (figure 2.10). Within Sub-Saharan Africa, most forced displacement took place domestically: of the 18.4 million displaced people in 2017, 12.5 million were internally displaced persons (IDPs) and 5.9 percent were refugees (figure 2.11).

INCLUSION MATTERS IN AFRICA 69

Figure 2.10 Forcibly Displaced Persons, 2012–2017

Figure 2.11 Forcibly Displaced Africans, 2012–2017

Source: Connor, P., and J. M. Krogstad. “Record Number of Forcibly Displaced People Lived in Sub-Saharan Africa in 2017.” Pew Research Center analysis of United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) data. http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/08/09/record-number-of-forcibly-displaced-people-lived-in-sub-saharan-africa-in-2017 (accessed August 24, 2019).

Note: Annual figures are as of December 31. Forcibly displaced populations include internally displaced persons, refugees, and asylum seekers. Palestinian refugees are not included.

Source: Connor, P., and J. M. Krogstad. “Record Number of Forcibly Displaced People Lived in Sub-Saharan Africa in 2017.” Pew Research Center analysis of United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) data. http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/08/09/record-number-of-forcibly-displaced-people-lived-in-sub-saharan-africa-in-2017 (accessed August 24, 2019).

Note: Those displaced within home country include internally displaced persons, and those displaced outside home country include refugees and asylum seekers. Annual figures as of December 31.

Year2012 2015

Europe2.34.9

5.9 6.0

6.76.97.4

Asia-Paci�c6.1

8.27.7

4.8

Americas

Sub-Saharan Africa

Middle East-North Africa

23.3

20.8 21.5

13.014.1

18.4

8.28.8 9.4

2016 2017

Mill

ions

Displaced within home country

Displaced outside home country

5.15.9

3.1

5.1

8.9

12.5

Year2012 20172016

Mill

ion

s

70 CHAPTER 2 AFRICA IS STRIDING: WHO’S LEFT BEHIND?

Conflict, the threat of conflict, and the likely pursuant displacement affect both displaced groups and their host communities. To start, although displacement comes with tremendous suffering, displaced persons are not necessarily the poorest (Beegle et al. 2016), and fleeing mitigates the detrimental effects of conflict (Etang-Ndip, Hoogeveen, and Lendorfer 2015). Moreover, host communities are affected by the inflow of these forced migrants, and in some places, especially in remote and underdeveloped borderlands, they are poorer than IDPs and refugees. The effects of displacement on host communities take place through different channels. The Kakuma refugee camp in Kenya, based in Turkana County, for instance, has a poverty rate of close to 80 percent, compared to the national average of 36 percent (KNBS 2015). In Tanzania, the influx of refugees from Burundi and Rwanda in the 1990s adversely affected Tanzanian casual laborers due to an increase in competition in labor markets and surging prices of goods. Public sector institutions were also affected, as numerous employees from hospitals, schools, and government departments left their positions for better job opportunities in relief-related sectors (Whitaker 2002, cited in Ogude 2018, 10). It is also true that the presence of forcibly displaced groups can benefit host communities. In Tanzania, the influx of additional labor has helped sectors like agriculture, construction, and housekeeping (Maystadt and Verwimp 2014; Whitaker 2002; both cited in Ogude 2018, 10). The gross regional product (GRP) of Turkana (Kenya) increased by 3.4 percent as a result of the refugee presence, total employment increased by 2.9 percent, and consumption measures within 5 km of the camp were found to be up to 35 percent higher than in other parts of the county (Sanghi, Onder, and Vemuru 2016).

The aftermath of conflict can lead to large numbers of ex-combatants trying to reenter their communities and facing challenges to reintegration. In 2015, the World Bank estimated that there were 194,000 combatants in armed groups in Africa. Ex-combatants the world over face stigma and discrimination, as well as other challenges in reintegrating into “normal” social and economic activities. Upon return, they may be subject to suspicion or fears from community members, or to tensions related to lifestyles or values (Baxter and Burrall 2011, 21f). Young ex-combatants (ages 18–30) lag behind average ex-combatants in social and economic reintegration, probably as a result of being mobilized as adolescents and never previously having established a stable social and economic identity. We discuss these challenges and some solutions later in this report.

Political and civic participation and social movementsSocial inclusion can be advanced when individuals or groups who feel excluded assert their agency through social and political participation. This participation has seen a change in recent years in many African countries. Recent surveys draw attention to declining participation in formal political and civic processes, particularly among youth and women in Africa; but the picture is complex. The likelihood of voting is lower among African youth than among their elders,10 and Afrobarometer data suggest that the political participation of young people has declined over the past decade and

INCLUSION MATTERS IN AFRICA 71

Figure 2.12 Civic Engagement among 18- to 35-Year-Olds in 16 Countries, 2002–2015

Source: Lekalake and Gyimah-Boadi 2016.

Note: The 16 countries included were Botswana, Cabo Verde, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, South Africa, Senegal, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. Respondents were asked (1) Now I am going to read out a list of groups that people join or attend. For each one, could you tell me whether you are an official leader, an active member, an inactive member, or not a member? and (2) Here is a list of actions that people sometimes take as citizens. For each of these, please tell me whether you, personally, have done any of these things during the past year. (The figure represents percent “yes.”)

Years

Perc

ent 70

60

50

40

30

20

10

0

2002/2003

21%

Of�cial leader/active member of religious group

Of�cial leader/active member of voluntary association

Attended a community meeting

Joined others to raise an issue

20% 19%

34%

38%

34%

45%47%49%

49% 49%51%

51%

56%57%60%

63%

50%

2005/2006 2008/2009 2011/2013 2014/2015

a half (figure 2.12). African youth are also less likely than their elders to participate in civic activities.11 On the other hand, they are more likely than their elders to participate in demonstrations and protest marches: 11 percent of young respondents say they attended at least one protest in the previous year, compared to 8 percent of older respondents. Young women participate even less in public affairs; compared to their male counterparts, young women report significantly less interest in public affairs and discussions around them. Yet, as noted in box 2.1, decreasing participation in formal political processes may signal several different things. It may mean disenchantment or lack of faith in the processes. It may also mean that young people use different channels to express their preferences. The importance of social media bears special mention here. The Internet affords anonymity, which allows groups that would otherwise not have a voice to express themselves through digital media. The youth in Africa are far more active on social media and digital platforms than are their older counterparts. Even so, the likely disenchantment with political processes may be an indication of broader disenchantment with the state, as discussed in chapter 4.

72 CHAPTER 2 AFRICA IS STRIDING: WHO’S LEFT BEHIND?

While participation in formal political processes seems to be declining, social movements continue to raise the profile of social inclusion across Africa. That Africa has a vibrant history of social and political movements is well known. They include the legendary movements for independence and decolonization, the critical movements in academia against Eurocentrism, movements for peace and civil liberties, and movements against various economic policies. The Women of Liberia Mass Action for Peace, for example, has been recognized for its role in pressing for Liberian warlords to sign a peace agreement in 2003 that ended ten years of civil war. The student-led Fees Must Fall movement in South Africa points to the fact that, although young people may not participate in formal political processes, they are nevertheless politically very vibrant. Similarly, the movement that asserts the rights of indigenous peoples to their culture, lands, and unique identity also has a strong history. Two other contemporary social movements deserve mention: the first brought attention to HIV/AIDS and the second to the rights of persons with disabilities. Both have used the axiom “nothing about us without us” to influence budget allocations, research priorities, and accessibility and delivery of services to excluded groups. In the process, the movements raised awareness and reduced the widespread stigma against the people they represented. The advocacy movement for albinism is unfolding before our eyes. Each of these campaigns demonstrates that norms and practices are mutable and continue to influence both the supply side and the demand side of access to markets, services, and spaces.

Civil society has also galvanized citizens against corruption in several countries in Africa. In South Africa, for instance, civil society organizations started campaigning against corruption in the late 1990s, which led to the first anti-corruption summit by the government in 1999 and the launch of the National Anti-Corruption Forum in 2001 that brought together civil society, business, and government in the fight against corruption.12 In Kenya, civil society organizations mobilized protests (Occupy Parliament) against the salaries of Members of Parliament (MPs) and brought about salary cuts of MPs and the president in 2013. Other countries have had similar forms of protest, and across Africa radical feminist movements have gathered strength over the years and have organized to hold the state and society accountable for the poorer opportunities for girls and women. The number of countries in Africa that have freedom of information (FOI) laws has grown substantially in the 21st century, from 4 countries in 2004 to 21 in 2017 (AFIC 2017). Civil society groups and citizens have since used the new laws to improve accountability and governance in areas from public and reproductive health information to access to power, sanitation, and water (Odinkalu and Kadiri 2014).

INCLUSION MATTERS IN AFRICA 73

Concluding reflections The changing development context of the continent, as demonstrated by select regional trends, portends new opportunities and challenges for African countries over the next few decades. First, the decline of poverty almost across the board, the enhancement of education, and the improvements in health have meant (and will increasingly mean) that policy makers will need to focus on those who have not benefited from this aggregate progress. Of these, individuals and groups who are affected by conflict and fragility stand out, but some groups in nonfragile contexts are also at risk. These include some categories of women, sexual and gender minorities, persons with disabilities, older persons, some categories of youth and children, certain ethnic and racial groups, and those who live in “lagging” regions. Some of these groups are more assertive; others may have festering grievances.

Second, development spearheads aspiration. As individuals and groups do better, they will seek more; this has implications for how governments respond to these heightened aspirations. As we discuss in the following chapter, citizens in many countries in Africa are simultaneously disenchanted with the state and filled with optimism and hope for better lives. As more countries graduate to middle-income status, they will focus on “second-generation” issues of prosperity. The trends and transitions that shape and tame Africa’s dynamism are likely to have significant implications for social inclusion in the years ahead. Although a focus on poverty must be front and center in addressing issues of social inclusion, states and societies will also need to consider the drivers of poverty and why some groups are left out.

74 CHAPTER 2 AFRICA IS STRIDING: WHO’S LEFT BEHIND?

Endnotes1 See https://africaindata.org/#/2.

2 See United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) Press center release at https://www.unicef.org/media/media_45279.html.

3 Mitra (2018) draws on the four LSMS panel datasets that include internationally comparable functional difficulty questions: the Ethiopia Rural Socioeconomic Survey (2011/2012 and 2013/2014), the Malawi Integrated Household Survey (2010/2011), the Tanzania National Panel Survey (2010/2011), and the Uganda National Panel Survey (2009/2010, 2010/2011).  Mitra points out that these are the first longitudinal datasets that include the recommended short questionnaire on functional difficulties of the Washington Group on Disability Statistics (WG) and thus provide internationally comparable data on disability using a tool that has been tested in different country contexts. Mitra uses other waves of the LSMS (that do not have the WG questions) to investigate the association between functional difficulties and short-term mortality, including the Malawi Integrated Household Survey (2012/2013), the Tanzania National Panel Survey (2012/2013), and the Uganda National Panel Survey (2011/2012).

4 In Malawi, 48 percent of persons with severe functional difficulty and 68 percent with moderate functional difficulty have ever attended school, compared to 81 percent with no functional difficulty. In Tanzania, 42 percent of persons with severe functional difficulty and 65 percent with moderate functional difficulty have ever attended school, compared to 80 percent with no functional difficulty (Mitra 2018, 105).

5 Based on $1.90 a day in 2011 purchasing power parity (PPP). Source: PovcalNet, http://iresearch.worldbank.org/PovcalNet.

6 The food deficit is defined as the amount of food needed to not be considered undernourished, measured in kilocalories a day.

7 Pew Research Center. 2018. “Internet Connectivity Seen as Having Positive Impact on Life in Sub-Saharan Africa, But Digital Divides Persist.” http://www.pewglobal.org/2018/10/09/inter-net-connectivity-seen-as-having-positive-impact-on-life-in-sub-saharan-africa.

8 From UN DESA Population Division “2018 Revision of World Urbanization Prospects,” https://www.un.org/development/desa/publications/2018-revision-of-world-urbanization-prospects.html.

9 From Nelson Mandela’s address to the Global Convention on Peace and Non-Violence, New Delhi, India, January 31, 2004 (UN DPI 2018).

10 Two-thirds (65 percent) of 18- to 35-year-old respondents who were old enough to vote in the last national election say they did so, compared to 79 percent of citizens above age 35. Slightly more than half (53 percent) of African youth report being “very” or “somewhat” interested in public affairs, and two-thirds (67 percent) say they discuss politics with friends or family at least “occasionally” (Lekalake and Gyimah-Boadi 2016, based on Afrobarometer data).

11 Less than half (47 percent) of 18- to 35-year-olds say they attended community meetings at least once during the previous year, while 40 percent joined others to raise an issue (vs. 57 and 47 percent for older citizens; Lekalake and Gyimah-Boadi 2016, based on Afrobarometer data).

12 Essoungou, A.-M. 2013. “The Rise of Civil Society Groups in Africa.” Africa Renewal, December. https://www.un.org/africarenewal/magazine/december-2013/rise-civil-society-groups-africa (accessed August 24, 2019).

CHAPTER3

INCLUSION MATTERS IN AFRICA 77

Social exclusion is fundamentally about relations of power.

Societies devise intricate ways to solidify social structures and

systems and uphold the status quo the world over. Structures

and systems comprise, among others, families, communities, legal

systems; markets, such as labor and land; and knowledge systems.

Norms, beliefs, attitudes and practices are the processes through

which societies uphold their structures and relegate some groups to

subordinate status. Processes also encompass superstitions, stigmas,

and rituals. Structures and processes reinforce each other and are

solidified by formal and informal institutions.

How Does Social Exclusion Play Out in Africa?

Culture plays a central role in the political, economic and social life of communities. Indeed, culture may be the missing link in the development of Africa. Culture is dynamic and evolves over time, consciously discarding retrogressive traditions, like female genital mutilation (FGM), and embracing aspects that are good and useful.

Wangari Maathai, 20041

78 CHAPTER 3 HOW DOES SOCIAL EXCLUSION PLAY OUT IN AFRICA?

Why do processes and practices matter for policies and programs? They matter because they affect the actions and behaviors of dominant and subordinate groups, of service providers, and of the state itself. Groups that are historically excluded, on their part, may respond in different ways. One possibility is that they “opt out” or reject the terms on which they are included. Excluded groups, therefore, may drop out of school or the labor market or disengage from political processes. A second and related possibility is that grievances may accumulate, creating social tensions and having long-term costs for the economy and society. A third possibility is that groups that feel excluded organize themselves into formidable lobbies and use the political space to demand change. Historically, this has led to movement toward social inclusion; this is discussed in greater detail in the next chapter. In one way or another, processes and structures have a strong bearing on feelings and perceptions of individuals and groups with consequent effect on actions and behaviors. In our quest to leave no one behind, attain universal access, eradicate extreme poverty, and promote peace and stability, we need to be cognizant of behaviors. Yet, even as we know that belief systems, feelings, and perceptions affect behaviors, measuring and interpreting such systems and the underlying affective foundations is a complex undertaking that requires a deep understanding of the context as well as robust data and analytic tools.

The second part of this chapter uses data from recent surveys to highlight some of the ways in which individuals and groups across African countries perceive their own lives and the world around them. Subjective indicators of well-being and of feelings and perceptions need to be used and interpreted carefully, fraught as they are with measurement challenges. The responses to questions depend on a variety of related and unrelated factors and events, and context is important. The same response in one country may mean something quite different in another.

Legal, administrative, and social structures

Legal structures

Discriminatory laws that place implicit or explicit barriers on groups can stymie their ability, opportunity, and dignity. In South Africa, the legal exclusion of black South Africans from education and labor markets predates apartheid. The 1913 Natives Land Act (and related acts) prevented self-employment of black people in agriculture, while the Native Urban Areas Act suppressed other forms of entrepreneurial activity by black South Africans in urban areas, including in trade and manufacturing. These barriers to entrepreneurial activity help explain why, for instance, the informal sector in South Africa remains smaller than in other countries in the region. In the same vein, the Job Reservation and Colour Bar Acts2 reserved many skilled and semiskilled jobs for white South Africans. Legal regulations in the education sector further enshrined the exclusion of black South Africans: through the 1953 Bantu Education Act, the syllabus was deliberately designed to de-emphasize basic skills in arithmetic and language to train black South Africans as unskilled laborers who would not compete with white employees (World Bank 2018f, 13).

INCLUSION MATTERS IN AFRICA 79

Colonial legacy has played a major part in the structure and function of legal systems, as pointed out earlier in this report. For instance, 75 percent of countries in Francophone Africa have regulations restricting women’s employment, drawing upon a 1954 ordinance from the former federation of French West Africa. Among these countries are Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, the Central African Republic, Chad, the Democratic Republic of Congo, the Republic of Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Gabon, Guinea, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, and Senegal. Similarly, the legacy of Portuguese and Spanish rule has left a mark in many former colonies. Portugal first introduced a series of decrees restricting women’s work in the 1890s that stayed in effect in some form until the early 2000s. Currently, almost every country in Lusophone Africa (and Brazil) has at least one restriction on women’s work. There are similar examples in the former Spanish colonies (World Bank 2018g), although many of these retrogressive laws are being dismantled in both former colonizing and former colonized countries.

The extent of criminalization of same-sex relations and attitudes toward people of different sexual orientation or gender identity (SOGI) also reflect the colonial history. For instance, Han and O’Mahoney (2014) analyze the variation in laws criminalizing same-sex relations across 185 countries and find that former British colonies are more likely to have criminalizing laws in place. Former British colonies in Africa are no exception to this pattern. In many Eastern and Southern African countries that were formerly colonized by Britain, same-sex sexual acts are punishable (figures 3.1 and 3.2). In contrast, former French colonies, mostly in the Central and Western Africa, are less likely to have such criminalizing laws.3 Seventeen of the 45 countries surveyed by UNAIDS (2018b) have either never had laws penalizing same-sex sexual acts or have decriminalized such acts. A majority of these countries are in Central Africa, with some in Western Africa (Angola, Benin, Burkina Faso, the Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Gabon, Mali, and Niger). Some countries in Southern Africa also do not criminalize same-sex sexual acts: South Africa, Mozambique, Rwanda, and Madagascar. Mauritania continues to criminalize same-sex sexual acts with the death penalty. Finally, most countries do not criminalize transgender people at all. Globally, much of the improvement in laws related to SOGI over the past few years has been in Africa.

In addition to their underpinning in the colonial past, laws may reflect long-held societal values, prejudices, and proclivities. Figures 3.1 and 3.2 lay out the extent of penalization for acts that go against some “moral values” of a society. For instance, in some countries, drug use, possession of drugs for personal use, and female sex work attract the highest penalties, as do nondisclosure of HIV positive status and transmission of the disease. Some of these laws are a response to the HIV epidemic, but in other places the information campaigns and demystification of the HIV epidemic have led to the loosening of laws against same-sex relations. In other cases, laws may be more progressive and inclusive than existing social mores and may be agents of social change. For example, same-sex sexual acts are not considered criminal in either Rwanda or South Africa, but attitudes toward “homosexual neighbors”4 vary starkly across the two countries. Although the former has the highest prevalence of negative attitudes toward homosexuality among African countries surveyed by the World Values Survey (WVS), the latter demonstrates the lowest prevalence of such attitudes.

80 CHAPTER 3 HOW DOES SOCIAL EXCLUSION PLAY OUT IN AFRICA?

Figure 3.1 Laws and Policies (I)

Source: UNAIDS 2018b.

Note: Data on laws restricting the entry, stay, and residence of people living with HIV are currently undergoing a global review that will involve country validation. An update is expected by the end of 2018. SRH = sexual and reproductive health services.

Angola

Botswana

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Eritrea

Eswatini

Ethiopia

Kenya

Lesotho

Madagascar

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Mauritius

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INCLUSION MATTERS IN AFRICA 81

Figure 3.2 Laws and Policies (II)

Source: UNAIDS 2018b.

Note: Data on laws restricting the entry, stay, and residence of people living with HIV are currently undergoing a global review that will involve country validation. An update is expected by the end of 2018. SRH = sexual and reproductive health services.

Benin

Burkina Faso

Burundi

Cabo Verde

Cameroon

Central African Republic

Chad

Congo

Côte d’Ivoire

Congo, Dem. Rep.

Equatorial Guinea

Gabon

Gambia

Ghana

Guinea

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82 CHAPTER 3 HOW DOES SOCIAL EXCLUSION PLAY OUT IN AFRICA?

Finally, laws that derive from custom and religion may similarly be responsible for unequal and discriminatory treatment of some groups. Traditional land tenure systems can vary within countries, depending on region or ethnicity (World Bank 2016d, 30, for Guinea-Bissau; Marzatico 2014, 4, for South Sudan). Although global data on women’s land ownership are limited,5 women face serious barriers to ownership in several countries. In Guinea-Bissau, for instance, land is exclusively administered by the male head of the household or family clan (the chefe de tabanca or regulado). Women’s land use rights are acquired through birth in their family of descent or through marriage and are usually only given for subsistence horticulture. Further, when a woman separates from her husband, she loses her land rights, including her land use rights in her family of descent (World Bank 2016d, 30). Customary land tenure also continues to restrict women’s ability to own land independently of their husbands or male relatives in South Sudan, despite formal land provisions that sought to establish women’s equal rights to land and property (Marzatico 2014, 8, 15).

Privileging certain cultures and knowledge systems at the expense of others intensifies asymmetrical information and affects the ability, opportunity, and dignity of subordinate groups. The tension between knowledge systems of the majority and the minority is well documented in the case of health service provision, in which “traditional” or “folk” knowledge systems may be overlooked, and “modern” systems imposed upon minority groups, who then may well decide not to take part in the medical system. Based on a study of maternal and neonatal health care in rural northern Ghana, Hill et al. (2014) point out that despite a pluralistic medical system that incorporated traditional and allopathic providers, tensions prevailed. Many allopathic providers were found to be disconnected from the culture of the communities in which they practiced, whereas traditional providers were more in tune with local cultural practices. The two systems of medicine also came into conflict at times. A large body of literature highlights the fact that ignoring indigenous systems of knowledge can have deleterious effects on several outcomes, including health, educational attainment, agricultural output, and adoption of new technologies. In the case of education, too, the language of instruction can have great impact on the ability of minority students to succeed in school. A more radical strand of the literature argues that appropriation of knowledge systems has been a tool to solidify social exclusion and to colonize the “ways of knowing” (Belenky et al. 1986), constituting in effect an exclusion from spaces that are signified by knowledge, power, status, and authority. By the same token, respect for indigenous systems of knowledge can enhance the dignity and respect accorded to indigenous peoples with the important positive ramifications of social inclusion.

Bureaucracies, with their rules, procedures, and ethos, can exclude or include some individuals and groups. An indigenous woman who lives in a remote village and needs a disability certificate, for instance, may have to go into a district office in a nearby town. She may not speak the dominant language, may not know her way around, may be intimidated by the formal office and its culture, and may have no idea what documents she needs to bring to secure the certificate. Documents of various kinds are indispensable to accessing services. Proof of identity, for instance, can enable or stymie inclusion in markets, services, and spaces; documents that establish this and

INCLUSION MATTERS IN AFRICA 83

others have perhaps become more important today than they were a decade ago. With greater formalization of governmental systems and procedures, individuals need proof of residence to show that they are eligible to buy and sell property and to generally participate in business and society.

Data from the World Bank Identification for Development (ID4D) project6 show that in Sub-Saharan Africa those who did not have an account in a financial institution were especially likely to cite documentation requirements as barriers to setting up such accounts. While the global average for citing documentation as a barrier to financial inclusion is at 20 percent, it is significantly higher in Zambia (35 percent), the Philippines (45 percent), and Zimbabwe (49 percent) (Demirgüç-Kunt et al. 2018, 40). On average, only 56 percent of adults in Africa without an account at a financial institution reported having government-issued identification (compared with an average of 85 percent in developing countries globally). But securing relevant documents can often be a challenge because some groups may not be able to navigate administrative rules and procedures or understand the etiquette required when dealing with administrative functionaries, or they may have accessibility barriers. Government offices or banks that are not accessible and instructions that are published only in the dominant language may exclude a large number of individuals.

Marriage and familial structures

Across the world, social structures, hierarchies, and norms underpin power relations within the household and the community, with strong influence on the ability of individuals and groups to access opportunities. Structures and rules of tribe, clan, and kinship have a strong role in customs and behaviors and, in turn, in determining outcomes. These structures and rules have often been influenced by the nature of colonial rule and postcolonial history. A strong body of anthropological literature sheds light on these structures. For instance, in many regions, women are dependent on their husbands or elders regarding the extent to which they can access health care and higher education, whether they can seek market work, how much leisure time they have, and for other aspects of life. Parental or other familial permission plays a strong role for young men as well. Figures 3.1 and 3.2 showed that several countries require adolescents to get parental permission before they can be tested for HIV/AIDS. Similarly, age at marriage for both men and women is often dictated by family and kin decisions. Such controls have a strong influence on the extent to which less powerful individuals in the family can access markets, services, and spaces. Kinship structures can also have salutary effects on inclusion.

As in many other parts of the world, in most African countries, marriage is an important symbol of status, security, and social acceptance. It also affects social inclusion in complex ways. In chapter 2, we discussed some of the nuances of marital status and sex of household head and their relationship with household poverty. Take also the case of ex-combatants in the Great Lakes Region (GLR): Uganda, Rwanda, the Democratic Republic of Congo, the Republic of Congo, and Burundi. Based on survey data collected between 2010 and 2012 from nearly 10,000 ex-combatants and

84 CHAPTER 3 HOW DOES SOCIAL EXCLUSION PLAY OUT IN AFRICA?

community members, Rhea (2014) finds that marriage is a core component of social reintegration in the GLR. Marriage is a critical pathway through which ex-combatants extend their familial networks and signal a shift in identity to the community. Marriage also serves as a pathway for access to land, an important indicator of economic stability, as most ex-combatants return to work in small-scale agriculture. Although ex-combatants are generally accepted by their family networks upon returning to their communities (contrary to popular belief), they still have less familial contact overall and are less likely to marry, compared to community members. Female ex-combatants, although generally accepted into existing kinship networks, are the least likely group to be married and most likely to be divorced, separated, or widowed. While male ex-combatants in the GLR have seen improved marriage rates over time, the rates for female ex-combatants are near stagnant. The hyper-exposure to (sexual) violence during conflict contributes to the stigma of female ex-combatants. In some parts of the GLR, this stigma is so strong that some women avoid self-identifying as ex-combatants and forfeit their entitlement to assistance that is targeted to ex-combatants.

There are other ways in which marriage and its dissolution, although important for both men and women, has varying forms and connotations. Overall, African men spend much more of their lifetime married than do African women; women are more likely to stay widowed or divorced. There may be several causes, including the higher life expectancy of women. If marriage confers status, its breakdown confers disadvantage. Women’s continued single status after marital dissolution or widowhood has implications for their inclusion in markets, services, and spaces.7 Van de Walle (2013), drawing on Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) data for Mali between 1996 and 2006, shows that widowhood (including prior widowhood of currently married women) is correlated with lower living standards. Drawing on more recent DHS data (2004–2013), Djuikom and van de Walle (2018) further find that widows and divorcées have worse nutritional status8 than do married women in both urban and rural areas.9 The detrimental effects of widowhood and divorce are also passed along intergenerationally (van de Walle 2013).

Finally, early marriage deserves special mention because of its impact on the lives of girls and women over their entire lifetime. While early marriage also affects boys and men, the negative effects are different and possibly not as limiting as they are for girls and women. When the latter marry too early, they are less likely to attend primary as well as secondary school, and more likely to be engaged in home care or work. For married girls, outcomes are particularly poor. Compared to boys of similar age, the odds of married girls finishing primary school are 1:5 and of enrolling in secondary school 3:5. Low educational attainment of girls and young women is particularly costly both for individuals and societies: girls dropping out of school early are more likely to marry and have children early, sometimes leading to adverse outcomes for their own and their children’s health. Additionally, because younger women have lower levels of agency than older ones, they are also more vulnerable to intimate partner violence (Wodon et al. 2017). Therefore, the relationship between early marriage and poor outcomes is mutually reinforcing.

INCLUSION MATTERS IN AFRICA 85

Processes of exclusion

Across the world, belief systems, superstitions, stigmas, and other practices present formidable barriers to the inclusion of certain groups. Intimidation and harassment instill fear that prevents some groups from reaching their full potential and “keeps them in their place.” Social norms may assign males and females to certain occupations or may render some practices “unclean.” Other practices such as stigma and shunning may render some groups, like persons with disabilities, invisible. Relatedly, some cultures may actively hide persons with disabilities. This lack of visibility can have several consequences, including not counting these groups in official statistics; thus, they remain hidden and unattended to, at both the familial and the national level. Often, these processes of exclusion are sanctified by religion or by those who interpret religious texts. Persons who have a nonconforming sexual identity are excluded to the point of being criminalized in many cultures; this is often upheld by an invocation of religious texts. Taboos surrounding menstruating women are common in many parts of the world; beliefs of purity and pollution serve to exclude certain groups at certain times or at all times. Overall, these practices are mechanisms to enforce social order and control.

The case of persons with albinism10 is instructive; superstitions surrounding them can have life and death consequences. Box 2.2 in chapter 2 highlighted their poorer human capital outcomes; these outcomes are underpinned by processes and practices. In many parts of Africa, persons with albinism are targeted for brutal attacks in the name of witchcraft and superstition (Cruz-Inigo, Ladizinski, and Sethi 2011; UNGA 2013). Widespread ignorance of its genetic causes helps sustain myths surrounding albinism, prevents persons with albinism from receiving adequate health care, and hinders the prevention of disease (Cruz-Inigo, Ladizinski, and Sethi 2011). Children with albinism may be ridiculed at school or be avoided and neglected by family members. Mothers of children with albinism may be condemned due to “uncertain ancestry” of the child, or because of other superstitions surrounding the condition. A study in Nigeria found individuals with albinism to be more withdrawn from social situations to avoid being noticed, less emotionally stable, and less assertive than persons without albinism. Persons with albinism were also more likely to consider their society to be unkind and rejecting (Cruz-Inigo, Ladizinski, and Sethi 2011; Hong, Zeeb, and Repacholi 2006; Lund 2001).

Similarly, the stigma of HIV is still strong in many parts of the world. Not just persons living with HIV but the surviving children of HIV/AIDS-affected parents may be treated with hostility, with the latter being left without adequate adult support (Bourdillon 2017). Figure 3.3 shows the difference across three countries in reports by gay men and female sex workers (two groups associated with higher susceptibility to HIV/AIDS) of avoiding health care in the past 12 months due to stigma and discrimination. Cameroon and Côte d’Ivoire show very high levels of stigma, whereas Guinea shows very low levels. Nonconforming sexual identity is criminalized in Guinea and Cameroon but not in Côte d’Ivoire. So, the extent of stigma is not always correlated with the legal status of SOGI. Additionally, laws do not always reflect

86 CHAPTER 3 HOW DOES SOCIAL EXCLUSION PLAY OUT IN AFRICA?

societal attitudes. In sum, although stigma and discrimination against HIV-affected persons are high in Africa, they are also widely prevalent across the world, including in OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) countries: a study assessing self-reported HIV-related discrimination in European health care settings (Nöstlinger et al. 2014) found that 32 percent of respondents had experienced HIV-related discrimination in the three years prior to the study, and almost half of them felt they had been discriminated against by health care providers.

Violence is one of the gravest manifestations of exclusion and a mechanism to show subordinate groups “their place.” Physical offensives are often justified by an intricate set of beliefs and taboos that serve to create a “logic of exclusion” that may be sanctified by religion. For example, many religions regard a woman’s place as being in the home and may implicitly or explicitly condone violence against women who dare to transgress this norm. Overall, the acceptance of domestic violence against women remains high in Africa, although there has been change over time. Beegle et al. (2016) find that between 2000–2006 and 2007–2013 acceptance of domestic violence by women in Africa declined by almost 10 percentage points, but, at 30 percent, acceptance of domestic violence in the region is still exceptionally high and more than twice the average in the rest of the developing world (14 percent). There is considerable heterogeneity across countries, however. Whereas in Mali and Uganda 77 percent of women condone violence, only 13 percent in Malawi and 16 percent in Benin do so (figure 3.4). Some practices, such as female genital mutilation (FGM), which hold cultural value for some groups, are also examples of violence and extreme forms of exclusion, with devastating effects on health, education, and life chances of women and girls. FGM can have direct effects on reproductive and mental health and cause infectious disease. Sanctified and upheld by religion and culture, FGM serves

Figure 3.3 Groups Reporting Avoidance of Health Care due to Stigma and Discrimination around HIV Treatment, 2014–2017

Source: UNAIDS 2018b based on the Integrated Biological and Behavioral Surveys, 2014–2017.

Perc

ent

Country

25

20

15

10

0Côte d’IvoireCameroon Guinea

Female sex workers

Gay men and other men who have sex with men

INCLUSION MATTERS IN AFRICA 87

to solidify the subordinate status of women and girls. The practice matters in and of itself without doubt, but it also matters because it curtails the ability, opportunity, and dignity of survivors. In the long term, it affects the manner in which survivors accumulate human capital and their future earnings.

Attitudes about society and social inclusion

Societal attitudes about subordinate groups or minorities are another marker of the extent of inclusion and bring to the surface entrenched prejudices and stereotypes. The World Values Surveys have questions about groups that respondents would not like to have as neighbors, including immigrants/foreign workers, “homosexuals,”11 people of a different religion, and people who speak a different language.12 The panels in figures 3.5 and 3.6 report the tabulated answers to these questions and also serve to compare some African countries with other OECD and non-OECD countries. Negative attitudes toward sexual minorities are high across the world and pervasive in some African countries (figure 3.5, panel a). In Rwanda and Zimbabwe, for example, 88 percent of respondents reported not wanting a “homosexual neighbor”; this is more negative than certain countries in the Middle East and North Africa, such as Iraq, Morocco, Qatar, and Turkey. Among African countries included in the WVS, South Africa displays the lowest level of antipathy toward sexual minorities; here the proportion of people who would not want a “homosexual neighbor” stands at 38 percent, similar to some European countries, including Poland (38 percent) and Slovenia (35 percent).

Figure 3.4 Women’s Acceptance of Domestic Violence

Source: Beegle et al. 2016,100. Calculated based on data from Demographic and Health Surveys, 2007–2013.

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88 CHAPTER 3 HOW DOES SOCIAL EXCLUSION PLAY OUT IN AFRICA?

Figure 3.5 Attitudes toward Sexual Minorities and People of a Different Religion

Source: World Bank calculations based on data from World Values Surveys 2010–2014.

Note: Respondents were asked to look at a list of different groups of people and to name those that they would not like to have as neighbors. The groups included “drug addicts,” people of a different race, people who have AIDS, immigrants or foreign workers, “homosexuals,” people of a different religion, “heavy drinkers,” unmarried couples living together, and people who speak a different language. Also see http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org.

a. “Homosexual” is the terminology used on the World Value Survey. The World Bank generally refers to lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender,and intersex (LGBTI) people (https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/sexual-orientation-and-gender-identity).

b. Antipathy toward people of a different religiona. Antipathy toward “homosexuals”a

AzerbaijanArmenia

ZimbabweRwandaGeorgia

MoroccoQatar

TurkeyIraq

GhanaKorea, Rep.

Kyrgyz RepublicLibya

KazakhstanBelarusNigeriaTunisia

Yemen, Rep.Russian Federation

West Bank and GazaUzbekistan

UkraineJordan

MalaysiaLebanon

AlgeriaPakistanRomania

ChinaEstonia

Trinidad and TobagoIndiaPeru

Taiwan, ChinaThailand

CyprusEcuador

PolandSouth Africa

SloveniaColombia

Hong Kong SAR, ChinaSingapore

PhilippinesChile

MexicoUnited States

GermanyBahrain

New ZealandAustralia

BrazilUruguay

ArgentinaNetherlands

SpainSweden

0 604020 80 100

ArmeniaLibya

Yemen, Rep.India

West Bank and GazaAlgeria

GeorgiaTurkey

Kyrgyz RepublicLebanonBahrain

JapanThailandEcuador

AzerbaijanMalaysia

TunisiaJordan

IraqKorea, Rep.

NigeriaCyprus

PakistanGhana

EstoniaMoroccoRomania

BelarusHong Kong SAR, China

South AfricaPhilippines

MexicoUkraine

UzbekistanRussian Federation

GermanyPeru

KazakhstanQatar

SingaporeChina

SloveniaZimbabweColombia

ChileTaiwan, China

RwandaPoland

AustraliaSweden

BrazilSpain

United StatesTrinidad and Tobago

UruguayNetherlands

ArgentinaNew Zealand

0 302010 40 50

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Percent Percent

INCLUSION MATTERS IN AFRICA 89

Figure 3.6 Attitudes toward Different Languages and Immigrants or Foreign Workers

Source: World Bank calculations based on data from World Values Surveys 2010–2014.

Note: Respondents were asked to look at a list of different groups of people and to name those that they would not like to have as neighbors. The groups included “drug addicts,” people of a different race, people who have AIDS, immigrants or foreign workers, “homosexuals,” people of a different religion, “heavy drinkers,” unmarried couples living together, and people who speak a different language. Also see http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org.

b. Antipathy toward immigrants or foreign workersa. Antipathy toward people of a different language

MalaysiaLibya

ThailandIndia

QatarSouth AfricaKorea, Rep.

LebanonWest Bank and Gaza

CyprusAzerbaijan

IraqEstoniaJordanKuwaitJapan

SingaporeEcuadorBelarus

Russian FederationGeorgiaBahrain

Kyrgyz RepublicTurkey

AlgeriaKazakhstan

Yemen, Rep.Taiwan, China

RomaniaHong Kong SAR, China

GhanaNigeria

NetherlandsPakistanUkraineTunisia

ArmeniaUnited States

SloveniaPhilippinesUzbekistanZimbabwe

ChinaMexico

MoroccoPeru

AustraliaChileSpain

PolandTrinidad and Tobago

New ZealandRwanda

ColombiaSweden

ArgentinaBrazil

Uruguay

0 10 20 30 40 50 60

IndiaLibya

West Bank and GazaEcuadorLebanon

Yemen, Rep.Philippines

MalaysiaKuwaitTurkey

ThailandIraq

Korea, Rep.Jordan

Kyrgyz RepublicAzerbaijan

NigeriaGhana

GeorgiaEgypt, Arab Rep.

JapanCyprus

Russian FederationAlgeriaBelarusEstonia

ArmeniaRomania

Hong Kong SAR, ChinaSouth AfricaNetherlands

MexicoBahrain

GermanyTunisia

United StatesUkraine

MoroccoKazakhstan

PakistanPeru

SingaporeQatar

ZimbabweAustralia

Taiwan, ChinaRwanda

ColombiaUzbekistan

Trinidad and TobagoChina

New ZealandChileBrazil

SloveniaArgentina

SpainPoland

SwedenUruguay

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90 CHAPTER 3 HOW DOES SOCIAL EXCLUSION PLAY OUT IN AFRICA?

African countries seem to display greater acceptance of persons belonging to a different religion or speaking a different language, as well as of immigrants or foreign workers, than they do of sexual minorities (figures 3.5 and 3.6). This pattern is also seen in some other regions of the world; interestingly, some African countries that demonstrate the least tolerant attitudes toward “homosexuals” (namely, Rwanda and Zimbabwe) are the most accepting of persons of a different religion or different language. Less than 10 percent of respondents in Rwanda and Zimbabwe would reject a neighbor of a different religion or language, making Rwanda similar to Colombia, New Zealand, and Sweden in this respect. By contrast, over 20 percent of Nigerians and Ghanaians would not like a neighbor that belonged to a different religion or language, on par with countries like Cyprus, Estonia, the Republic of Korea, and Pakistan. South Africa, where respondents report the least negative attitudes toward sexual minorities, demonstrates the most negative attitudes toward immigrants or foreign workers, with 43 percent not wanting such a neighbor (on par with the Republic of Korea and Qatar), whereas Ghana and Nigeria (at 21 and 20 percent, respectively) display attitudes similar to Germany and the Netherlands. We would like to reemphasize the fact that attitudes are notoriously difficult to capture and to interpret and can reflect recent events or localized occurrences. We cannot draw generalized conclusions about the degree of inclusion in a country based on such attitudes. These attitudes do, however, give us a flavor of nuance and shine a light on which groups are likely to be excluded.

Attitudes affect outcomes, but the relationship is not clear cut. Take the case of attitudes about higher education for women (figure 3.7). Countries where attitudes toward university education for females are retrogressive tend to have lower gross female tertiary education enrollment. The World Values Surveys ask respondents whether they think university education is more important for boys than for girls. Combined with data from the World Development Indicators (WDI) on gross female tertiary enrollment,13 the results in general suggest a clear negative relationship: the higher the percentage of respondents who think university education is more important for boys than for girls, the lower the gross female tertiary enrollment rates. In countries like the Netherlands, New Zealand, Slovenia, and Sweden, for instance, discriminatory attitudes toward female access to higher education are very low: almost no one in these countries believes that men should have greater access to higher education than women. Female gross enrollment in tertiary education is at 76 percent (Netherlands), 83 percent (Sweden), 95 percent (New Zealand), and 104 percent (Slovenia).14 By contrast, in countries like India, Pakistan, and Uzbekistan, around or more than 50 percent of respondents believe that university education is more important for boys than for girls, and female tertiary enrollment rates are around or below 20 percent. Although there is a clear global pattern suggesting a negative relationship between attitudes and enrollment, data from the five African countries for which this indicator was available on the WVS show that the relationship is not clear cut. Only 15 percent of respondents expressed the view that university education is more important for boys in Zimbabwe, compared to 28 percent in Ghana, 36 percent in Rwanda, 38 percent in South Africa, and 42 percent in Nigeria. Yet, gross female tertiary enrollment varies much less across these countries. In fact, female tertiary enrollment is lower in Zimbabwe (at 5 percent) than in the other countries, despite favorable attitudes. But,

INCLUSION MATTERS IN AFRICA 91

the number of African countries for which data are available for this indicator in the WVS is too few to draw any inferences about a regional pattern.

Feelings of belonging and attitudes toward the state

Feelings of belonging can point to the extent that people feel included in different groups and institutions. Belonging to an ethnic group can create affinity and comfort among members; in the same vein, expressing affinity with a national identity is an indication that respondents feel connected to their country. The Afrobarometer 2014/2015 asked respondents who disclosed their ethnic identity at the beginning of the survey if they regarded their national or their ethnic identity as more important. The results, shown in figure 3.8, are instructive. Only a small minority of respondents appeared to give precedence to their ethnic identity alone. Over 70 percent of respondents from Eswatini, Guinea, Madagascar, Niger, and São Tomé and Príncipe regarded their national group to be more important that their ethnic group. In Botswana, Lesotho, Liberia, Mauritius, and Uganda, by contrast, nearly or over 70 percent of respondents felt that being a member of their ethnic group and of their national group was of equal importance. Feelings of national or ethnic identity may be driven by several factors, related to the extent of pluralism or of competition in society, the history of the nation-state or of

Figure 3.7 Attitudes toward Female and Male University Education and Female Tertiary Enrollment

Source: World Bank calculations based on data from the World Values Survey, 2010–2014 (for attitudes toward importance of university education for boys vs. girls); World Development Indicators, 2010–2014 (for gross female tertiary enrollment rates).

Note: African countries are in red.

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92 CHAPTER 3 HOW DOES SOCIAL EXCLUSION PLAY OUT IN AFRICA?

0Percent

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Sierra Leone

Côte d’Ivoire

Benin

Malawi

Cabo Verde

Zambia

Mauritius

Uganda

Lesotho

Liberia

Botswana

Figure 3.8 Salience of National versus Ethnic Identity and Feelings of Belonging

Source: World Bank calculations based on data from Afrobarometer 2014/2015 Note: Those respondents who identified as a member of an ethnic group were asked “Let us suppose that you had to choose between being a [member of national identity] and being a [member of your ethnic identity]. Which of the following statements best expresses your feelings?”

Only national More national Equally national and ethnic More ethnic Only ethnic Don’t know

INCLUSION MATTERS IN AFRICA 93

Figure 3.9 Perceptions of Unequal Treatment under the Law

Source: World Bank calculations based on data from Afrobarometer 2014/2015, Round 6 (http://afrobarometer.org/sites/default/files/summary_results/ab_R6_afrobarometer_global_release_highlights.pdf).

Note: Respondents were asked: “In your opinion, how often in this country are people treated unequally under the law?”

NamibiaBotswanaMauritius

MalawiZambia

TanzaniaMadagascar

UgandaMozambique

NigeriaGhana

ZimbabweBurundi

NigerEgypt, Arab Rep.

GuineaTotal

LiberiaLesotho

South AfricaSierra LeoneCabo Verde

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AlgeriaKenyaTogo

MoroccoCameroon

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0Percent

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Never Rarely Often Always Don’t know

94 CHAPTER 3 HOW DOES SOCIAL EXCLUSION PLAY OUT IN AFRICA?

conflict, and the current political milieu. It is also possible that these questions elicit socially or politically acceptable responses; they should not be taken as “truths” and must be interpreted with caution.

There appears to be widespread discontent with the state across Africa. This disaffection is apparent in several countries in newspaper columns, social media, and casual conversations. It is also reflected in perception surveys. The Afrobarometer 2014/2015 asked respondents how often they feel that people in their country are being treated unequally “under the law” (that is, by the state); this likely indicates grievances and feelings of injustice and exclusion. Figure 3.9 presents the results. There are, as expected, large variations across African countries; Botswana and Namibia stand out as countries where almost 60 percent of the respondents felt that people were never or rarely treated unequally under the law. In Malawi, Mauritius, and Tanzania, about half or a little more of the respondents felt that unequal treatment under the law was never or rarely manifested. At the other end of spectrum, in Mali and São Tomé and Príncipe, over half the respondents felt that unequal treatment under the law was always manifested. Overall, in most countries more than half the respondents felt that people were treated unequally under the law often or always. It is also telling that in some countries, notably Lesotho and Sierra Leone, over 10 percent of the respondents did not answer the question.

When a majority of citizens feel that people in their country are treated unequally, it often points to elite capture; in other words, the state is perceived as catering to the needs of a small section of society. In this situation, exclusion is not a minority issue but affects many or most citizens. Several recent World Bank Systematic Country Diagnostics (SCDs) in Africa identify elite capture and a lack of public trust as important obstacles to the delivery of inclusive services and a stable social contract more broadly. See, for example, SCDs for Benin (World Bank 2017b); Guinea-Bissau (World Bank 2016d); Liberia (World Bank 2018e); and Madagascar (World Bank 2015). Other surveys and anecdotal evidence also point to perceptions that the state and its institutions are opaque and that they benefit only a few. A perception survey conducted by the Pew Research Center found that 64 percent of Kenyans, 63 percent of Nigerians, and 69 percent of South Africans surveyed felt that many jobs go to people with connections.15

Hope and optimism

Despite serious misgivings about their economies and often about their governments, there is emerging evidence that people living in several African countries have high levels of optimism. For instance, as part of the Pew Research Center’s Spring 2017 Global Attitudes Survey, roughly half of Africans (median of 49 percent) and Latin Americans (48 percent) surveyed said their day was “particularly good,” whereas other regions overwhelmingly described their day as “typical” (figure 3.10).16 Similarly, Graham and Hoover (2006), based on Afrobarometer data, found levels of optimism in Africa that surpassed other regions, with particularly high levels of optimism among the poorest and most insecure respondents, who had high hopes for the future of their children. In keeping with this finding, the Liberia SCD (World Bank 2018e) cites a

INCLUSION MATTERS IN AFRICA 95

Figure 3.10 Hope and Optimism around the Globe

Source: Pew Research Center, based on Spring 2017 Global Attitudes Survey (Johnson, C. 2018. “‘Particularly Good Days’ are Common in Africa, Latin America and the U.S.” http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/01/02/particularly-good-days-are-common-in-africa-latin-america-and-the-u-s).

Note: Respondents were asked whether they would describe their day as “typical,” “particularly good,” or “particularly bad.”

United StatesCanada

Russian Federation

PhilippinesAustralia

IndiaIndonesia

VietnamKorea, Rep.

JapanMedian

TunisiaJordan

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36730

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175526

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2752348115

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67322

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96 CHAPTER 3 HOW DOES SOCIAL EXCLUSION PLAY OUT IN AFRICA?

2014 survey that found that most Liberians believe the country is headed in the right direction, driven in part, by Liberia’s return to relative peace and stability. The SCD also notes, however, that as the recent conflict fades further into the past, Liberians are likely to have increasing expectations from their government (World Bank 2018e, 72).

Similar optimism is visible in other survey results as well. For example, ex-combatants in the GLR overall, despite perceiving themselves as being worse off than community members (perceptions that are corroborated by community members), have a positive outlook about their future and understand that social change occurs over a long period of time. Interestingly, despite being disadvantaged on nearly all indicators of social and economic reintegration processes, female ex-combatants report a stronger sense of overall happiness, a stronger sense of overall life satisfaction, and a better outlook of the future than male ex-combatants. The former also express a higher sense of empowerment and control in their lives and everyday activities than other women. In Burkina Faso, national consultations, including a telephone survey conducted by the World Bank in October 2016 (World Bank 2017a), found that although the majority (55 percent) of respondents believed that the economic situation in 2016 was worse than at any other point in the past decade, larger numbers (73 percent) believed that the situation would improve in the years to come (figure 3.11; World Bank 2017a, viii). In Kenya, Nigeria, and South Africa, the Pew Research Center found that, despite overall discontent with the economy, respondents were optimistic about the future.

Figure 3.11 Burkinabe Economy

55

20

2514

73

13

a. Percent Burkinabe perceiving 2016economic situation as worse, same, or

better than last 10 years

b. Percent Burkinabe believing 2016economic situation will improve in

2017/18.

Worse Same Better No Same Yes

Source: World Bank 2017a, viii.

INCLUSION MATTERS IN AFRICA 97

About 60 percent in each country said they expected health care and education to be better for the next generation and that the economy would improve in the 12-month period following the survey. Further, over three-fourths of those surveyed said young people who wanted a bright future should stay in the country rather than emigrate (Pew Research Center 2016).

Concluding reflectionsThis chapter showed the ways in which social exclusion plays out—the structures and processes that aid and abet its impact. It also drew attention to attitudes and perceptions as they pertain to generalized views about social inclusion and exclusion. It showed that social structures and processes—both formal and informal—affect social exclusion in myriad ways. These structures and processes are mechanisms that uphold and solidify social exclusion. If we can make a dent in them, we have moved closer to social inclusion. Therefore, it is important to understand how these formal and informal mechanisms can impede the best efforts of governments and societies.

Feelings and perceptions may be difficult to measure, but they too can matter for policy and practice, in much the same way that polls matter for politicians during an election or that score cards matter for service delivery. In tandem with robust impact evaluations and administrative data, feelings and perceptions can serve as a gauge of the extent to which existing policies are accomplishing their objectives. In some cases, an evaluation may show that a policy is successful, but people’s perception of it may be negative. In still other cases, perception data provide government with information about how implementing bodies and service providers are being perceived and what policy or implementation tweaks may lead to greater success. A survey of perceptions can also help governments create a better communication plan, instill confidence among citizens, and show that they care. In sum, if we understand the conduits through which exclusion plays out, we are in a better place to design policies and programs that will affect inclusion.

Attitudes and prejudices in African countries look quite similar to those in other countries. The relationship between attitudes and objective outcomes in African countries is not always clear cut, but attitudes can provide pointers to areas of exclusion. Finally, large groups of people feel left out by the state and the elites. These groups are disenchanted with the state, but this does not seem to affect their overall outlook: evidence from different sources points to heightened hope and optimism across many African countries.

98 CHAPTER 3 HOW DOES SOCIAL EXCLUSION PLAY OUT IN AFRICA?

Endnotes1 Wangari Maathai, Nobel Lecture, Oslo, December 10, 2004, https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/

peace/2004/maathai/26050-wangari-maathai-nobel-lecture-2004.

2 Starting with the first iteration of the Mines and Works Act in 1911 (World Bank 2018b, 12).

3 This could be related to the fact that same-sex relations were decriminalized in France after the French revolution, but it remained a criminal act in Britain from the early 16th century until 1967. See Hyde 1970, 147–48; Copley 1989.

4 Note that this is the terminology used in the World Values Survey. The World Bank generally refers to lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and intersex (LGBTI) people (https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/sexual-orientation-and-gender-identity).

5 See A. Wellenstein and V. Stanley, “Three Things to Know about Women’s Land Rights Today,” World Bank Blogs, https://blogs.worldbank.org/sustainablecities/three-things-know-about-women-s-land-rights-today (accessed September 1, 2019).

6 See http://id4d.worldbank.org.

7 Over 80 percent of men between their early 30s and early 80s are married. By contrast, the share of married women peaks around age 30 and then drops below 80 percent just after age 40. By age 65, there are as many widowed women as married women, and 80 percent of women are widowed by age 80. The number of divorced is also higher for women than for men at all ages (Djuikom and van de Walle 2018).

8 In particular, women experience lower levels of body mass index (BMI) and higher rates of underweight (Djuikom and van de Walle 2018).

9 The overall gain from not becoming a widow and remaining married is equivalent to about six to seven years of schooling, depending on the nutritional indicator used. Around four to six years of education would be needed to compensate for divorce (Djuikom and Van de Walle 2018).

10 Albinism is a noncontagious, genetically inherited condition that most commonly results in the lack of melanin pigment in the hair, skin, and eyes.

11 This terminology is used in the World Values Survey. The World Bank generally refers to lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and intersex (LGBTI) people (https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/sexual-orientation-and-gender-identity).

12 The WVS also includes “drug addicts,” people of a different race, people who have AIDS, “heavy drinkers,” and unmarried couples living together.

13 The WDI measure gross female tertiary school enrollment. Gross enrollment ratio is the ratio of total enrollment, regardless of age, to the population of the age group that officially corresponds to the level of education shown. Tertiary education, whether or not to an advanced research qualification, normally requires, as a minimum condition of admission, the successful completion of education at the secondary level. See https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SE.TER.ENRR.FE.

14 Gross enrollment ratio is the ratio of total enrollment, regardless of age, to the population of the age group that officially corresponds to the level of education shown. This explains why percentages can exceed 100. Gross enrollment ratios indicate the capacity of each level of the education system, but a high ratio may reflect a substantial number of over-age children enrolled in each grade because of repetition or late entry rather than a successful education system. The net enrollment rate excludes over-age and under-age students and more accurately captures the system’s coverage and internal efficiency. Differences between the gross enrollment ratio and the net enrollment rate show the incidence of over-age and under-age enrollments. See https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SE.TER.ENRR.FE.

15 See R. Wike et al., 2016, “In Key African Nations, Widespread Discontent with Economy, Corruption: But Most Are Optimistic about Future in South Africa, Nigeria, Kenya,” Pew Research Center, https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2016/11/14/in-key-african-nations-widespread-discontent-with-economy-corruption.

16 Only 22 percent of Europeans said their day was good (Johnson, C. 2018. “‘Particularly Good Days’ are Common in Africa, Latin America and the U.S.” Pew Research Center. http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/01/02/particularly-good-days-are-common-in-africa-latin-america-and-the-u-s).

CHAPTER4

INCLUSION MATTERS IN AFRICA 101

Africa has made enormous progress toward economic development

and social inclusion, as previous chapters have shown. This is

testimony to a truism—that change toward social inclusion is

possible. The innovations, policies, and programs in Africa serve

as lessons across countries in the continent and for other regions

grappling with similar issues. In some cases, change is inevitable.

But it can also be painful and difficult. Change is always complex

and political and may lead to newly excluded groups. For instance,

the focus on female secondary education in many countries (notably

in the Caribbean) meant that boys at the secondary level were left

behind. In other cases, where refugees have settled in large numbers

and have come with higher human capital endowments than their

host communities, the latter have felt afraid and anxious about

jobs, services, and voice. Social inclusion is not a linear process.

Progress can stall for unanticipated reasons, but it may pick up

again. Groups that were once disempowered may gain power and

may upstage earlier dominant groups, who may in turn work to

impede progress toward social inclusion because it hurts their

interests. Social inclusion is, as World Bank (2013) states, always

work in progress.

Toward Greater Inclusion in Africa

There will be failures along the way, for the world will not change overnight. But we have seen change in our lifetimes, and the world will continue to change in ways that affect us all.

Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, 20111

102 CHAPTER 4 TOWARD GREATER INCLUSION IN AFRICA

Investing in social inclusion must be a conscious choice by societies and governments, with a clear understanding of costs and benefits. Investing in an inclusive society is not free and needs concerted action to transform the investment into a win for all. Social programs, for instance, can be expensive and have an impact on fiscal sustainability. Governments often need to make trade-offs, either by cutting costs on other initiatives or by raising taxes. There may be political costs as well, as initiatives that focus on historically excluded groups can upset power relations. Governments and politicians need to craft clear social contracts with citizens to ensure support for social inclusion. There are examples the world over of citizens willing to pay for a more inclusive society. The most powerful form of support is through the fiscal realm, whereby citizens pay taxes that they know will fund policies and programs for greater social inclusion. In Brazil, Mexico, and Nepal, for instance, there is strong support for social protection programs; and in Bangladesh, poverty reduction is recognized as a national priority, with the elite supporting antipoverty initiatives (Hossain and Moore 1999).

How does change take place? Who are the main actors? What are the channels through which progress toward social inclusion is achieved? What can we learn for the future and for the countries that want to make greater progress? We draw from the World Bank’s social inclusion framework (World Bank 2013) and address inclusion in markets, services, and spaces. Inclusion how? And here we repeat what we have said earlier in this report: by raising the ability, opportunity, and dignity of individuals and groups most likely to be left out. This chapter outlines some of the policy and program efforts in African countries in the pursuit of social inclusion. Sometimes documenting process helps others in their quest to design workable solutions, so we focus on some innovations and solutions that African countries have tried. The chapter has two parts: the first focuses on the actors that drive change and the second on interventions in the form of policies, programs, and projects that have been implemented or for which there are impacts to share.

Who drives change, and how?Multiple actors and processes can lead to change toward social inclusion, but, as the World Bank (2013) points out, the state has the preeminent responsibility and is the dominant actor.

The preeminent role of the state as the driver and propeller of change towards inclusion is well recognized. It can intervene for social inclusion through three conduits. The first is to create an enabling environment for social inclusion, such that citizens have the freedom to exercise their choice and to innovate for better outcomes and processes. The second is to design legislation, policy and programs that directly or indirectly affect social inclusion. The third is to ensure implementation and enforcement of the legal and policy framework. All these roles are underpinned by the nature of the state, the degree of openness of the polity and the

INCLUSION MATTERS IN AFRICA 103

vision that the state and citizens share. The strength of both formal and informal institutions is critical for the success of state-led actions.World Bank 2013, 200

There are other important drivers of change toward social inclusion in Africa, as elsewhere. These include a host of nonstate actors: religious groups, NGOs, the private sector, and, most importantly, organizations of historically subordinate groups. Lasting change usually comes when state and nonstate actors come together. Elites are often part of both state and nonstate actions and play a critical role in propelling social inclusion. The importance of the HIV/AIDS epidemic in many parts of the continent presents an interesting case in point. What started as attention to a public health emergency quickly moved to identifying affected groups; they included, among others, gay and bisexual men and other men who have sex with men (MSM), widows, and orphans. The attention to sexual orientation in many African countries was legitimized because it was linked to a public health crisis, and groups previously invisible were rendered visible. This is not to say that stigma no longer exists, and sometimes the

Box 4.1 Talking About Change: Stigma and Discrimination

We know from the experience of the HIV/AIDS epidemic that stigma and discrimination are not immutable; these have been significantly reduced in Eastern and Southern Africa. Although this may partly reflect the reduction in the number of infections and deaths from the disease, it also signifies the victory of campaigns

spreading information and knowledge regarding HIV/AIDS. The partnership between governments, advocacy groups, the private sector, international agencies, scientists, researchers, and medical practitioners was the foundation of this change.

Figure B4.1.1 Stigma and Discrimination in Eastern and Southern Africa, 2000–2016

Source: UNAIDS 2018a. Note: Persons surveyed were males and females ages 15–49.a. Female respondents only.

Year

Perc

ent

pers

ons

who

wo

uld

no

t b

uy

veg

eta

ble

s fr

om

sho

pke

ep

er

livin

g w

ith H

IV

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

100

80

60

40

20

0

Angola

Botswana

Comoros

Eswatinia

Ethiopia

Kenya

Lesotho

Malawi

Mozambique

Namibia

Rwanda

Tanzania

Uganda

Zambia

Zimbabwe

104 CHAPTER 4 TOWARD GREATER INCLUSION IN AFRICA

stigma may only have changed its form. Nevertheless, the epidemic was a catalyst. It presented an opportunity that enabled previously excluded groups to mobilize and be partners in the change that policy and programs propelled. Through the process of attacking the epidemic, governments and civil society co-opted elites and community members alike. Box 4.1 shows that the stigma against shopkeepers who had HIV decreased considerably in Eastern and Southern Africa.

Regardless of what actor sponsors a program that is intended to promote social inclusion, few programs can succeed without community ownership. Communities that own the movement toward social inclusion and can visualize a new society for themselves are most likely to be invested in the success of such programs. Relatedly, accountability of the state and service providers to citizens and communities often forms the crux of success. Conversely, when programs are designed without community involvement or are top down, they may take longer to take off and even face resistance from the community. The process of abolishing female genital mutilation (FGM) in Burkina Faso, as described in box 4.2, is an illustrative case. Together with criminalizing the practice in 1997, the government implemented a broad array of measures that promoted community ownership of the change. In addition to training lawyers, judges, police, and security officers to ensure their buy-in, the government supported “community patrols” that raised awareness of the harmful consequences of FGM and informed communities of its criminalization.

Examples of communities driving change exist across the world in areas as diverse as reproductive health, education, infrastructure, the environment, and employment, both in the context of decentralized governance and as standalone initiatives. The community-based rehabilitation (CBR) model for persons with disabilities is known to have positive outcomes, especially in remote areas; various organizations have come together to build the CBR Africa Network (CAN), sponsoring several country-specific and local initiatives. There are other examples as well. A review of the effectiveness of interventions focusing on gender-based violence (GBV) found that participatory, multiple stakeholder–supported discussion (around gender relationships and the acceptability of violence) encouraged shared decision making among family members and nonviolent behavior and tended to show great success (Ellsberg et al. 2015). One way to secure ownership of communities is to give them the power to make local decisions and set budget priorities for themselves. Box 4.3 highlights the case of participatory budgeting in West Pokot in the wake of Kenya’s thrust toward devolution. Also of note is the Local Governance and Service Delivery Project (LOGOSEED) in South Sudan that engages communities with an aim to ensuring that project investments reflect their needs and that service delivery transcends social divisions. In its mobilization process, the project focuses on reaching diverse ethnic groups, women, youth, persons with disabilities, displaced people, and returnees (Vemuru and Karim 2017).

High levels of within-community trust and social capital are likely to be associated with support for programs promoting social inclusion. Rhea (2014) describes the successful reintegration of ex-combatants across the GLR (Great Lakes Region) and the positive role that communities play. Although community members consistently

INCLUSION MATTERS IN AFRICA 105

Box 4.2 Talking About Change: Female Genital Mutilation

Burkina Faso has seen the most striking drop in female genital mutilation (FGM) over the decades of 2000 and 2010 (figure B4.2.1). But the first efforts to end FGM go back a long time and were not particularly successful to start. Catholic missionaries during colonization tried unsuccessfully to put an end to FGM by threatening to excommunicate those who practiced it, and under the First Republic in the 1960s awareness-raising campaigns against the practice were met with strong resistance by the traditional and customary chieftainship.

Several developments in the late 1970s began to garner support for abolishing FGM and highlight the role of partnerships between civil society, government, the judiciary, and communities. These included the denunciation of FGM by nongovernmental organizations, women’s associations, and the media; a national radio broadcast condemning FGM and disseminating information of the harm done by the practice; and a series of governmental anti-FGM campaigns and seminars covered by national radio, television, and newspapers from the 1980s onward. The government then institutionalized the fight against FGM by establishing an interministerial committee in

1990, which was charged with coordinating resources and activities promoting the elimination of FGM in Burkina Faso. In 1997, FGM was criminalized in Burkina Faso, and the implementation of the law has since been accompanied by stronger enforcement as well as normative change. These measures have included training lawyers, judges, police, and security officers to become advocates against FGM; sending patrols into communities to raise awareness of harmful consequences and of the criminalization of the practice; as well as the translation of the law into local languages, wide distribution of the law in communities, and establishment of a telephone hotline for people to anonymously report cases of FGM. Even before criminalization of FGM, there was a national telephone helpline called “SOS Excision” that people could call to report cases; around 70 percent of cases before the courts start with a tip via this phone line. Cases are also reported at police stations and customs offices, through religious leaders and local administrators, and directly to the Permanent Secretariat (SP) for the National Council for the Fight against the Practice of Excision (CNLPE). Table B4.2.1 details prevalence of FGM in several African countries.

Figure B4.2.1 Female Genital Mutilation in Burkina Faso, 1998–2015

Figure B4.2.2 Prevalence of Female Genital Mutilation in Eight African Countries

Source: UNFPA Regional Office for West and Central Africa 2018, based on DHS (Demographic and Health Survey); MICS (Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey); EMC (Continuous Multisectoral Survey).

Note: FGM = female genital mutilation.

Sources: UNFPA (United Nations Population Fund), based on Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS); Continuous Multisectoral Survey (EMC); and Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey (MICS). Burkina Faso data is from the 2015 EMC conducted by the National Institute of Statistics and Demography in Burkina Faso.

Source: UNFPA 2018.

Country

High-prevalence countries

GuineaMaliGambia, TheSierra LeoneMauritania

Medium-prevalence countries

Burkina FasoGuinea-BissauSenegal

Low-prevalence countries

Nigeria

Women ages 45–49 (%)

99.683.975.997.875.2

87.445.226.0

35.8

Girls ages 15–19 (%)

94.083.176.374.365.9

42.441.920.6

15.3

Percent females ages 16–49 having experienced

any form of FGM

1998/99 2003 2006 2010 2015

71.6 76.6 72.5 75.8 67.6

64.2 65.0 59.7 57.7 42.4Percent girls ages 16–19 having experienced any

form of FGM

Percent FGM prevalence

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report high levels of fear regarding the return of ex-combatants before their arrival, few report having such fears after the ex-combatants return. Community members surveyed described positive contributions that ex-combatants make to communities, and both community members and ex-combatants tended to report high levels of overall trust in the community and improvement in trust over time. In the Democratic Republic of Congo, in contrast to other countries in the GLR, both ex-combatants and community members perform weaker across almost all indicators of reintegration processes. A core challenge in the Democratic Republic of Congo is that communities display weaker levels of social capital and social cohesion. The broader societal shift toward peace and development that appears to have served as a catalyst to ex-combatants’ reintegration in other GLR countries is diminished in the context of continued local violence and insecurity in the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of Congo. Therefore, programs that also invest in building community cohesion and trust are likely to show better results than those that proceed from an assumption that communities are a panacea to intractable problems.

Box 4.3 Participatory Budgeting in West Pokot, Kenya

After a nationwide mandate to devolve governance and increase civic participation in planning, budgeting, and service monitoring, West Pokot, a pastoral community in the north of Kenya, became one of the first counties to introduce participatory budgeting (PB). The initiative was part of the West Pokot government’s resolve to increase its citizen outreach and participation in the planning and budget process by moving meetings from the ward level to remote sublocations and encouraging the participation of women in what is largely a patriarchal society.

In the West Pokot pastoral community women tend to defer to the decisions made by their male counterparts. This practice was reflected in past budget consultations, when very few women attended budget meetings. When women attended, they would sit separately from the men and endorse the projects proposed by men without direct involvement. Following trainings in partnership with the World Bank in October 2015 and January 2016, the county

government of West Pokot committed 32 percent of its development budget to be decided upon by citizens in PB meetings that specifically targeted women. The initial results and outcomes of the PB have been positive. Women’s participation in budget consultation meetings increased. Women prioritized improvement in maternal health care services, accessibility to water, and early childhood education. Men focused on improvement of roads, construction of cattle dips, and improvement of livestock and agricultural services. The projects that citizens selected in the PB process are currently being implemented or are in the pipeline.

The Kenya Participatory Budgeting Initiative (KPBI) is being implemented under the Kenya Accountable Devolution Program.

Source: Omolo, A. 2017. “West Pokot County Participatory Budget Hearings (Kenya).” https://participedia.net/en/cases/west-pokot-county-participatory-budget-hearings-kenya. Also see Finch and Omolo 2015.

INCLUSION MATTERS IN AFRICA 107

Programs and policies toward social inclusion: Reflections on the African experienceMost countries in Africa, as elsewhere, have a plethora of policies, programs, and projects to advance social inclusion. These policies may be targeted to certain groups or areas, or they may be universal, accessible to everyone. The effectiveness of particular programs varies by country, context, and initiative. At the highest level, constitutions of most countries guarantee equality and basic freedoms. At the next level, broad-vision documents, manifestos, and pronouncements give a more defined indication of the priorities of a government. Still lower down are policies, which lay out directives and show the clearer path of a government’s focus on social inclusion. Many policies signal the groups that they privilege or ignore, by their silence on certain topics or groups or by the intensity of implementation of certain policies. So, although policies may not actively exclude individuals or groups, they may do so passively, either by not expressly indicating who is included or by not investing adequate resources or attention to implementation.2 As pointed out earlier, many policies are political, and their implementation is even more so. Well-crafted policies have clear rules, guidelines, and implementation plans and mechanisms. Under policies, there are often programs that highlight reforms by sector or subsector. As previously described, the policy literature in Africa tends to focus on poverty reduction, response to humanitarian emergencies, and food security. In addition, and especially in countries and contexts wracked by conflict, governments and donor partners have rightly focused on basic services, security, and livelihoods. This section reflects on some of the policy and programmatic interventions furthering social inclusion, based on our definition of social inclusion.

How do policies in Africa deal with social identity, which is often fraught with political and social implications?

There’s no dispensing with identities, but we need to understand them better if we can hope to reconfigure them, and free ourselves from mistakes about them that are often a couple of hundred years old. Much of what is dangerous about them has to do with the way identities—religion, nation, race, class, and culture—divide us and set us against one another.… They are the lies that bind.

Appiah 2018, xvi

In contexts where ethnicity or race has historically been implicated in divisions and tensions, or are otherwise political, whether at the societal or national level, the state may consciously move away from an attention to ethnicity. Several countries in Africa have emphasized civic citizenship and national identity over ethnic or parochial identities. We saw in chapter 3 that the majority of those surveyed by the Afrobarometer tended to identify with their national identities more than their ethnic identities, for instance. Yet most countries address at least some identities—most commonly gender,

108 CHAPTER 4 TOWARD GREATER INCLUSION IN AFRICA

age, location, and occupation—via targeted programs or special provisions. Social protection programs are a case in point and are discussed later in this section.

One way of focusing on specific individuals or groups is through affirmative action or quotas. Special provisions for individuals and groups are common in OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) and non-OECD countries alike. Although sometimes controversial, especially in the context of stubborn group-based inequalities, affirmative action policies are still considered among the more effective policy mechanisms (Langer, Stewart, and Schroyens 2016). Many African countries have affirmative action policies for women and persons with disabilities. Uganda enshrined a quota system for parliament in the 1995 Constitution (Article 78) stating that parliament should include a woman representative in every district, as well as representatives from the army, youth, workers, persons with disabilities, and “other groups as Parliament may define.” Similar provisions were made to ensure seats for women in local government (Muriaas and Wang 2012, 311). South Africa, of course, has the most prominent and comprehensive set of initiatives: “While the Constitution of 1996 appeared to favor the ‘soft’ form of transformation through training and mentoring, the Employment Equity Act of 1998 focused on quotas, or targets: all employers of firms with more than 50 people have to ensure equitable representation of all race groups according to population demographics. Employers are required to give preferential treatment to black candidates. They also have to develop an “equity plan” for the Department of Labour, and there are fines for not meeting targets. . The broad-based black economic empowerment (BBBEE) legislation of 2007 also imposed quotas for black executives” (World Bank 2018f, 15). Some evidence suggests that affirmative action has had positive effects on wages and led to growing returns to education for black South African men (Burger, Jafta, and von Fintel 2016). A recent paper finds tentative evidence from Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, and Uganda that attitudes toward redistribution are favorable overall, suggesting that affirmative action policies may well have popular support in different African countries (Langer, Stewart, and Schroyens 2016).

Another way of dealing with social identities, sometimes referred to as “special groups,” is to nest a focus on them within universal access programs such as in health or education. Health programs in several countries pay special attention to groups such as children, adolescents, the elderly, or pregnant women. Uganda has committed itself to inclusive education and has passed the Persons with Disability Act (2006) that requires institutions of higher learning to eliminate barriers to accessibility and prohibit discrimination (Emong and Eron 2016; Roberts Otyola, Kibanja, and Anthony 2017). Similarly, the government of Ghana has had specific targets for the education of learners with disabilities since 2013 (Ametepee and Anastasiou 2015). The government’s current Inclusive Education Policy establishes several measures, from adjusting educational infrastructure and teacher training in diversity and nondiscrimination to the tailoring of curricula to different educational needs. The policy is accompanied by a costed action plan to facilitate its implementation.

INCLUSION MATTERS IN AFRICA 109

Often, and especially when ethnicity or religion is divisive, governments may prefer to name the geographical region where a certain group is concentrated. Programs can be geographically targeted to regions that may need special attention. Take the case of Nigeria, which has between 250 and 400 different ethnic groups, depending on what criteria are applied. Following various political reforms to ensure the representation of ethnic and regional groups, the Federal Character Commission (FCC) was established in 1996 to oversee the implementation of affirmative action not only in government administration but also in social services, infrastructure development, and the private sector. The Federal Civil Service (FCS) instituted a geopolitical quota based on territorial states and zones but was silent on ethnicity and religion. Despite criticism of the quota system, the FCC seems to have made important contributions. It provides an avenue for resolving conflicts over both ethnic and regional representation in a peaceful way, as disgruntled groups tend to approach the FCC or the FCC Committees of both Houses of the National Assembly to investigate claims and seek concrete data or remedies. The FCC also generates the data through which representation can be assessed and monitored. And, finally, it has been argued that the FCC has moved the culture of bureaucratic recruitment toward greater diversity (Mustapha 2009).

Legal provisions and reforms

Although laws can be discriminatory, they are also one of the most potent agents of social change. African countries have wide ranging legal and constitutional provisions aimed at social inclusion. For instance, over the past decade, Africa has seen a surge in reforms that promote gender equality, from laws addressing both workplace sexual harassment to those addressing domestic violence (see box 4.5). In fact, Africa has been a global leader, having implemented the most reforms promoting gender equality of any region world-wide. Also consider countries where SOGI equality is explicitly acknowledged. In South Africa such equality is written into the constitution. Mozambique and the Seychelles have recently decriminalized same-sex relations (2015 and 2016, respectively). Others do not criminalize based on sexual orientation at all.3 The Botswana Supreme Court ruled in 2017 that the constitution requires the government to legally recognize transgender people’s gender self-identification, and Namibia’s courts interpreted their 1963 law on registrations of births, marriages, and deaths as allowing official recognition of gender change. Other laws ban all or some forms of anti-LGBTI discrimination (countries that ban some forms include Angola, Botswana, Cabo Verde, Mauritius, Mozambique, and the Seychelles; South Africa bans all forms). Another 10 African countries that have supported LGBTI rights in declarations to the UN General Assembly or the UN Human Rights Council include Cabo Verde, the Central African Republic, Gabon, Guinea-Bissau, Mauritius, Rwanda, São Tomé and Príncipe, the Seychelles, Sierra Leone, and South Africa. Although different from decriminalization of same-sex relations, reforms to family laws across the world are also instructive. Hallward-Driemeier and Gajigo (2013) analyzed the effects of such changes for women in Ethiopia, where the change required both spouses’ consent in the administration of marital property. This reform removed the ability of one spouse to deny permission to the other to work outside the home. Simultaneously, there was a change implemented to raise women’s minimum age of

110 CHAPTER 4 TOWARD GREATER INCLUSION IN AFRICA

Africa has implemented the most reforms promoting gender equality of any region globally, with 71 reforms over the last 10 years. Most of these reforms (over 50 percent) regarded laws affecting gender-based violence, with Burundi, the Comoros, Rwanda, São Tomé and Príncipe, and Zambia all introducing

laws addressing both workplace sexual harassment and domestic violence. Among the top reforming economies in the region over the past decade are the Democratic Republic of Congo, Guinea, Malawi, Mauritius, São Tomé and Príncipe, and Zambia (see figure B O.4.1).

The Democratic Republic of Congo saw the largest increase in its Women, Business and the Law index (from 42.50 in 2009 to 70 in 2018). Improvements in the Democratic Republic of Congo were based on reforms allowing married women to register businesses, open bank accounts, sign contracts, get jobs, and choose where to live in the same way as men. The legal requirement for wives to obey their husbands was removed, as were restrictions on women working in specific industries such as mining, manufacturing, and construction. The Democratic Republic of Congo also introduced gender nondiscrimination laws in employment and access to credit.

Mauritius began reforms in 2008 by introducing civil remedies for sexual harassment at work, prohibiting the dismissal of pregnant workers, introducing paid paternity leave, and prohibiting discrimination in access to credit based on gender. The government mandated

equal remuneration for work of equal value in 2013 and increased the length of paid maternity leave from 12 to 14 weeks in 2015. Due to these reforms, Mauritius’ score increased by 16.88 points; between 2009 and 2018, the female labor force participation rate went up by 6.82 percent relative to men’s.

São Tomé and Príncipe introduced a domestic violence law in 2009, implemented a workplace sexual harassment law including criminal penalties in 2012, and reformed its retirement laws for men and women to entitlement to full pension benefits, also making the mandatory retirement age for men and women equal, in 2014. Between 2009 and 2018, female labor force participation increased by 1.75 percent relative to that of men.

Source: World Bank 2018g.

Box 4.4 Legal Reform for Women in Africa

Figure B4.4.1 Improvement in Women, Business and the Law Index, 2009–2018

Source: World Bank 2018g, 11, based on Women, Business and the Law database. Note: WBL = Women, Business and the Law database

WB

L in

dex 100

90

80

70

60

50

40

30

Congo, Dem. Rep.

São Tomé and Príncipe

Bolivia

Country

Maldives Guinea Mauritius Samoa Malawi Zambia

42.50

70

82.50

73.7568.13

76.88

58.75

75.00

73.75

83.7578.75

63.7568.13

56.88

91.88

49.3853.13

61.88

Change in score between WBL 2009 and WBL 2018

INCLUSION MATTERS IN AFRICA 111

marriage, which strengthened women’s bargaining position within the household, as older women usually have greater power. Women are also more likely to work outside the home, employ more educated workers, and be in paid and full-time jobs where the reform has been enacted, after controlling for time and location effects.

Law and custom are inextricably linked; in the case of land ownership, both formal and customary laws wield great influence. Providing land titles or de facto recognition of land use patterns of historically excluded groups can be effective in increasing their inclusion and enhancing their dignity. Women in many societies, including in Africa, face many barriers to owning land. Making them joint holders in land redistribution or resettlement projects or reserving land use quotas can increase their access to opportunities, for example in agricultural labor markets, while at the same time empowering them. Similarly, recognizing the customary rights of indigenous peoples over their native lands and strengthening their representation in land negotiations is as much about creating opportunity for these groups to use the land as it is about recognition (World Bank 2013, 216). For example, Mozambique’s 1997 land law allows oral evidence to be used in land tribunals. As literacy rates are low among poor and marginalized groups in rural areas, this measure proved critical to enabling their participation in land registration procedures (FAO 2010; cited in World Bank 2013). In Kenya, the decision of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights to recognize the ownership rights of Endorois (agropastoralists) helped this group gain better access to their ancestral lands around the Lake Bogoria Game Reserve, traditionally used for cattle grazing and to perform their religious and cultural rites (Abraham 2012; cited in World Bank 2013, 217). However, enforcement of laws can be challenging for several reasons, not least because enforcement agencies often reflect exclusionary norms and attitudes. In South Sudan, despite the fact that the 2009 Land Act and the 2011 Transitional Constitution of South Sudan (TCSS) recognize women’s equal rights to land and property, perceptions that women cannot own land independently of husbands or male relatives remain widespread among land administrators in both statutory and customary systems (Marzatico 2014, 15). The disregard of customary land practices in the formalization of land rights can also exacerbate exclusion and become a source of conflict.

Rwanda’s far-reaching land reforms in the context of its national reconciliation had strong effects on women’s access to land markets and on their overall power. Legislative reform first eliminated bias against female land ownership and was followed by the 2005 Organic Land Law (OLL) to establish a single statutory system of land tenure and end the dualism of customary and formal tenure systems. In 2010 Rwanda introduced a nationwide land tenure regularization (LTR) program, a first-time land adjudication and registration process that was imagery-based and low cost. As a result of the reforms, women—with or without a legal marriage certificate—were more likely to be registered as owners alone or jointly with their spouses, and women’s rights to mortgage or lease land increased substantially. The LTR not only achieved impressive numbers of registration in less than three years but also led to improvements in the perceptions of women’s land rights. The perceived rights for females to be registered as claimants (alone or jointly) on parcels owned by married couples increased from 33

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percent to between 67 and 94 percent, depending on the program area (Ali, Deininger, and Goldstein 2011; Ali et al. 2015).

Social programs

Well-designed and implemented programs across the globe have changed the face of social exclusion. Of these, social safety nets (SSNs) have a historical track record of shielding households from the negative effects of shocks and, more recently, of building household and community assets. Such programs started in Africa in response to food crises and humanitarian emergencies and still complement emergency responses to crises or shocks, consequently reducing the cost and increasing the effectiveness of humanitarian action. Social safety nets often provide ready vehicles through which to intervene in crises. In response to the Ebola emergency, governments leveraged the existing modest programs and scaled up cash transfers and public works programs (Beegle, Coudouel, and Monsalve 2018, 67). Over time, Africa has become a leader in the design and delivery of social safety nets. Every country in the region has at least one social safety net program. The average number of programs per country is 15; it ranges from 2 in the Republic of Congo and Gabon to 56 in Burkina Faso and 54 in Chad. African countries now spend on average 1.2 percent of the gross domestic product (GDP) on social safety nets, close to the global average of 1.6 percent. These programs run the entire gamut, from cash transfers of various hues to food transfers, school feeding programs, public works, social pensions, emergency response programs, and programs that build human capital (through health and education). Figure 4.1 shows the mix of safety net programs in Africa by region, income level, fragility, resource status, and drought exposure. The results are expected: low-income countries, those that are fragile, those exposed to drought, and those lacking in resources are more likely to have emergency programs with some cash transfers. Richer countries, on the other hand, tend to have food-based programs and social pensions. Public works are more common in countries that have low levels of drought exposure and those with better resource endowment, and in West African countries.

A new generation of social safety net programs goes beyond poverty reduction to enhance the dignity of recipients. Among Africa’s many innovations, the new generation of social safety nets stand out. Their rapid and successful expansion is unique in the developing world. Beyond addressing income poverty and strengthening human capital, there is growing evidence that social safety nets can promote social inclusion and the dignity of recipients. Orphans, other vulnerable children, and recipients with disabilities in Kenya, Mozambique, and Zambia reported that cash transfers raised their sense of self-confidence and dignity, gave them the ability to be more assertive, and enhanced their perception of future well-being (Attah et al. 2016; Handa et al. 2014a, 2014b; Haushofer and Shapiro 2013; Jones et al. 2016; Seidenfeld, Handa, and Tembo 2013; all cited in Beegle, Coudouel, and Monsalve 2018, 24). Although many of the same positive outcomes associated with social protection programs obtain in other regions of the world as well, the scale of these programs in African countries and the vast proportions of the population that they reach makes their social inclusion–related externalities particularly noteworthy.

INCLUSION MATTERS IN AFRICA 113

Since the social inclusion framework emphasizes not only ability and opportunity, but also the dignity of individuals and groups, it is opportune to ask: What are some of the channels through which SSNs enhance the dignity of individuals and groups? In Ghana, safety net programs have reduced the stigma of helplessness among persons with disabilities; in Lesotho and Zimbabwe, they have enabled children to go to school well dressed and clean; and, in Malawi, they have helped raise the social status of the poorest (Attah et al. 2016; MacAuslan and Riemenschneider 2011; Oduro 2014; all cited in Beegle, Coudouel, and Monsalve 2018, 163). Recipients of SSNs are also more able to meet their social obligations and engage in relations of reciprocity, such as paying church tithes or funeral group fees, contributing to savings groups, or attending weddings (Pavanello et al. 2016). Each of these elements raises the status of previously more dependent individuals and families, thus enhancing pride and dignity.

A broad array of programs that can be loosely classified as “empowerment programs” are often targeted to historically excluded groups and can have large positive impacts. In Uganda, the Empowerment and Livelihood for Adolescents (ELA) program was developed and implemented by Building Resources Across Communities (BRAC) to provide training for small-scale enterprises and education for health and reduction of risky behaviors. Tracking 4,888 girls over a period of two years, Bandiera et al. (2013) found that the program increased the likelihood of girls engaging in income-generating activities by 32 percent; self-reported condom use by those who were sexually active increased by 50 percent; fertility rates dropped by 26 percent; and there was a 76 percent reduction in adolescent girls reporting having had sex against their will during the past year. Importantly, the combined program (livelihood training plus health education) was more successful than most other interventions that exclusively focused

Figure 4.1 Social Safety Net Programs in Africa

Source: Beegle, Coudouel, and Monsalve 2018, 8.

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Cash transfers School feeding Public works Education Health Emergency Food Social pensions Other programs

114 CHAPTER 4 TOWARD GREATER INCLUSION IN AFRICA

on life skills or livelihood skills. In Uganda, the World Bank supports the Nkingo girls’ clubs in Kemwenge and Kabarole. Run by BRAC, they offer safe spaces and training in empowerment and life skills, as well as entrepreneurship and financial literacy training. The girls’ clubs also offer access to sexual health, family planning, and legal aid. Evaluation of the Kenya Cash Transfer for Orphans and Vulnerable Children, a national unconditional cash transfer program, after four years of the program found a reduction in the likelihood of pregnancy by 5 percentage points among females aged 12 to 24, but no reduction in early marriage. The authors posit that the impacts were the result of increased school enrollment and financial stability of the household as well as delayed age at first sex (Handa et al. 2015; cited in Chakravarty, Das, and Vaillant 2017). Box 4.6 casts a spotlight on the Sahel Women Empowerment and Demographic Dividend (SWEDD) project that spans Burkina Faso, Chad, Côte d’Ivoire, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger and focuses on the drivers of exclusion of young women.

Empowerment programs that combine multifaceted assistance have proven useful for survivors of physical and sexual violence. Since violence tends to be accompanied by psychological trauma, survivors often need a combination of medical treatment, health counseling, and psychosocial support, in addition to legal or paralegal assistance services. At the same time, economic empowerment for survivors is often a key factor in reducing their economic dependence on the perpetrator and improving resilience to violence. Experience from the World Bank’s engagement around GBV shows that

Box 4.5 In the Sahel: A Focus on Young Women

The Sahel has a tough terrain and faces multiple challenges, ranging from extreme poverty to conflict, desertification, and low institutional capacity. It also has a very young population; in Mauritania, 30 percent of the population is under the age of 10, and over 44 percent is under age 15. Young people have limited education and skills, and finding a job is difficult. In addition, the Sahel has the some of the world’s highest rates of child marriage, with adolescent girls being disproportionately affected. Early marriage thwarts their growth, development, agency, human capital accumulation, and overall life chances. Niger has the world’s highest prevalence of child marriage at 75 percent, followed by Chad, with the world’s third highest at 68 percent, and Mali at 55 percent, the fifth highest.

Initiated by the presidents of Burkina Faso, Chad, Côte d’Ivoire, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger, the Sahel Women Empowerment and Demographic Dividend (SWEDD) is financed by the World Bank, with implementation supported by the United Nations Population Fund. The project has used several innovations toward attaining its objective of empowering women and adolescent

girls through access to quality reproductive, child, and maternal health services and helping boost the capacity of local partners. For instance, the project has garnered the support of religious leaders on issues such as child marriage, maternal and child health, family planning, girls’ education, gender-based violence, and elevating women’s agency. In yet another initiative, the project gives bicycles, school kits, and sanitary kits to girls, and grains and foodstuff to their families. The project also organizes coaching classes in select areas so that girls can keep up in school. Finally, the project trains young women in nontraditional trades and in some areas has given them tractors, which both augments their incomes and gives them status and power in the community.

Sources: World Bank, “Getting Religious and Traditional Leaders on Board in the Sahel to End Harmful Practices against Girls, ”https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2018/06/28/getting-religious-and-traditional-leaders-on-board-in-the-sahel-to-end-harmful-practices-against-girls; World Bank, “Mali: Using Bikes to Get to School and Stay in School,” https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2018/07/25/a-bike-for-school-in-mali.

INCLUSION MATTERS IN AFRICA 115

collaboration between law enforcement, legal aid services, health care organizations, public health programs, educational institutions, and agencies devoted to social services and economic development has the deepest impacts. Annex 3 lays out examples of World Bank engagement with GBV in various African countries.

Fostering normative and attitudinal change has also been at the heart of a range of national service programs that have been implemented in countries like Ghana, Kenya, and Nigeria. Some countries in Africa and globally have programs that require citizens, in particular young people, to undertake community service or live in a different part of the country for a period of time. The typical objective of such programs is to develop a sense of national identity and civic responsibility. Nigeria, for instance, has implemented such a program for over four decades, sending university graduates to different regions of the country for a mandatory one year of national service through the National Youth Service Corps (NYSC). Recent evidence suggests that this exposure to diverse groups within the country can foster a stronger sense of connection to the country as a whole. In Nigeria, participants in national service seem to have greater national pride and more positive attitudes toward the country as a result. Participants also are more likely to live outside their ethnic region seven years after the program. At the same time, such programs may highlight distinctions between ethnic groups: the same Nigerian study suggests that participants in the NYSC are more positive toward their own ethnic group but not toward other ethnic groups following the program. The research also finds that participants are more likely to have closest friends from their own ethnic group (Okunogbe 2018).

Other interventions that promote inclusion in markets, services, and spaces

Technology is one of the most powerful means of deepening social inclusion. We have seen examples of this in previous sections, and we have noted that technology can exacerbate exclusion as well. Nevertheless, some important instances of its positive role deserve mention. Lack of access to credit affects some groups more that it does others, and innovations that provide access may have larger benefits for groups who start with a lower base. Although empirical evidence on the economic and social impacts of M-PESA—a money transfer system operated by Kenya’s largest cellular phone provider—(and similar technologies) is new and sparse, there are indications that it has positive effects for the poorest, and for women in particular; at the same time, its impact on individual savings may be limited (Van Hove and Dubus 2019). Suri and Jack (2014) find that the use of M-PESA can effectively improve the resilience of poor households to income shocks. In a 2016 paper Suri and Jack argue that access to M-PESA in Kenya had positive impacts on poverty reduction, in particular for female-headed households. A recent evaluation of an experiment randomizing the promotionand registration of a mobile savings account among women microentrepreneurs inTanzania finds that women saved substantially more through the mobile account andthat additional business training bolsters this effect (Bastian et al. 2018).

Financial inclusion through mobile savings accounts also opens new markets to women because women may obtain more microloans through the mobile account,

116 CHAPTER 4 TOWARD GREATER INCLUSION IN AFRICA

an additional service provided by the product. While no significant evidence was found that these impacts translated into greater investment, sales, or profits, there was some evidence of business expansion through the creation of profitable secondary businesses, as well as improvements in women’s empowerment and subjective well-being (Bastian et al. 2018). Finally, and as noted earlier, the Internet has provided huge opportunities for the inclusion of previously excluded groups in markets, services, and spaces. Amplifying voice is one benefit. Innovative methods of using information and communication technology to solicit anonymous responses to questions have become increasingly popular. In Tanzania and South Sudan, two pilot initiatives referred to as “Listening to Africa” have been highly successful in collecting panel data through mobile phone interviews. Evaluations suggest that the method is cost effective, with low attrition rates even after more than 30 rounds of interviews (Croke et al. 2012).

The importance of interconnected services for all groups, but especially those who are at risk, needs to be underscored. For instance, the provision of services often goes hand in hand with infrastructure. Yet, merely building infrastructure often has limited effectiveness for universal access. Box 4.7 draws out the importance of a bundle of interventions that need to accompany the building of toilets so that girls, women, and persons with disabilities can use them. Box 4.4 demonstrates the importance of interconnected interventions to enable ex-combatants to be reintegrated into their communities. In each case, programs that are intended for groups previously excluded need careful ex ante analysis that shows why the groups were excluded and what can be done to rectify past wrongs. Ultimately, building systems to ensure that the right interventions are designed, implemented, and evaluated is critical to success. Take the example of systems that provide identity documents to citizens and residents, so that they can access services that are due to them. The lack of identity documentation is a

Box 4.6 Reintegration for Ex-Combatants

A pilot project in the Democratic Republic of Congo, in Kindu, Maniema, in 2008–09 called Strengthening Socio-Economic Reintegration Opportunities for Vulnerable Households of Ex-Combatants Demobilized through the PNDDR (National Program for Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration) included (i) support for income-generating activities; (ii) basic skills (literacy/numeracy) and household budget management training; (iii) support for the creation or strengthening of associations; and (iv) information and sensitization around sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) and referral to SGBV services. Although it did not attribute causality, the evaluation suggested that the project activities not only contributed to higher asset and household ownership and better nutrition outcomes, but also that levels of confidence in other ex-combatants within the community, including male combatants, had increased by 44 percent since the

beginning of the project in 2008. It also found that project beneficiaries were more informed about SGBV and related services than nonbeneficiary ex-combatants. In another intervention targeting ex-combatants, the Liberian Ministry of Public Works, with support from UNMIL (the United Nations Mission in Liberia), UNDP (the United Nations Development Programme), and the World Bank, initiated a labor-intensive employment scheme to rehabilitate roads, offering some 8,000 jobs to ex-combatants and war-affected youth. Rates of both crime and domestic violence came down in areas where these programs were implemented, and participants also reported have invested their income into other income-generating activities.

Sources: African Union Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Capacity Program 2014; World Bank LOGiCA 2013.

INCLUSION MATTERS IN AFRICA 117

key obstacle for many excluded groups, as discussed earlier in the report. However, providing such documents often has significant administrative ramifications and involves infrastructure and setting up delivery systems. One initiative to propel the inclusion of all in the identity systems of countries in Africa is the World Bank Group’s ID4D (Identification for Development) initiative. Under this initiative, analyses have to date been conducted in 17 African countries, including Botswana, Cameroon, Chad, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Ethiopia, Guinea, Kenya, Liberia, Madagascar, Morocco, Namibia, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, and Zambia. The objective has been to evaluate countries’ identity ecosystems and facilitate collaboration with governments for future work (World Bank 2017c).

Indigenous knowledge systems and local languages and customs constitute the intellectual and cultural space of historically subordinate groups and are intrinsic to their dignity and pride, while also facilitating their access to markets and services. One study in Lushoto district, in northern Tanzania, shows the importance of integrating indigenous knowledge of weather forecasting with the Tanzania Meteorological Agency (Mahoo et al. 2015). Language is a key marker of social identity, and those who speak minority languages often lag behind in schooling, jobs, and other endowments. Growing evidence suggests that the language of instruction (LOI) can help or hinder learning outcomes, especially of children who speak minority languages. For instance, Ethiopia’s comprehensive LOI policy mandated the use of the mother tongue as the language of instruction in grades one through eight. The policy also stipulated primary teacher training in the relevant language. Although all students learn Amharic as a national language, English may be introduced if desired by the state. Prior to 1994 all Ethiopian students were taught in Amharic. The policy seems to have been successful.

Box 4.7 Building Infrastructure Doesn’t Mean It Will Be Used

The existence of a separate toilet is not enough to ensure usage by women and girls. Privacy, cleanliness, safety, and availability of water matter. Women and girls with disabilities face additional challenges due to limitations in mobility. Even when there are water and sanitation facilities for females, they may not be accessible to females with disabilities, intensifying the context of their disadvantage.

A survey of 62 primary schools in rural western Kenya found that 84 percent of the schools had separate latrines for girls, but 77 percent of these did not have a lock, and only 13 percent had water in or near the latrine. Furthermore, only 10 percent of schools reported always providing sanitary pads to girls. Disposal arrangements for used sanitary pads were not adequate in most schools.a These findings underscore the importance of toilets as “package deals” to ensure usage, especially by female students and employees, and even women in public places.

The differential needs of women and girls become pronounced when they are menstruating. In Nigeria, about one-quarter of women seem to lack the requisite privacy for toileting needs. But there is a high degree of variation. For example, 85 percent of women in Lagos reported having everything they need to manage their menstruation; only 37 percent in Kaduna State did. There are differences across urban and rural areas too. About 88 percent of women in Nigeria have no handwashing facility on their premises; 92 percent of rural women report this to be the case.b Similar conditions obtain for women in many other countries across Africa and Asia.

Source: Das 2017.

a. Alexander et al. 2014.b. World Bank 2017c.

118 CHAPTER 4 TOWARD GREATER INCLUSION IN AFRICA

One analysis found that children who were taught in their mother tongue for eight years of primary education outperformed those who received instruction in the mother tongue for only five years and in English in the upper primary grades (Heugh et al. 2007; cited in Bashir et al. 2018). Another study in Guinea-Bissau and Niger assessed transitional bilingual programs that were piloted in selected schools. This study found that students in Niger who started in their mother tongues were able to read and write better even in their second language. The strongest positive effects in both countries were for rural children and girls in the bilingual programs. The programs also garnered the support of parents (Hovens 2002). In general, making information accessible to those who communicate in languages and mediums that are distinct from those of the majority is an important step toward social inclusion. Accessibility to information is also a step toward increased accountability of the state and service providers. For persons with disabilities, this service is indispensable to their ability to access information, as several programs the world over have shown.

In addition to knowledge systems and making information accessible, several initiatives have also focused on the quality and quantity of data for better analysis. Several of these initiatives focus on better data on poverty, human development and other outcomes. Chapter 2 showed that the availability of data led to analysis that brought out the nuances of disadvantage based on disability status. All too often such disaggregated data by social group are hard to come by, as are data on the processes of exclusion. The World Bank’s Gender Innovation Lab4 collects granular data on aspects such as cognitive skills, bias, discrimination, and other processes, while also evaluating the impact of experimental interventions. A range of other data platforms now follow open data principles and make data public. Croke et al (2012), for example, show how high-frequency panels can be collected using mobile phone interviews. Finally, the role of geospatial data is also important to understand the intersection of social and spatial exclusion. Across Africa, there has been a proliferation of initiatives to collect better data and make them accessible, as more and more analysts and activists realize the importance of data. But we should also add that data are merely the raw material for insight. Governments and international organizations also need to invest in better and more rigorous analysis of social inclusion.

Historical wrongs are often the foundations of present-day exclusion; they can be corrected by several means, of which symbolic acts are one. Truth and reconciliation commissions are an increasingly common mechanism employed globally, including in Africa, to overcome conflict and divisions of the past. In South Africa, the post-apartheid Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC)5 instituted during the transition to democracy was intended help overcome the legacy of apartheid and racial divisions. Rwanda established its National Unity and Reconciliation Commission (NURC)6 in 1999. In Mauritius, the Truth and Justice Commission was established in 2009 to address the legacy of slavery and to investigate the dispossession of land. In The Gambia, the Truth, Reconciliation and Reparations Commission (TRRC) was sworn in in October 2018. However, reconciliatory processes are complex, and their implementation is politically sensitive. What constitutes “truth” and “reconciliation” in the wake of conflict is likely contested by different groups, and openly addressing

INCLUSION MATTERS IN AFRICA 119

historic wrongs can trigger renewed tensions and may be traumatic for survivors of violence (Broneus 2010). There are also no clear international norms for the powers or standards of proceedings for such commissions (OHCHR 2006). Other symbolic acts include renaming streets and monuments, and in the process acknowledging the historical wrongs and elevating the identity of those who have been wronged.

Concluding reflectionsThis chapter, and indeed the entire report, highlighted the role of diverse actors in the progress toward social inclusion. The state, of course, is the preeminent among these, but there are other important drivers of change. Non-state actors, citizens and communities that exercise agency to effect change are powerful vehicles for social inclusion. Programs and projects that are anchored in, and derive leadership from, the community, are likely to be more successful; this is well-known across the world. Moreover, when the state and service providers are moored by systems that make them accountable to citizens and communities, they receive both community ownership and a greater likelihood of success. Technology, for instance, is one of the most powerful means of deepening social inclusion and enhancing accountability to communities and citizens, but governments and other actors must also realize the risks that technology can pose for those who do not have access to this potent medium. Finally, programs that acknowledge that some communities and groups may feel left out by the state and their elites and make genuine efforts to correct the perception, can change both outcomes toward social inclusion, as well as rebalance power relations.

We discussed in chapter 3, that belief systems, superstitions, stigmas, and other practices present daunting barriers to the inclusion of certain groups. This chapter highlighted a few initiatives that effected change in such processes and practices. For example, the stigma of HIV is still strong in many parts of the world. Similarly, FGM, which holds importance for some groups, also violates the very personhood of women and girls and makes them less likely to achieve their potential. Such beliefs and practices matter for policies and programs; they stymie the ability, opportunity and dignity of certain groups, and in the process, are costly to society as a whole. They can also permeate the ways in which the state and service providers interact with historically excluded groups. But it is important to note that such beliefs, norms and practices, often considered to be insurmountable barriers to achieving inclusion, are known to change.

In sum, this chapter drew attention to the myriad reforms, policies, programs, and projects that advance social inclusion and emphasized the importance of design and implementation of such interventions. An illustrative list of interventions is summarized in Table 4.1. The table outlines the domains in which change is intended and examples of actions taken by various countries toward social inclusion. Finally, investing in social inclusion often comes with financial, administrative, and political costs. Yet the benefits often outweigh the costs, depending on the context. Therefore, in order to secure a win-win situation, the state and society need a clear social contract and a transparent enactment and implementation of legal and administrative steps toward social inclusion.

120 CHAPTER 4 TOWARD GREATER INCLUSION IN AFRICA

Domain of inclusion

Channel for intervention

Illustrative actions targeting those most likely to be left behind

Illustrative examples of policies, programs, and projects

MARKETS

Labor Legal provisions enabling access to the labor market

· Ensuring access of excluded groupsto jobs and their ability to open bankaccounts and businesses.

· Removing the obligation of women toobey their husbands.

· Lifting restrictions on women working atnight.

· Enshrining nondiscrimination inemployment law (including hiring, pay,and promotions).

· Banning harassment at work.

· Establishing legal remedies for sexualand other forms of harassment inemployment.

· Prohibiting dismissal of pregnantemployees.

· Establishing paid maternity and paternityleave.

Congo, Dem. Rep. Reforms of family code to improve gender equality and gender nondiscrimination reforms in employment.

Zambia Gender Equity and Equality Act and establishment of Gender Equality Commission.

Ethiopia Reforms of property law, requiring both spouses’ consent in the administration of marital property; simultaneous change to raise women’s minimum age of marriage.

Burundi, the Comoros, Mauritius, Rwanda, São Tomé and Príncipe, and Zambia Laws against workplace sexual harassment and domestic violence.

Mauritius Prohibition of dismissal of pregnant workers, introduction of paid paternity leave, and extension of paid maternity leave.

Affirmative action and quotas

· Implementing measures to attract,develop, and retain individuals fromhistorically disadvantaged groups.

· Considering job quotas forunderrepresented groups.

· Establishing data and monitoring andevaluation systems to monitor and assessimpact of affirmative action.

· Setting up institutions that can addressgrievance.

South Africa 1998 Employment Equity Act and 2003 broad-based black economic empowerment legislation for “Blacks (including African, Coloured [mixed race] and Indians), women and people with disabilities.”a

Nigeria Federal Character Commission (FCC) established in 1996. Oversees implementation of affirmative action in bureaucracy, social services, infrastructure development, and the private sector.

Skills and training

· Supporting income-generating activitiesfor excluded groups (e.g., ex-combatants,youth, and women).

· Developing soft and hard skills training.

· Training for small-scale enterprisestargeted at specific groups, e.g., women.

Congo, Dem. Rep. Strengthening socioeconomic reintegration opportunities for vulnerable households of ex-combatants demobilized through the PNDDR.

Liberia Ministry of Public Works (with support from UNMIL, UNDP, and WB) initiated labor-intensive employment scheme to rehabilitate roads, offering jobs to ex-combatants and war-affected youth.

Uganda Empowerment and Livelihood for Adolescents (ELA) program.

Financial Mobile financial technology

· Prohibiting discrimination in access tocredit and financial transactions andputting in place systems for enforcement.

· Providing access to financial technology(“fintech”) to those who have beentraditionally “unbanked.”

· Training for the use of mobile financeproducts; business skills training formicroentrepreneurs.

Congo, Dem. Rep. and Mauritius Gender nondiscrimination laws regarding access to credit.

Kenya M-PESA, a money transfer system first introduced in 2007; by 2018, 96 percent of households outside Nairobi had at least one M-PESA account.

Tanzania Business Women Connect (BWC) program.

Table 4.1 Illustrative Interventions for Social Inclusion in Markets, Services, and Spaces

INCLUSION MATTERS IN AFRICA 121

Domain of inclusion

Channel for intervention

Illustrative actions targeting those most likely to be left behind

Illustrative examples of policies, programs, and projects

Land Legal provisions for land ownership

· Establishing gender parity in inheritanceand land ownership laws.

· Providing land titles or de factorecognition of land use and recognizingcustomary rights of excluded groups.

Rwanda Legislative reform first eliminated bias against female land ownership, followed by the 2005 Organic Land Law (OLL) to establish a single statutory system of land tenure and end the dualism of customary and formal tenure systems.

Kenya Decision of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights to recognize the ownership rights of Endorois (agropastoralists) to their ancestral lands around the Lake Bogoria Game Reserve.

Land reform · Enabling redistribution through landreforms, e.g., by making excludedgroups (women, indigenous groups) jointlandholders in land redistribution andresettlement projects.

· Reserving land use quotas.

· Strengthening the representation ofwomen and indigenous persons in landnegotiations.

· Facilitating participation of excludedgroups in procedures, e.g., by allowingoral evidence in land tribunals.

Mozambique 1997 land law allows oral evidence to be used as part of land tribunals.

Rwanda 2010 nationwide land tenure regularization (LTR) program.

SERVICES

Cross-cutting services

Documentation · Ensuring that all groups have relevantdocumentation to access services.

World Bank Group–supported ID4D initiative (Botswana, Cameroon, Chad, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Ethiopia, Guinea, Kenya, Liberia, Madagascar, Morocco, Namibia, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, and Zambia).

Emergency responses to protect vulnerable groups

· Scaling up cash transfer and public worksprograms.

Multicountry responses to Ebola emergency, extreme weather events, and conflict.

Engaging communities and training governmental authorities

· Training regional and municipalgovernments in participatory budgeting.

· Requiring and enabling participation ofexcluded groups (e.g., women, pastoralistgroups) in budget consultation meetings.

Kenya Participatory budgeting in West Pokot.

South Sudan Local Governance and Service Delivery Project (LOGOSEED).

Targeted attention to historically excluded groups

· Ensuring equal rights to qualityservices.

· Prohibiting discrimination in services.

· Establishing monitoring andenforcement mechanisms.

· Making services free and compulsory.

Nigeria Federal Character Commission (FCC) oversees affirmative action, including in social services.

Ghana Inclusive Education Policy.

Uganda Persons with Disability Act 2006.

Tanzania Primary education made both free and compulsory.

Kenya Cash Transfer for Orphans and Vulnerable Children.

Table 4.1 continued

122 CHAPTER 4 TOWARD GREATER INCLUSION IN AFRICA

Domain of inclusion

Channel for intervention

Illustrative actions targeting those most likely to be left behind

Illustrative examples of policies, programs, and projects

Education Accessibility · Ensuring that educational infrastructure isaccessible to persons with disabilities.

· Adapting education systems to ensurethe inclusion of all learners, in particularthose with special educational needs,including physical accessibility of schools.

· Promoting Universal Design for Learning(UDL) and learner-friendly schoolenvironments to enhance the quality ofeducation for all learners.

Ghana Inclusive Education Policy.

Teacher training and curriculum development

· Training teachers to respond to diverseeducational needs.

· Providing teacher training in locallanguages.

· Considering bilingual education.

· Ensuring that curricula are designed in away that is sensitive to excluded groups.

Ethiopia Language-of-instruction (LOI) policy.

Ghana Inclusive Education Policy.

Guinea-Bissau and Niger Pilots of transitional bilingual programs.

SPACES

Physical Safety in public places

· Generating forums such as women’s andgirls’ clubs that provide safe spaces forsurvivors of gender-based violence andoffer access to sexual health services,legal aid, and empowerment training.

Uganda BRAC Nkingo girls’ clubs in Kemwenge and Kabarole.b

Political and social

Constitutional and legal provisions

· Explicitly acknowledging equal statusand rights of different groups in thegovernment constitution.

· Creating legal provisions toinstitutionalize equality and inclusion offormerly excluded groups.

· Establishing quota for excluded groups,e.g., in political representation.

South Africa LGBTI equality in constitution.

Mozambique and Seychelles Decriminalized same-sex relations (2015 and 2016, respectively).

Botswana 2017 Supreme Court decision requires government to legally recognize transgender people’s gender self-identification.

Namibia Courts’ decision to allow official recognition of gender change.

Bans on anti-LGBTI discrimination (Angola, Botswana, Cabo Verde, Mauritius, Mozambique, Seychelles, South Africa).

Kenya Domestic violence law.

Uganda 1995 Constitution (Art.78) stating that parliament should include a woman representative in every district as well as representatives from the army, youth, workers, persons with disabilities, and “other groups as Parliament may define.”

Changing social norms and tackling discrimination

· Building coalitions between government,civil society, the judiciary, andcommunities.

Congo, Dem. Rep. Strengthening socioeconomic reintegration opportunities for vulnerable households of ex-combatants demobilized through the PNDDR.

Table 4.1 continued

INCLUSION MATTERS IN AFRICA 123

Domain of inclusion

Channel for intervention

Illustrative actions targeting those most likely to be left behind

Illustrative examples of policies, programs, and projects

Changing social norms and tackling discrimination (continued)

· Promoting information campaigns,e.g., through national radio broadcasts,television, newspapers, and social media.

· Putting in place systems to ensureparticipation of multiple stakeholders.

· Fostering community buy-in throughongoing contact and conversation withcommunities.

· Ensuring that the law is understood by all;translation of law, rules, and proceduresinto local languages.

· Training and fostering normative changeamong state personnel (e.g., lawyers,judges, police, and security officers.

· Providing space for movements thatadvocate for excluded groups to engageon policy reform.

Burkina Faso Criminalization of FGM and measures for enforcement and normative change.

Information campaigns around HIV across the region.

Opportunities for intergroup cohesion

· Sending young citizens to live in differentregions of the country.

· Considering truth and reconciliationcommissions (TRCs) to overcome conflict.

Nigeria National Youth Service Corps (NYSC).

TRCs in The Gambia, Mauritius, Rwanda, and South Africa.

Empowerment and dignity

· Establishing cash transfers and othersocial protection programs that boostself-confidence and imbue a sense ofdignity.

· Using social media and technology toamplify voices of excluded groups.

· Promoting reproductive rights andservices.

· Enabling survivors of gender-basedviolence to report anonymously.

Kenya, Mozambique, and Zambia Cash transfer programs.

South Sudan and Tanzania “Listening to Africa” initiative.

Sahel Women Empowerment and Demographic Dividend (SWEDD).

Uganda BRAC Empowerment and Livelihood for Adolescents (ELA) program.

Community-based rehabilitation (CBR) for persons with disabilities.

Better data and analysis

· Collecting better disaggregated data onsocial groups and processes

· Promoting platforms that make datapublic

· Fostering innovations in data collection,such as high frequency data collectionthrough mobile phones

· Investing in geospatial data and otherforms of big data

· Encouraging and financing better analysis

World Bank’s Gender Innovation Lab

Listening to Africa initiative

Table 4.1 continued

Note: BRAC = Building Resources Across Communities; FGM = female genital mutilation; ID4D = Identification for Development; LGBTI = lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and intersex; PNDDR = National Program for Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration; UNDP = United Nations Development Programme; UNMIL = United Nations Mission in Liberia; WB = World Bank.

a. Burger and Jafta 2010.

b. Via the Supporting Children’s Opportunities through Protection and Empowerment Project, implemented by the Ministry of Gender, Laborand Social Development.

124 CHAPTER 4 TOWARD GREATER INCLUSION IN AFRICA

Endnotes1 From E. J. Sirleaf, 2011, “A Voice for Freedom!” Nobel Lecture, Oslo. https://www.nobelprize.

org/prizes/peace/2011/johnson_sirleaf/26166-ellen-johnson-sirleaf-nobel-lecture-2011.

2 For a discussion of active and passive exclusion, see Sen (2000).

3 Benin, Burkina Faso, the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of Congo, the Republic of Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Guinea-Bissau, Lesotho, Madagascar, Mali, Niger, São Tomé and Príncipe, the Seychelles, and South Africa do not criminalize same-sex relations.

4 See https://www.worldbank.org/en/programs/africa-gender-innovation-lab.

5 See http://www.justice.gov.za/trc for more about the South African TRC.

6 For more about NURC, see http://www.nurc.gov.rw/index.php?id=69.

CHAPTER5

INCLUSION MATTERS IN AFRICA 127

Final Reflections

Main Messages

1. Africa has seen significant progress toward social inclusion in thepast few decades, in many areas moving at a pace faster than seenglobally.

2. Some groups and areas have been left out of the progress in Africaand continue to remain at risk. Social inclusion helps us understandwho is left out, from what, in what ways, and why.

3. Social inclusion draws attention to the drivers of poverty in Africaand explains that while we need to focus on poverty, this is only astarting point to end the exclusion.

4. Structures and processes that aid and abet social exclusion oftenhave historical and cultural roots.

5. Areas that are affected by conflict and fragility stand out as havingthe poorest outcomes related to social inclusion. Conversely, peaceand security matter for social inclusion.

6. Societies incur significant costs from social exclusion. Yet, achievingsocial inclusion also has costs. Therefore, investing in social inclusionhas to be a conscious choice for states and societies.

7. With a strong social contract, social inclusion in Africa is eminentlywithin reach, as hundreds of initiatives across the continentdemonstrate.

128 CHAPTER 5 FINAL REFLECTIONS

This report identifies barriers to social inclusion and presents pathways to inclusion across countries in Africa. It defines social inclusion as the process of improving the terms for individuals and groups to take part in society. It asserts that inclusion in markets, services, and spaces is the foundation for shared prosperity (World Bank 2013). The report highlights the fact that impacts on poverty and human capital deficits can only be achieved when we identify who is likely to stay poor, how, and why. It focuses on social structures and processes, an understanding of which helps us get to the core of how exclusion plays out. Without this understanding, many of the solutions we employ to address social inclusion are likely to fail or to meet with resistance.

The Africa Region of the World Bank has developed its new regional strategy. This report contributes to the priority areas of the strategy by focusing on women’s empowerment, digital technology, fragility, and climate change, among other areas, using a social inclusion lens. The report also shows that Africa is not alone in some of the challenges of social exclusion; these issues affect all countries and regions—OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) and non-OECD. There are areas in which some of the fastest progress globally has been in African countries. Examples include reforms of laws that enable women’s participation in markets, those that enhance women’s safety and security, and laws that end the discrimination against individuals in same-sex relationships. The report also describes instances in which norms and practices that are often implicated in governmental resistance to change have been transformed. Movement toward the abolition of female genital mutilation (FGM) in Burkina Faso, and the growing de-stigmatization of persons with HIV or with disabilities are three illustrative examples of this transformation. Finally, Africa is home to some of the most powerful innovations toward social inclusion; here, M-PESA (a money transfer system operated by a cell phone provider) in Kenya and anew generation of safety net programs are instances that stand out.

The process of improving the terms for individuals and groups to take part in society

The process of improving the ability, opportunity and dignity of people disadvantaged on the basis of their identity to take part in society

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In conclusion, we reflect on what this report accomplishes:

• It places the notion of social inclusion front and center in an analysis of Africa’sachievements and the challenges the region faces in poverty reduction and humancapital formation.

• The report takes an interdisciplinary approach, using evidence from varied sourcesand bringing empirical weight to issues that are often debated through advocacy andcontestation.

• It addresses with granularity of who is left out, from what, and how. It garners andintegrates evidence on historically invisible groups such as persons with disabilities,persons with albinism, some women, refugees, migrants, LGBTI persons, certainethnic and occupational groups, persons who live in “lagging areas,” and especiallyyoung people. It further focuses on the intersectionality of social identity.

• The report is grounded in the experience of African countries, but also shows thatAfrica’s challenges in social inclusion are not unique or exceptional.

• It shows the channels through which individuals and economies incur costs of socialexclusion. The report points out that these costs may be direct or indirect, shortterm or long term. When taken cumulatively, the costs can impede the best efforts ofgovernments and societies.

• The report provides examples of the remarkable innovations that abound in Africaand of the policy and programmatic movement toward social inclusion. It shines alight on areas in which deeply entrenched social and cultural norms and practiceshave changed.

• Finally, the report asserts that social inclusion must be a conscious choice for societiesand their governments. It must be based on a clear social contract that recognizesboth the costs and benefits of policies and interventions toward social inclusion.

ANNEXES

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ANNEX 1: ENGAGING AROUND SOCIAL INCLUSION WITH WORLD BANK PARTNERS IN AFRICA

The World Bank has an ongoing dialogue about social inclusion with diverse counterparts across Africa. Governments have been particularly interested in integrating social inclusion into the design of policies and in indicators and methods that assess social inclusion impacts of policies. Perhaps the largest set of consultations took place around the Environmental and Social Framework (ESF), from general discussions on nondiscrimination to those addressing specific identity groups. Other conversations took place on policy areas that included provision of water and sanitation, services for persons with disabilities, albinism, trends in internal displacement, women’s participation in the labor market, gender-based violence, and the reintegration of ex-combatants. Some examples follow.

In 2014, the World Bank organized a week-long workshop for 44 representatives from government agencies, parliament, civil society, and academia at Lake Victoria in Uganda. This workshop had been requested following previous trainings on country social analysis (CSA) and poverty and social impact analysis (PSIA) during which social inclusion was explicitly addressed.

On End Poverty Day (EPD) in October 2017, the World Bank’s Africa Region brought together civil society organizations, academics, government officials, media, and World Bank staff from country offices across the Region for a day of discussions through an interactive video conference on mobility and social inclusion.

Water and Social Inclusion was the theme of a discussion and training session convened remotely for 36 participants from client governments and water and sanitation service providers in Kenya, Malawi, Mozambique, Zambia, and Zimbabwe in December 2017. The session was held by videoconference following a request from the World Bank’s partner governments for practical training on integrating social inclusion and gender into “water writ large.”

Finally, World Bank teams have strong partnerships with civil society, academia, and regional entities such as the AU (African Union) and the AfDB (African Development Bank), as well as with bilateral donors and other grant-making organizations. Especially following enunciation of the Leave No One Behind agenda, most of these partners have exhorted the World Bank to engage more intensively on social inclusion.

Sources: World Bank Social Development Department, 2014, “Understanding Social Inclusion: Uganda Training Note”; Gender, Social Inclusion and Water Training, 2017, Internal notes; http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/527241508179463441/Social-Inclusion-in-Africa-English.pdf; http://www.worldbank.org/en/region/afr/brief/social-inclusion-in-africa.

132 ANNEXES

ANNEX 2: SOCIAL INCLUSION IN THE WORLD BANK’S ENVIRONMENTAL AND SOCIAL FRAMEWORK

Social inclusion has a place of pride in the new World Bank Environmental and Social Framework (ESF) that has applied to World Bank Group (WBG) projects since October 2018. At the start, much was said about the step forward that the ESF represented, including specific attention to a broad range of issues, including labor, stakeholder engagement, and social inclusion. With regard to social inclusion, Environmental and Social Standards (ESS) require borrowers to pay explicit attention to both the identification of disadvantaged or vulnerable groups and the mitigation of risks and impacts to them in relation to a range of project risks and impacts and stakeholder engagement. The ESF also places obligations on World Bank staff that are detailed in the Bank Directive “Addressing Risks and Impacts on Disadvantaged or Vulnerable Individuals or Groups.” The Bank Directive requires World Bank staff to take specific steps regarding the review of the environmental and social assessment conducted by the borrower; participation in consultation activities, as appropriate; and the review of borrower information (or information the World Bank itself has gathered) on risks and impacts to these populations.

This explicit and across-the-board articulation of, and attention to, vulnerability—with responsibilities placed on both the borrower and the World Bank—integrates social inclusion more tightly into the design and implementation of investment project financing. In addition, the ESF implementation presents an opportunity for the World Bank and its borrowers to build on, and deepen, past work on social inclusion. The Bank Directive necessitates the expansion of a knowledge base, both internally and among World Bank clients, on characteristics of the disadvantaged and excluded, on the factors that contribute to exclusion within certain project contexts, and, importantly, on how social inclusion can be operationalized. Ultimately, the ESF will expand the space available for developing knowledge regarding how social inclusion can be advanced through WBG-financed projects.

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ANNEX 3: ADDRESSING GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE IN AFRICA: SNAPSHOT OF WORLD BANK ENGAGEMENT

Interventions that support behavioral and normative change are often crucial to sustain the impact of policies and programs for social inclusion. In the case of gender-based violence (GBV), for instance, severely unequal power relations between men and women, reflected in attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors that exclude women, are often deeply entrenched. Addressing these ingrained causes of GBV requires long-term engagement and an explicit focus on changing gender norms. Comparing different forms of prevention and awareness-raising activities, global evidence shows that integrated approaches that include community outreach and participatory workshops and promote reflection and debate—including with boys and men—show the most promising results.

The World Bank supports programs to counter GBV through financing, technical assistance, and research. The following illustrative projects provide financing to address GBV.

• Regional—Great Lakes Emergency Sexual and Gender-Based Violence and Women’sHealth Project in Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Rwanda and atthe International Conference of the Great Lakes Region.

• Democratic Republic of Congo—Prevention and mitigation of sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) in North and South Kivu Project, focused on testinginnovative pilot programs supporting prevention and delivery of holistic services towomen, children, and men survivors of SGBV.

• Democratic Republic of Congo—Gender-Based Violence Prevention and ResponseProject focused on the prevention of and response to GBV in 38 health zones inNorth Kivu, South Kivu, Maniema, and Tanganyika provinces.

• Somalia—Somalia Inclusive Community Resilience and GBV pilot-tested economicempowerment initiatives paired with GBV prevention and response services.

• Uganda—Strengthening Social Risk Management and Gender-Based ViolencePrevention and Response Project, a multisectoral intervention.

• Gender-based violence interventions linked to forced displacement—Under theDevelopment Response to Displacement Impacts Project (covering Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda), implementation of interventions and subprojects under thethree investment components (basic social services and economic infrastructure,environmental and natural resources management, and traditional and nontraditional livelihoods) will be gender-informed and contribute to GBV prevention and responseamong target beneficiaries of the project. Operational guidance is being developedfor Kenya that will be extended to the other countries.

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  • FRONT COVER
  • CONTENTS
  • FOREWORD
  • ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
  • ABBREVIATIONS
  • OVERVIEW
    • Main Messages
    • Why social inclusion? Why now?
    • Social inclusion: A primer
    • What does social inclusion add to the focus on poverty reduction?
    • Africa is striding: Who’s left behind?
    • How does social exclusion play out in Africa?
    • Social inclusion can be achieved if it is a conscious choice for societies
    • Change toward social inclusion is within reach
    • Endnotes
  • Chapter 1 The Motivation and Conceptual Clarity
    • What do we mean by social inclusion?
    • What does social inclusion add to poverty reduction?
    • Costs of social exclusion: What are the channels?
    • Analytic strategy and road map
    • Endnotes
  • Chapter 2 Africa Is Striding: Who’s Left Behind?
    • Demographic trends and human capital accumulation
    • Economic transitions
    • Technology and digital inclusion
    • Climate-related events and trends
    • Conflict and fragility: Challenges to social inclusion
    • Political and civic participation and social movements
    • Concluding reflections
    • Endnotes
  • Chapter 3 How Does Social Exclusion Play Out in Africa?
    • Legal, administrative, and social structures
    • Concluding reflections
    • Endnotes
  • Chapter 4 Toward Greater Inclusion in Africa
    • Who drives change, and how?
    • Programs and policies toward social inclusion: Reflections on the African experience
    • Concluding reflections
    • Endnotes
  • Chapter 5 Final Reflections
  • ANNEXES
  • REFERENCES
  • BOXES
    • Box O.1 Does Ethnicity Matter for Poverty in Africa?
    • Box O.2 Disability in Africa: The Importance of Advocacy, Data, and Analysis
    • Box O.3 The Importance of Place and Peace for Social Inclusion
    • Box O.4 Legal Reform for Women in Africa
    • Box 1.1 World Bank Regional Strategy for Africa
    • Box 2.1 Ability, Opportunity, and Dignity for African Youth
    • Box 2.2 Albinism and Human Capital Outcomes
    • Box 2.3 Ethnicity and Poverty in Rural and Urban Africa
    • Box 2.4 Areas and Peoples: North and Northeast Kenya
    • Box 2.5 Urban Floods: Disproportionate Effects
    • Box 4.1 Talking About Change: Stigma and Discrimination
    • Box 4.2 Talking About Change: Female Genital Mutilation
    • Box 4.3 Participatory Budgeting in West Pokot, Kenya
    • Box 4.4 Legal Reform for Women in Africa
    • Box 4.5 In the Sahel: A Focus on Young Women
    • Box 4.6 Reintegration for Ex-Combatants
    • Box 4.7 Building Infrastructure Doesn’t Mean It Will Be Used
  • TABLES
    • Table O.1 Illustrative Interventions for Social Inclusion in Markets, Services, and Spaces
    • Table 1.1 Costs of Social Exclusion: Mapping Some Channels
    • Table 4.1 Illustrative Interventions for Social Inclusion in Markets, Services, and Spaces
  • FIGURES
    • Figure O.1 The Social Inclusion Framework
    • Figure O.2 Growth of Global Urbanization, 1950–2050
    • Figure O.3 Smartphone Usage by Age, Gender, and Income Level
    • Figure O.4 Perceptions of Unequal Treatment under the Law
    • Figure B O.4.1 Improvement in the Women, Business and the Law Index, 2009–2018
    • Figure 1.1 The Social Inclusion Framework
    • Figure 1.2 Identity Is Salient to Social Inclusion
    • Figure 2.1 Fertility Decline across the Globe
    • Figure 2.2 Female and Male Literacy Rates, Ages 15 and Above
    • Figure 2.3 Poverty Rates in Fragile and Nonfragile Countries
    • Figure 2.4 Distribution of Ethnic Groups in Bottom Wealth Quintile
    • Figure 2.5 Depth of Food Deficit
    • Figure 2.6 Top Problems Facing Countries across Africa
    • Figure 2.7 Smartphone Usage by Gender, Age, Education, and Income
    • Figure 2.8 The Coming of the Urban Age, 1950–2050
    • Figure 2.9 Access to Electricity and Water Services
    • Figure 2.10 Forcibly Displaced Persons, 2012–2017
    • Figure 2.11 Forcibly Displaced Africans, 2012–2017
    • Figure 2.12 Civic Engagement among 18- to 35-Year-Olds in 16 Countries, 2002–2015
    • Figure 3.1 Laws and Policies (I)
    • Figure 3.2 Laws and Policies (II)
    • Figure 3.3 Groups Reporting Avoidance of Health Care due to Stigma and Discrimination around HIV Treatment, 2014–2017
    • Figure 3.4 Women’s Acceptance of Domestic Violence
    • Figure 3.5 Attitudes toward Sexual Minorities and People of a Different Religion
    • Figure 3.6 Attitudes toward Different Languages and Immigrants or Foreign Workers
    • Figure 3.7 Attitudes toward Female and Male University Education and Female Tertiary Enrollment
    • Figure 3.8 Salience of National versus Ethnic Identity and Feelings of Belonging
    • Figure 3.9 Perceptions of Unequal Treatment under the Law
    • Figure 3.10 Hope and Optimism around the Globe
    • Figure 3.11 Burkinabe Economy
    • Figure B4.1.1 Stigma and Discrimination in Eastern and Southern Africa, 2000–2016
    • Figure B4.2.1 Female Genital Mutilation in Burkina Faso, 1998–2015
    • Figure B4.2.2 Prevalence of Female Genital Mutilation in Eight African Countries
    • Figure B4.4.1 Improvement in the Women, Business and the Law Index, 2009–2018
    • Figure 4.1 Social Safety Net Programs in Africa

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    6. Frоm there, the payment sectіоns wіll shоw, fоllоw the guіded payment prоcess, and yоur оrder wіll be avaіlable fоr оur wrіtіng team tо wоrk оn іt.

    Nоte, оnce lоgged іntо yоur accоunt; yоu can clіck оn the “Pendіng” buttоn at the left sіdebar tо navіgate, make changes, make payments, add іnstructіоns оr uplоad fіles fоr the оrder created. e.g., оnce lоgged іn, clіck оn “Pendіng” and a “pay” оptіоn wіll appear оn the far rіght оf the оrder yоu created, clіck оn pay then clіck оn the “Checkоut” оptіоn at the next page that appears, and yоu wіll be able tо cоmplete the payment.

    Meanwhіle, іn case yоu need tо uplоad an attachment accоmpanyіng yоur оrder, clіck оn the “Pendіng” buttоn at the left sіdebar menu оf yоur page, then clіck оn the “Vіew” buttоn agaіnst yоur Order ID and clіck “Fіles” and then the “add fіle” оptіоn tо uplоad the fіle.

    Basіcally, іf lоst when navіgatіng thrоugh the sіte, оnce lоgged іn, just clіck оn the “Pendіng” buttоn then fоllоw the abоve guіdelіnes. оtherwіse, cоntact suppоrt thrоugh оur chat at the bоttоm rіght cоrner

    NB

    Payment Prоcess

    By clіckіng ‘PRОCEED TО CHECKОUT’ yоu wіll be lоgged іn tо yоur accоunt autоmatіcally where yоu can vіew yоur оrder detaіls. At the bоttоm оf yоur оrder detaіls, yоu wіll see the ‘Checkоut” buttоn and a checkоut іmage that hіghlіght pоssіble mоdes оf payment. Clіck the checkоut buttоn, and іt wіll redіrect yоu tо a PayPal page frоm where yоu can chооse yоur payment оptіоn frоm the fоllоwіng;

    1. Pay wіth my PayPal accоunt‘– select thіs оptіоn іf yоu have a PayPal accоunt.
    2. Pay wіth a debіt оr credіt card’ or ‘Guest Checkout’ – select thіs оptіоn tо pay usіng yоur debіt оr credіt card іf yоu dоn’t have a PayPal accоunt.
    3. Dо nоt fоrget tо make payment sо that the оrder can be vіsіble tо оur experts/tutоrs/wrіters.

    Regards,

    Custоmer Suppоrt

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